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
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ANALYSES OF THE SOVIET, CHINESE,
AND U.S. CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCES:
INTERIM TECHNICAL REPORT

Sponsored by:
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency



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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

This volume reports the progress of CACI's research dealing with the outcomes of recent (1966-1978) Soviet and U.S. crises. It is part of a project sponsored by the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA/CTO) as part of its Crisis Management Program. This chapter reviews the DARPA/CTO Crisis Management Program and CACI's previous research within it, summarizes CACI's FY79 contributions to this Program, and outlines the remainder of the volume.¹

THE DARPA CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Four of the major classes of products that have been produced within the DARPA Crisis Management Program are:

- Computer-based decision aids that can be employed in national and major command-level operations centers during crisis management activities to provide better crisis indications and warning.
- Databases on the changing character of U.S. and Soviet crisis management operations including crisis characteristics, the actions that the two superpowers have employed in these incidents, the objectives they have pursued, and the crisis management problems encountered.

¹ This volume deals solely with CACI's research involving the crisis behaviors of the Soviet Union and the United States. A companion summary report (CACI, 1979) presents the results of CACI's FY79 research dealing with the crises of concern to the People's Republic of China since its foundation in 1949.

- New quantitative methods for crisis advance warning, monitoring, and management.
- Reports summarizing:
 - U.S. and Soviet crisis management activities and concerns from 1946 through 1976,
 - The typical problems encountered in crisis management,
 - Current opportunities for improving crisis management techniques and decision-making, and
 - Research gaps in planning for better national security crisis management.

Wide-ranging research has been directed toward each of these areas by DARPA since 1974. Initial work through 1976 was directed toward certain basic research themes prerequisite to effective social science technology development. Characteristic of this type of research were CACI's attempts to inventory past U.S. crises (CACI, 1975) and to identify the major patterns of problems encountered in past U.S. crises (CACI, 1976).

By 1976, however, a corner had been turned in the research needs for crisis management. Significant new information had been developed directly applicable to producing user-oriented, computer-based aids to:

- Assist defense operations centers in identifying what indicator and warning patterns signal the onset of a crisis, and
- Develop option generation and evaluation aids to assist crisis managers after the crisis has begun.

CACI'S ROLE IN THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

CACI's efforts within the Crisis Management Program contribute to four classes of research products:

- Computer-based decision aids applicable to national and major command centers during crisis management activities.

- Databases on the changing nature of crises, problems likely to be encountered, the types of objectives sought, actions taken, and the results achieved.
- New quantitative methods for analyzing U.S. and foreign crisis experiences.
- Substantive reports summarizing the problems of crisis management, opportunities for improving crisis management techniques and decision-making, and research gaps in the field of planning for better national security crisis management.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among these various classes of products in DARPA's Crisis Management Program. CACI's initial attempts to reconceptualize crises and develop an inventory of U.S. crises began in FY75 (CACI, 1975). These efforts were continued and expanded during FY76 in CACI's major assessment of the background characteristics and problems encountered in a sample of U.S. crises between 1946 and 1975 (CACI, 1976).

Analysis during FY76 indicated four major directions for additional research. First, one tangent of the research (Shaw, et al., 1976) identified terrorist-induced crises as a growing area of concern. Subsequent analyses have identified research and development gaps in this area (CACI, 1977a). Second, a need was identified to reduce crisis management problems by determining the most effective set of actions for different crisis contexts and policy objectives. Accordingly, CACI's efforts during early FY77 focused on examining the relationships between U.S. crisis actions and policy objectives and developing a prototype computer-aiding system for crisis managers that incorporates these empirical relationships (CACI, 1977b). During FY78 this prototype system was developed into CACI's executive aid for crisis managers (CACI, 1978a). The executive aid provides national security planners with ready access to data concerning U.S. crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and




Figure 1. Selected CACI Crisis Management Program Research Efforts

problems over the span 1946-1976. The design characteristics of this aiding system (described in CACI, 1978b) allow planners to have ready access to these data in the course of searching for precedents when planning for ongoing or anticipated crises.

During FY78, significant research progress was made on two fronts. The Crisis Problem Analyzer project (CACI, 1978c, 1978d) expanded the database of cases coded for U.S. crisis management problems to 101 crises. This provided a richer set of precedents for crisis planners. Taking advantage of the more reliable statistical base provided by the expanded dataset, CACI analyses focused on the relationships between the characteristics of the crisis events and the types of crisis management problems most often encountered by U.S. decision-makers. A new executive aid module was developed that allowed users to examine the historical associations between types of crises (defined in terms of user-specified sets of descriptive attributes) and crisis management problems.

Crisis management is not a game of solitaire. Accordingly, the second thrust of CACI's Crisis Management Program-sponsored research during FY78 (CACI, 1978e, 1978f) focused on the Soviet Union's crisis management experience, 1946-1975. In this research Soviet sources were used to identify the political-military crisis events that were of concern to the Soviet leadership during the postwar period. Using a combination of Soviet and Western sources, the basic characteristics of 386 crisis events were coded; crisis problems, actions, and apparent objectives were coded for a sample of 101 crises. Analyses of these data revealed trends and patterns in Soviet crisis concerns and behaviors. Incorporation of these data into executive aid programs comparable to those previously produced for the U.S. allowed U.S. planners and decision-makers to have access to these data as inputs into their assessments of likely Soviet responses to crisis situations.

As shown in Figure 1, during FY79, CACI's Crisis Management Program research involves several related tasks:

- Updating the U.S. and Soviet databases through 1978, to provide planners with up-to-date information.
- Analysis of U.S. and Soviet crisis outcomes (1966-1978), focusing on outcomes defined in terms of goal achievement.
- Development of the executive aids for crisis managers into the aiding system, including incorporation of the results of the other research thrusts being conducted during the fiscal year.
- Analysis of Chinese crises and their characteristics from the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949 through FY78.

This volume, which reports research in progress, focuses on the second task, which makes up the core of the research; the first task largely feeds into it and the third largely follows from it. Analyses of Chinese crises and their characteristics are presented in CACI, (1979).

OUTLINE

Chapter 2 presents the methodology employed to measure and evaluate the outcomes of recent (1966-1978) Soviet and American crises. The arguments presented in this section, notably the technical approach of defining outcomes in terms of goal achievement, set the limits of the remainder of the report. Chapter 3 presents U.S. political-military policy goals. Chapter 4 presents Soviet policy goals. Chapter 5 outlines the remainder of the project, and Chapter 6 introduces the appendices for coding U.S. and Soviet crisis outcomes.

Appendix A and Appendix B present what is in many ways the core of the first phase of the research: the codebooks employed to assess the outcomes of Soviet and U.S. crisis operations and concerns. Each outcome measure presented has a counterpart discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 (the considerations of national goals).

CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets forth the research methodology employed to identify and assess the outcomes of recent U.S. and Soviet crises (1966-1978). The remaining sections of this volume, and of this component of the project, are direct reflections of this research strategy.

It is not surprising that most crisis research to date (as shown in the review of Parker, 1976) has focused on the characteristics of crisis situations and the processes by which nations engage in crisis management (for example, actions undertaken and problems encountered). Moving from the objective attributes of crises to an assessment of their outcomes introduces a range of analytical questions that are intrinsically much more difficult. The assessment of crisis outcomes involves much more than simply determining if nations achieved one or a limited set of goals in a single crisis. Nations pursue a multiplicity of short-and long-term goals in crises. Only a fraction of these aims are represented in their goals in any single incident. At the same time, the outcome of a crisis can affect a wide variety of national goals and interests, over both the long- and short-term, including interests that might not have been regarded as being at stake during the opening crisis phase. A final difficulty is that it is never easy to identify organizational goals, much less assess their achievement, when dealing with very complex organizations such as the policy apparatuses of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Despite the obvious difficulties posed by the question of crisis outcomes, it is important to assess them in an objective and systematic manner. Without rigorous outcome assessments it is impossible to move beyond descriptive analyses of crisis situations, actions, and problems to determine what types of actions are more or less efficacious in particular contexts.

Outcome assessments are prerequisites for the development of more effective types of crisis management.¹

The three sections of this chapter develop the research strategy used to assess the outcomes of recent Soviet and U.S. crises. This strategy emphasizes the assessment of outcomes in terms of goal achievement (or nonachievement).

The first section provides a base for some of the most distinctive aspects of the methodology (for example, the emphasis on goal-related outcomes and the employment of a fairly complex ensemble of potentially relevant goals for each superpower) by reviewing previous attempts to evaluate nations' policy performances. The review focuses upon national policy performances rather than upon the more directly focused topic of policy performance during crises because of the relative paucity of systematic, data-based analyses dealing with the more narrowly defined issue. There are some striking convergences in the recent literature that cut across what would otherwise appear to be divergent bodies of research. These convergences in some of the best recent political science and international studies research are incorporated in the research strategy employed in this project for the assessment of crisis outcomes. This portion of the presentation helps to delineate the nature of the analytical problem being addressed and show why the alternative strategy of using a smaller number of easier to measure, nonjudgmental variables is not the most effective research strategy.

The second section identifies some of the more general conceptual and methodological questions involved in any attempt to assess the outcomes of superpower crises for instance: What roles do goals play? How can differences between Soviet and U.S. perspectives be accommodated? What credence can be attached to open source materials?

¹ Additionally, knowledge of outcome assessments will inform our understanding of the more "objective" aspects of crises: their characteristics, problems, actions, etc. Better knowledge of each part of a crisis enhances our understanding of the whole.

The final section builds directly on the preceding two to present the research strategy adopted for the assessment of Soviet and American crisis outcomes over the period 1966-1978.

ASSESSMENTS OF NATIONS' POLICY PERFORMANCE

Recent attempts to evaluate nations' policy performances share two features: emphases on goals as an essential element in any evaluation and on the complexity of the performance outcomes assessed. This stress on goals and complex outcomes holds both for attempts to formally evaluate national policy performances as well as for attempts that have been made to develop more realistic models of national policy processes that incorporate goal achievement outcomes into their explanatory schemes. Prominent examples of these emphases include research on artificial intelligence as applied to international relations (Bennett and Alker, 1977); attempts to apply cognitive mapping techniques to interpret the perceptual processes of national decision-makers and analysts (Axelrod, 1976; Bonham, Shapiro, and Trumble, 1979); analyses of the psychological process that go into outcome evaluation assessments (Mlotek and Rosen, 1974); and attempts to develop and apply formal evaluation schemes for the assessment of conflict situations (Butterworth, 1978; Dowty, 1974; Hannah, 1972; Holsti, 1966).²

Artificial Intelligence Models of International Relations

Emphasis on goals and complexity are two of the hallmarks of the artificial intelligence modeling approach to the analysis of international relations and national decision processes (Bennett and Alker, 1977, is a good recent example of this approach). The cybernetic approach to analysis found in the artificial intelligence literature is, in part, a

² Only representative examples of each of the tendencies in the literature are cited here or examined below.

response to the limitations of other approaches to modeling inter- and intrastate policy processes that, while capable of representing unchanging policies, do not allow the entities modeled to engage in such elementary processes as learning and adaptation.

One way in which artificial intelligence approaches incorporate adaptive behaviors into their models of national decision-making processes is by defining these processes in the terms set by the formal theory of organizations (for example, Cyert and March, 1963). In this theory, a nation/organization attempting to solve a problem/achieve a goal is postulated to engage in a number of basic processes:

- Quasiresolution of conflicts: large complex issues are subdivided into smaller problems, and each of these smaller problems is assigned to a subcomponent of the organization specializing in that type of issue, much as national policy bureaucracies are subdivided into functional and regional subsections.
- Uncertainty avoidance: decision rules are employed that stress short-run feedback and avoid attempts to predict other actors' behaviors.
- Problemistic search: solutions are sought only when problems are brought to the organization's attention; an attempt is made to find solutions as similar as possible to those used in the recent past.
- Organizational learning: goals, rules used to guide perception, and the types of solutions chosen are altered as a function of experience.

In the actual practice of modeling, these elements are incorporated in precedent-based models. A simplified representation of how such a model operates is:

- A policy problem or opportunity is identified, using a set of rules that identify problems and opportunities in the modeled nation's environment.

- Using previously set criteria, the central aspects of the problem are identified, including the goal or goals whose achievement is affected.
- Based on the specification of the problem situations' elements and the relevant goals, the organization's history is searched to identify previously successful strategies (What actions achieved these goals in similar circumstances?).
- Action is then taken and the results of the action, in terms of an outcome in which goals are achieved or not achieved, are recorded.
- The outcome of the actions then serves as feedback, which modifies the probability that that particular mix of actions will be selected to achieve the same set of goals in similar types of situations in the future.

Even in this very simplified representation, it is evident that this approach to modeling is far more complex than many of the more common multiple regression-based procedures that estimate one unchanging set of parameters to account for an organization/nation's behaviors over a broad range of situations and goals. It is also apparent that goals, and goal achievement, play a central role in this process.

Over the next decade, artificial intelligence approaches to modeling nations' policy performances are likely to become increasingly common for two reasons. The first is the intrinsic reasonableness of the modeling assumptions employed, which stand out even in the brief sketch given above. Put simply, it is reasonable to assume that national leaders draw upon precedents in their definition of problems and selection of actions to achieve goals (May, 1973) and that these leaders modify their actions, at least in part, as a function of their success or failure in achieving goals in specific types of situations. Because they are capable of capturing these types of adaptive behaviors, artificial intelligence models are especially suited for the analysis of policy outcomes. Second, experience to date suggests that such models do a fairly good job of reproducing the performance of nations (Bennett and Alker's (1973) analysis

of the Latin American nations involved in the 19th century War of the Pacific is, once again, a case in point).³

Cognitive Mapping

The cognitive mapping approach to the analysis of decision-making shares with artificial intelligence modeling an emphasis on goals and complexity as central elements in the explanation of national policy performances. Cognitive mapping (Axelrod, 1976) is based on a set of fairly simple assumptions:

- National policies are selected and implemented by leaders.
- Like all other people, leaders act on the basis of perceptions, assumptions, and objectives.
- Leaders' belief systems encompass immediate and longer-term policy objectives, beliefs concerning events in the international environment, and policy options (alternative courses of actions).
- In order to produce consistent policies, leaders' belief systems have linkages. Cognitive maps attempt to elucidate these linkages to show how leaders relate events to policy alternatives and goals.

In research conducted to date, leaders' cognitive maps have been identified in two ways: documentary analysis (for example, Axelrod's (1976) analysis of British decision-makers' discussions of the Persian question following the First World War) or through open-ended interviews (for example, Bonham, Shapiro, and Trumble's (1979) interviews with U.S. Middle Eastern policy advisors on the National Security Council, and within the Departments of Defense and State).

³ The current limitations on the use of these techniques are in large part technical -- there is no SPSS for the AI community. Validation problems posed by the sheer complexity of the models are another limitation.

For our present purposes, three findings from this body of research are of particular relevance. The first is that when applied in practice, the procedures of cognitive mapping appear to work on a wide variety of leaders and problem situations. The cognitive maps produced provide plausible reconstructions for the mixes of actions selected by leaders.

A second point, exemplified in the research of Bonham, Shapiro, and Trumble (1979) on the impact of the 1973 Middle East war on the belief systems of U.S. policy analysts, is that belief systems tend to be resilient. As might be expected, given cognitive psychology (cf. the review of Steinbrunner, 1974), planners tend not to make major alterations in their world-views, even in response to seemingly dramatic events. This suggests that leaders' goals may have considerable stability over reasonably short periods of time, such as the 13 year horizon involved in the present project's assessment of national goals and crisis outcomes.

Finally, analysis to date suggests that planners and leaders have extremely complex belief systems. Instead of having "neat" belief systems with strong hierarchical structures, in many instances their conceptual systems have a proliferation of elements with many elements lacking strong perceived interconnections, (for example, Axelrod, 1976). This is not a surprising finding. It is, for example, consistent with Cyret and March's (1963) concept of quasiresolution of conflicts presented in the preceding review of artificial intelligence models, in that problems (belief system elements) are highly decomposed. It does, however, suggest that any realistic picture of a national leaderships' ensemble of goals is likely to contain a relatively large number of elements (goals) with few interconnections among them and that the elements (goals) of relevance are likely to vary widely across crises.

Analysis of the Psychological Process of Performance Evaluation

Mlotek and Rosen (1974) have produced a highly innovative analysis of the psychological factors that enter into assessments of national policies.

While their subjects were undergraduate college students rather than national leaders, their results provide some of the best insights available concerning the dynamics of the assessment process.

Mlotek and Rosen were concerned with students' assessment of the costs of the Vietnam war. Cost-tolerance (the dependent variable) was computed as the summed total of subjects' scores on five scales assessing cost-tolerance in terms of the cost of the war to the nation in money; combat deaths; policy costs (unpopular stances in the United Nations that lose international support for the U.S., and so forth); costs to each individual in terms of additional taxes, inflation, and wage controls; and costs in terms of personal commitment (being drafted and sent to Vietnam, and so forth).

Three independent variables were employed. An evaluation dimension dealt with attitudes pertaining to the Saigon regime, the Vietcong, the rationale for U.S. involvement in the war, American national interests, and other salient aspects of the conflict situation. A cost dimension addressed both the real and opportunity costs of the involvement, once again as expressed in subjects' responses to attitude survey questions. The final dimension concerned expectations of policy outcomes and the subjects' evaluations of the likelihood of a U.S. victory in the conflict.

These three predictors -- evaluations, costs, and expectations of policy outcomes -- were related to cost-tolerance assessments in two ways. The first was a standard multiple regression equation, in which the three accounted for 30 percent of the variance in cost-tolerance. The second was a more complex equation in which the three predictors were combined in a utility calculation ((evaluations x expected outcomes) - costs). When regressed on the utility score produced by this formula, 58 percent of the variance in cost-tolerance could be accounted for.

The importance of Mlotek and Rosen's research for present purposes concerns less the actual beliefs of American undergraduates in 1971 as the

general processes involved in the evaluation of policy outcomes. What stands out in their analysis is the complexity of the students' assessments of the Vietnam war. No fewer than five cost-tolerance dimensions and three dimensions of predictors were identified and differentiated. Moreover, the three predictor factors were best related to the criterion of cost-tolerance when combined in a utility formula rather than when treated independently. When students dealing with a classroom problem deal with policy performances in such a complex manner, one can begin to gain some insights into the even greater levels of complexity that are likely to be involved in the deliberations of national leaders and planners faced with a multiplicity of complex issues.

Formal Evaluation Schemes for the Assessment of Conflict Outcomes

There have been three major recent attempts to analyze the outcomes of international conflicts:

- Holsti's (1966) pioneering investigation of the resolution of conflicts from 1919-1965,
- Dowty's (1974) study of the efficacy of great power guarantees in peace settlements since 1815, and
- Butterworth's (1978) analysis of the post-World War II experience of five international organizations in the management of international disputes.

Since these studies include crises, along with wars and other types of interstate conflicts within their analyses, they provide some of the best methodological guidance available for the present attempt to evaluate the outcomes of recent Soviet and American crises.

The first study in the series (Holsti, 1966) in many ways exemplifies the major methodological attributes of the set. In his analysis, Holsti was concerned with a very narrow type of outcome: the ways in which international conflicts involving the threat or use of force ended since 1919.

Six categories of conflict outcomes were developed and differentiated by Holsti in his theoretical argument:

- Avoidance: voluntary withdrawal by one or more parties from the bargaining/conflict situation,
- Conquest: victory through decisive use of force,
- Submission-Withdrawal: one party yields to another's threats,
- Compromise: both sides to the dispute agree to a partial withdrawal of their initial objectives, positions, demands, or actions,
- Award: use of third parties to arbitrate or adjudicate the conflict, and
- Passive Settlement: while there is no immediate resolution to the conflict, over time the parties attribute at least partial legitimacy to the status quo.

These categories proved sufficiently robust to support Holsti's analysis of the types of settlement procedures used in the set of conflicts analyzed and also served in the same role in Hannah's (1972) analysis of war termination from 1914-1965.

The most striking aspect of these categories for our immediate purposes is that they require the use of judgment. The distinction between avoidance and submission, for example, depends largely on a coder's assessment of contextual information about the dispute and the actions and reactions of the parties involved in the conflict. This employment of judgmental variables is even more striking when we recall that Holsti is dealing with (quite appropriately for his purposes) a very narrowly defined outcome likely to occupy only a fraction of the space defined by the crisis-related goals of either the United States or the Soviet Union.

A similar emphasis on the use of judgmental variables is present in Dowty's analysis of the effectiveness of great power guarantees and in

in Butterworth's (1978) investigation of the crisis management functions of international organizations. The latter incorporates such judgmental factors as the likelihood that a conflict would have abated within three years without any external intervention and the likelihood of the disappearance or spread of a conflict had international organizations not become involved.

GENERAL CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES

Like all other organizations of sufficient interest to warrant serious analysis, national policy bureaucracies are complex.⁴ This complexity raises a number of issues that need to be resolved to develop reliable and valid assessments of policy outcomes, such as the superpower crisis outcomes that are the object of the present project. This section briefly presents some of the more significant problems. In most instances, the solutions to these problems are deferred until the next section, which presents the project's research strategy. For convenience, the conceptual and methodological questions are grouped under two headings: problems that follow from the character of national policy apparatuses as complex organizations, and those posed by the bureaucratic politics paradigm and potential value bias.

Complex Organizational Processes

The major analytical problems falling within this category concern the two different "directions" in which the policy apparatuses of the United States and Soviet Union constantly face, the variegated sets of goals sought by both nations, and the interdependencies between goals and outcomes.

⁴ The discussion in this section, particularly the components dealing with complex organizations, are derived in large part from the arguments presented by Mohr (1973), Simon (e.g., 1969) and Cyert and March (1963).

Following Mohr (1973), an argument can be made that any organization always faces in two "directions." At the same time it is seeking to have an impact on the external environment while seeking to maintain and increase its own capacity to affect external events in the future. This dual orientation has some significant implications for any assessment of the external policies of nations. In many instances, major defense and international policy goals are likely to be at least partially instrumental in character. Nations seek to acquire and retain foreign bases, for example, because of the instrumental value these bases might serve in affecting events abroad rather than for their own intrinsic value (viewed in and of themselves, bases are often as much of a liability as an asset). Similar arguments could be made for a wide variety of other external policy goals pursued by both superpowers. In the ongoing course of policy, many "outcomes" are both ends in themselves and the means for achieving future ends.

Recognition of this dual orientation has some direct implications for any attempt to catalog and assess policy outcomes. Given the Janus-faced character of superpower policy, it is necessary to develop a set of crisis outcomes that denotes various stages on the chain of ends and means. In some cases the most important "outcomes" of a crisis (in the eyes of the evaluating superpower) may lie outside of the immediate crisis theater. Indeed, in some cases the most significant outcomes may be internal to the superpower itself. For example, Jones (1975) has argued that one of the major factors inhibiting large scale commitments of Soviet forces in distant conflicts is the Soviet leadership's fear of the domestic political repercussions that might follow from an unpopular foreign involvement. In their writings, the Soviets have been quick to point out such repercussions of French involvement in Algeria and U.S. involvement in Vietnam, presenting analogies that are not likely to be missed by astute readers (CACI, 1978e).

The second aspect of the complexity of organizational processes within both the United States and the Soviet Union that raises difficulties for

analysis is the sheer range of interests pursued by both actors. One illustration of this range is provided by Blechman and Holt (1971) who, relying on only one State Department publication, were able to differentiate almost 50 distinct, operationally measurable aspects of U.S. "interests" abroad. Each of these goals could readily be subdivided using additional functional or regional criteria. There is no reason to expect that Soviet goal structures will be any less complex. Indeed, at least in the realm of ideological goals and interests, the Soviet structure is likely to be more involved than that of the United States.

Once again the analytical implications of this type of complexity are fairly direct. Any realistic assessment of crisis outcomes in terms of goals needs to include a broad sampling of those superpower interests that might be involved in a crisis.

The third factor that needs to be considered is the interdependency between goals and outcomes. As Mohr contends (1973), along with intent, outcome is one of the essential elements involved in organizational goals. Outcomes have an obvious relationship, bordering on tautological, to goals in any assessment of an organization's goal structure and performance.

Less immediately obvious, but essential for later purposes, is the other side of interdependency. Just as goals are obviously related to outcomes, so are outcomes (including crisis outcomes) dependent upon goals. Any attempt to develop performance assessments for nations not taking this linkage into account would be critically flawed since it would, in effect, be evaluating a nation's achievement of an outcome where that outcome/goal set might not have been involved, as least from the vantage point of the nation being assessed.

The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Problem of Value Bias

The analytical problems posed by the bureaucratic politics paradigm and the problem of value bias can be posed succinctly, leaving their resolution

to the next section. In the case of the bureaucratic politics paradigm (elaborated in Allison and Halperin, 1972) the difficulty has to do with the salience, particularly to policy audiences who spend a good deal of their day to day existences involved in bureaucratic politics, of an explanatory model of national policy that places primary emphasis upon the interplay of bureaucratic interests and actors as the determinants of national policy. This model of the policy process stands in direct opposition to the "unitary rational actor model" of policy, in which decision-makers have a high degree of latitude to specify and adjust goals and actions. Given that this project's methodology focuses on goals, a purposeful form of behavior that fits most naturally (at least at first glance) into the unitary rational actor model, the problem posed by the bureaucratic policies paradigm is fairly obvious.

The problem of value bias (Hendricks, 1976) in the identification and assessment of crisis outcomes is both simple and difficult to overcome. Its simplest component is the evaluation of outcomes themselves. It is by no means difficult to avoid drawing normative conclusions in the course of such evaluations; one can simply focus on the state of affairs as it exists, postcrisis. More difficult problems to overcome pertain to the selection of outcomes to measure and the selection of indices for these outcomes. Given the wide variety of outcomes that could be assessed, and the existence of multiple (and not necessarily congruent) indicators for each, it is apparent that bias could easily creep into the analysis in the form of selective attention to a limited range of outcomes and outcome measures.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This section outlines the research design employed to identify and evaluate the outcomes of recent Soviet and American crises. Some of the major components of this design are developed in succeeding chapters and appendices, with Chapters 3 and 4 presenting the rationales for the sets of

goals/outcomes selected for the United States and the Soviet Union and Appendices A and B providing a detailed codebook for each of the outcome variables. The argument in this section is divided into two parts. The first focuses on the advantages of a goal-based approach to the assessment of crisis outcomes. The second presents the research design and the key assumptions that figure in it.

The Advantages of a Goal-Based Approach to the Assessment of Outcomes

In this project the outcomes of superpower crises from 1966 through 1978 are assessed in terms of goal achievement -- the extent to which either the United States or the Soviet Union satisfied those of their self-defined national interests involved in each of the incidents.

Policy goals were identified by examining primary source materials. In the case of the United States, the sources consulted included the records of Presidential press conferences, Presidential papers and memoirs, and publications issued by the Departments of State and Defense.⁵ For the Soviets, Soviet Party Congress materials, books published by the Soviets dealing with international affairs, and statements in the Soviet press were employed (Chapters 3 and 4 present both the U.S. and Soviet sources in greater detail).⁶

In the course of reviewing these materials, a very deliberate attempt was made to outline the major dimensions of external policy bearing on national security interests, as presented in the writings of both superpowers. Essentially, an attempt was made to identify all of the major

⁵ In addition, some of the standard American foreign and defense policy textbooks were also reviewed, for example, Spanier (1977). These texts are often very close in orientation to national policy and have the advantage of presenting detailed depictions of some of the goals, as is shown in the discussions in Chapter 3.

⁶ In a few policy arenas, where the Soviets are notoriously reticent concerning their actions and objectives, supplementary Western materials were also used, as is detailed in Chapter 4.

external policy goals that occurred with some frequency in the sources reviewed and might be affected by international political-military crises. In many cases the source materials also suggested the appropriate indices to assess the achievement of the goals. Reflecting the structure of policy in both nations, both functional (for example, ideological, economic, military) and regional goals were identified for both superpowers. Consistent with the complex character of superpowers' self-defined national interests, the goals included some instrumental aims (for example, certain access and military capability variables) in addition to goals whose outcomes are most appropriately assessed in terms of events occurring in foreign nations (for example, the survival of friendly regimes and parties).

The use of a broad ensemble of Soviet and U.S. goals has a number of advantages. The first is that it helps to locate the crisis management activities and concerns of the superpowers within the broader ranges of Soviet and American policy and interests. Crises, while important, are only a part of the picture; the more general goals of the two superpowers cut across all aspects of it.

Second, the use of a broad range of goals derived from each nation's public statements answers the obvious question of why some outcomes are assessed in preference to others in the course of developing performance assessments for Soviet and U.S. crises. The value bias problems that would arise if researchers' judgments, rather than the statements of national leaders, were used to specify outcomes, are avoided in this manner. Naturally, one can question whether either superpowers' leadership is completely forthright in its statements concerning its goals and objectives. Without attempting to settle this question in any final sense, we think the answer to the question is a qualified yes. Both superpowers are aware of the importance of public communications, particularly in crisis management (CACI, 1978e). While neither is likely to say everything that is of concern to it, we believe that it is reasonable to

assume that the core self-defined interests of each state are communicated through the media we have examined. Public signals of the type examined in this project have significance and import simply by virtue of being public statements concerning self-defined national interests.⁷

Focusing on a broad range of goals, any one of which might be involved in any given crisis, rather than upon a narrower range of interests, also has a number of analytical advantages. Most obviously, it allows us to keep "score" from the perspective of the relevant superpower. This is done by assessing the relevance of each goal in a particular crisis and evaluating outcomes only for those aims relevant in that specific incident. By doing this, the outcome assessments match the actual range of superpower concerns during the incidents instead of evaluating the outcomes in terms of the set chosen by an outside observer.

By the same token, the initial determination of the relevance of each goal (and attendant outcome assessments for that aim) provides valuable information concerning the ways in which different types of superpower interests vary across crises and various categories of crises. At the same time, the inclusion of important values that may not be frequently challenged during recent crises serves an important role by presenting an opportunity for the identification of low threshold threats to those values. Finally, a goal-oriented approach lends itself to subsequent aggregation and disaggregation in analysis (for example, by combining outcomes in given functional categories such as military-economic national security interests).

In the data collection phase of this project, two types of crisis outcomes are examined, crisis-specific and general. Consistent with the preceding arguments, most of the data generation effort is focused on the crisis-specific outcomes based on the ensembles of superpower goals identified

⁷ The Soviets are particularly constrained in this regard, as they attempt to "sell" their "line" to a host of foreign Marxist-Leninist parties and movements.

in Chapters 3 and 4. These are termed crisis-specific outcomes because the subset of situationally relevant superpower goals varies radically across crises. Because they concern complex policy outcomes, these variables are assessed judgmentally.⁸ Because of the importance of these judgments, unusual care is taken in the codebooks (Appendices A and B) to show how these judgments are generated. The codebook entry for each crisis specific outcome moves from general to particular, beginning with a generalized statement of the superpower goal the performance of which the outcome indexes. Next follows a set of measures or indices consulted in the course of assessing the outcome, followed, at the most specific level, with the outcome assessment scale that is used to code the variable. As a reflection of the primary source materials used to identify the goals, and in order to capture some of the "flavor" of each superpower's self-defined interests, each crisis-specific goal is discussed from the perspective of the superpower holding it.

In addition to the crisis-specific goals/outcomes, which are the most important part of the data collection effort, modest amounts of effort are devoted to the collection of general crisis outcomes coded for all crises, irrespective of their relevance to crisis-specific superpower goals. These general crisis outcomes provide benchmarks representing basic economic, political, and military contacts between the United States and/or the Soviet Union and the other states involved in each crisis. Their inclusion provides some general comparative baselines for the assessment of the crises. By their very nature, however, they do not provide the same amount of in-depth information regarding superpower crisis interests as the crisis-specific outcomes. The general crisis outcomes are outlined in detail in Appendices A and B.

⁸ The reliability, validity, and general analytical utility of judgmental variables in such roles has been demonstrated in previous DARPA-sponsored research dealing with crisis behavior (for example, CACI, 1978e), and the operations of military forces (CACI, 1978g).

Research Design

Sequentially, the identification and analysis of crisis outcomes involves the following stages:

1. The identification of Soviet and U.S. policy goals from primary source materials.
2. The specification of types of evidence that are to be used as the basis for judgments concerning the achievement of each goal (once again, relying upon primary source materials to the extent possible).
3. The development of crisis outcome scales for the assessment of goal achievement.
4. As the first step in the coding process, a determination of the relevance of each goal/outcome set in each crisis.
5. The coding of the crisis-relevant outcomes plus the general outcome variables.

Crisis outcomes are coded at 1- and 5-year intervals to capture both the short- and medium-term effects and correlates of the incidents. The 1 year interval was selected as a commonly used short-term effects interval. The 5-year interval used for medium term effects is of approximately the same length at the longest formal policy cycles found in both superpowers (the 4-year administrations in the United States and the 5-year cycle of of Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).⁹

Analysis of the crisis outcomes variables will focus on both causal and concomitant relationships between these outcomes and other factors. Given

⁹ The crisis-specific outcomes are also structured to reflect another type of short term/medium term distinction. For the most part, the goals and outcomes included in the functional categories (military, economic, ideological, tend to have longer periods of validity than those grouped under regional headings, which are more subject to change in response to the evolution of events in each region.

the complexity of international politics, it would be unreasonable to expect to find a large number of clear-cut decisive causal effects with the crises being the only direct influences upon the outcomes, particularly over a 5-year span. During the coding process, the strength of the causal linkages that appear to have existed between the crisis-relevant outcomes and the crises are coded. These additional judgmental variables, presented in Appendices A and B, provide the most practical assessment available of the strength of the linkage between putative cause (crisis) and effect (outcome).

The crises analyzed for both the United States and the Soviet Union over the period 1966-1978 are updated versions of data sets developed by CACI for the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA/CTO) (1976, 1978e). Both consist of events in which the superpowers have indicated by either physical or verbal actions their particular concern with these events out of the myriad of postwar crises. (CACI, 1976 and 1978e explicate the operational definitions used to identify these cases in greater detail). In the case of both the United States and the Soviet Union, 1966 stands as a threshold denoting the beginning of a new phase in crisis management activities. In the case of the U.S., 1966 was a breakpoint year (Mahoney, 1978), with the average number of crises being considerably higher before that point and lower afterwards. In the Soviet case, it is likely that the increase in the crisis activity of the Soviet Navy, which formally began with the June War of 1967, was the result of policy deliberations concomitant with the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966, (McConnell and Dismukes, 1979).

Reliability and validity are approached in several ways. The primary factor contributing to the validity of the approach adopted is the use of Soviet and American statements to identify the goals whose outcomes are to be assessed. Reliability is being maintained by intercoder reliability checks, comparisons of the coding of the same outcome across crises (particularly similar crises), and comparisons of similar cases. While a

deliberate attempt has been made to generate outcome scales including as many as seven values, these scales will be collapsed, as required, to enhance the reliability of the research, as is the standard practice in psychometric research from which such scales originate (Summers, 1979).

In the analysis of superpower goals and outcomes, the assumption of a "unitary rational actor" criticized by students of bureaucratic politics is not being made, (cf. the critique of Allison, 1971). Instead, we make a less demanding set of assumptions. We assume that both superpowers are adaptive organizations seeking to achieve goals in fairly stable environments. We assume that over a reasonably short period of time there is some consistency of intent in these actors' aims -- an assumption that we feel has been confirmed by our review of the primary source materials. While this approach does not capture the interplay of bureaucratic process, this interplay is largely irrelevant for our purposes.¹⁰

CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented the goal-oriented way in which the outcomes of recent (1966-1978) Soviet and American crises are being assessed in this project. The following sections elaborate this sketch, with Chapter 3 and 4 presenting and explaining U.S. and Soviet policy goals over this period. Chapter 5 provides a brief outline sketch of the remainder of the project. Chapter 6 introduces the crisis goals codebooks contained in the appendices. Finally, Appendix A and Appendix B present the core methodological product of the project -- the codebooks for the assessment of crisis outcomes in terms of goal achievement.

¹⁰ The bureaucratic politics paradigm tends to be most persuasive when policy is viewed over very short periods of time, from the perspective of those within the bureaucracy. Viewing policy over the medium term, greater degrees of consistency of purpose are often evident. Over even longer terms, for example, 30 year periods, structural and contextual factors begin to have more evident salience.

CHAPTER 3. U.S. POLICY GOALS

INTRODUCTION

This is the first of two chapters detailing the political-military policy goals of the two superpowers. Such goals play a crucial role in the assessment of crisis outcomes in terms of goal achievement -- the methodological strategy presented in Chapter 2.

It is by no means easy to compare Soviet and U.S. goals. American researchers have a natural bias towards the latter. In response to this tendency, very deliberate attempts have been made to approach the goals of both superpowers from the perspective of "outsiders." Primary source materials (Soviet and American) have been used to identify the declaratory aims of each power. This results, necessarily, in a certain stylistic "tone" in each chapter. In the interest of later comparative analyses, however, this approach is essential.

Substantively, an understanding of goals is critical for an understanding of American policy. As a "superpower," the United States by definition must show special and detailed concern for its preferences and principles within the international milieu in which it acts. The actual coherence of its political-military policy in many respects reflects the internal consistencies of the goals and objectives it pursues. Therefore, examination of U.S. policy goals allows analysts to evaluate individual policies plus the more holistic designs the United States has for the world. Indeed, the way a country, particularly a superpower, specifies its goals reflects its world view and describes its ideal world organization.

The U.S. world view is complex, dynamic, and not easily categorized. Phenomena such as the liberal democratic tradition,¹ geographical size

¹ See Hollander and Skard (1968).

and location, cyclical historical periods,² executive-congressional relations,³ public opinion,⁴ and the media⁵ are but a few of numerous factors that scholars suggest help shape American political-military policy. Instead of deductively focusing on a number of previously specified variables from other studies in compiling and categorizing political-military policy goals of the United States, the research design focused on primary source materials of American political-military policy decision-makers. Table 1 presents the complete list of sources consulted in the compilation of U.S. international policy goals for the years 1966-1978. As the subheadings of Table 1 suggest, these sources fall into several general categories:

1. American statements in the United Nations,
2. State of the Union addresses,
3. Presidential books and memoirs,
4. State Department bulletins and reports,
5. Annual reports of the Secretary of Defense,
6. Prestigious international relations journals, and
7. Miscellaneous academic materials.

These sources are not viewed as definitive, but we would suggest that they are as authoritative as any unclassified sources can be. This does not mean, however, that they are free of weaknesses. Many of the individual sources used have internalized or institutionalized systematic biases. For example, the Defense Department materials, as would be expected, primarily focus on more narrowly defined military-security

² See Klingberg (1952).

³ See Wilcox (1971).

⁴ See Almond (1950).

⁵ See Cohen (1963).

TABLE 1

Source Materials for the
Compilation of American Policy Goals, 1966-1978

American Statements in the United Nations, 1966-1970

Provisional Verbatim Records of the General Assembly, 1966-1978.
New York: United Nations.

Presidential State of the Union Addresses, 1966-1978

Department of State Bulletins: Washington: U.S. Government

Volume 54, Number 1388: 150-155 (Johnson, 1966)
Volume 56, Number 1440: 158-163 (Johnson, 1967)
Volume 58, Number 1493: 161-163 (Johnson, 1968)
Volume 60, Number 1545: 89-91 (Johnson, 1969)
Volume 62, Number 1598: 145-147 (Nixon, 1970)
Volume 66, Number 1702: 141-151 (Nixon, 1972)
Volume 68, Number 1757: 217-219 (Nixon, 1973)
Volume 70, Number 1808: 157-169 (Nixon, 1974)
Volume 72, Number 1858: 133-137 (Ford, 1975)
Volume 76, Number 1963: 97-101 (Ford, 1977)
Volume 79, Number 2023: 1-2 (Carter, 1978)

Presidential Books, Memoirs, and Biographies

CARTER, J. (1976) Why Not the Best? New York: Bantam Books.

JOHNSON, L.B. (1971) The Vantage Point. New York: Popular Library.

NIXON, R.M. (1970-1973) U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, Volumes I-IV. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

State Department Materials

Department of State Bulletin: The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy (1966-1979) 54, 1384-79, 2023.

ROGERS, W. (1973) United States Foreign Policy, 1972: A Report of the Secretary of State. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

____ (1972) United States Foreign Policy, 1971: A Report of the Secretary of State. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

____ (1971) United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970: A Report of the Secretary of State. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

Continued

Table 1
Source Materials of American Policy Goals
Continued

Defense Department Materials

- BROWN, H. (1978) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY79.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- CLIFFORD, C.M. (1969) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
FY70. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- LAIRD, M.R. (1972) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY73.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- ____ (1971) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY72.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- ____ (1970) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense FY71. Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- McNAMARA, R.S. (1968) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
FY69. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- ____ (1967) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY68.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- ____ (1966) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY67.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- RICHARDSON, E.L. (1973) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
FY74. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- RUMSFELD, D.R. (1977) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
FY78. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- ____ (1976) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, FY77. Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government.
- SCHLESINGER, J.R. (1974) Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
FY75. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government.

International Relations Scholarly Journals

- Foreign Affairs (1966-1978) 44-56.
- Foreign Policy (1970-1978/79).

Continued

Table 1
Source Materials of American Policy Goals
Continued

Miscellaneous Scholarly Materials

- BLOOMFIELD, L.P. (1974) In Search of American Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University.
- BUTTERWORTH, R.L. (1976) Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945-1974: Data With Synopses. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
- Department of Defense (1971) The Pentagon Papers. Boston: Beacon.
- FERRELL, R.H. (1975) American Diplomacy. New York: Norton.
- FULBRIGHT, W.J. (1972) The Crippled Giant. New York: Vintage Books.
- GEORGE, A.L. and R. SMOKE (1974) Deterrence in American Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University.
- ____ (1971) The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. Boston: Little, Brown.
- HALBERSTAM, D. (1965) The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House.
- HALPERIN, M.H. (1971) Defense Strategies for the Seventies. Boston: Little, Brown.
- HEAD, R.G. and E.J. ROKKLE (eds.) (1973) American Defense Policy, 3rd Edition. Baltimore: John Hopkins University.
- HOFFMAN, S. (1968) Gulliver's Troubles on the Setting of American Foreign Policy. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- KENNAN, G.F. (1967) Memoirs. Boston: Little, Brown.
- KISSINGER, H.A. (1969) American Foreign Policy. New York: Norton.
- ____ (1966) The Troubled Partnership. New York: Anchor Books.
- ____ (1957) Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- KOLKO, G. and J. KOLKO (1969) The Limits of Power. New York: Harper and Row.

Continued

Table 1
Source Materials of American Policy Goals
Continued

NATHAN, J.A. and J.K. OLIVER (1976) United States Foreign Policy and World Order. Boston: Little, Brown.

SCHURMAN, F. (1974) The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry Into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics. New York: Pantheon.

SPANIER, J. (1977) American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 7th Edition. New York: Praeger.

STOESSINGER, J.G. (1976) Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power. New York: Norton.

issues and goals and neglect political and ideological concerns. On the other hand, public speeches (such the State of the Union and addresses before the United Nations) and State Department materials concentrate on more general ideological goals and political and economic objectives. In many respects the parochial nature of one source was offset or neutralized by one of the other sources used.

A more problematic aspect of some of the sources was that they were unsystematic, forcing reading "between the lines" to infer the relevant policy goals presented. Moreover, the vast majority of sources were void of any conceptual foundation or underpinning. Instead of systematically reviewing each of the individual objectives of American political-military policy as they relate to more general American policy pursuits, the usual descriptive method was to present a series of near, past, or present international policy concerns of Washington and methods used to secure them. In itself, there is nothing inherently wrong with this presentation style. Indeed, it reflects the traditional administration and deployment of resources by the institutions of American foreign policy. Policy-makers "muddle through" successive incremental policies toward some desired objective (Lindblom, 1959: 86). Moreover, truly shared assumptions and objectives do not require constant repetition. One major task in compiling our list of American foreign policy goals, however, was to integrate individual decision-makers' inferences from primary source material in such a way to form a mosaic of general American policy pursuits for the relevant time period.

An immediate analytical problem involved in compiling the U.S. goal list dealt with the distinctions between "long-term" and short-term" goals. This became particularly problematical in primary source materials. Long-term goals are the more general, static, or ultimate designs a state holds toward the international system. They usually reflect cherished values of a society and its leaders. They are basically invariant over time and space and the pursuit of them often tends to be fraught with polemics,

complexities, and ambiguities (Holsti, 1972). Short-term goals, on the other hand, relate to a particular demand or series of demands. The actual time period of such a goal can be limited to a number of days or as long as a number of years. The actual time period of the goal's pursuit is not as useful in the distinction between the two types of goals as the overall importance attributed to each. For example, a dominant, long-term American foreign policy goal is "the preservation of a balance of power that would safeguard democratic values in the United States and other basically Western countries" (Spanier, 1977: 235). Shorter-term objectives or goals sought in order to achieve this, however, have changed significantly over the years from policies of "containment of Communism" in the late 1940's and early 1950's, to the "rolling back of Communism" in the 1950's, to more recent policies based, in part, on "detente" or the relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers.

Table 2 presents the compiled list of dominant American international policy goals for the years 1966 to 1978. The goals are grouped under nine main categories. The first three -- ideological, military-security, and economic -- contain long-term goals. These goals have been strongly held by all postwar administrations and correspond to what Harold and Margaret Sprout (1957) call the "psychological" environment of policy or the circumstances constantly sought and perceived in an almost objective way by American policy-makers. The other six categories of goals relate more to area-specific phenomena and thus have a shorter-term focus (not necessarily "shorter" or more limited, in terms of time but rather in terms of geographical scope).

IDEOLOGICAL GOALS

The tradition of American international policy is founded on an image of the United States as a "new protean society based on the ideas of the

TABLE 2
Major American Policy Goals, 1966-1978

Ideological

1. Support democratic values and countries
2. Promote peace and the peaceful resolution to conflict
3. Advance global welfare and human rights
4. Support international law and international organizations
5. Ensure the prestige and dignity of the United States

Military Security

1. Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. territorial integrity and U.S. possessions
2. Maintain/increase military capability for defending major industrial democracies (W. Europe, Japan)
3. Maintain/increase military capability for defending strategically important LDC's
4. Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. overseas maritime interests
5. Maintain/increase military capability for "show of force" and demonstrating ability to intervene in overseas conflict arenas
6. Maintain/increase military capability for defending U.S. commercial interests and U.S. citizens in foreign countries
7. Assist friendly or neutral developing countries in strengthening their military capability for regional stability purposes
8. Assist friendly or neutral developing countries in developing their military/policy capability for domestic stability purposes

U.S. Economic Goals

1. Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. commercial interests and relations
2. Support international economic order/system compatible with U.S. economic interests

Continued

Table 2
Major American Policy Goals, 1966-1978
Continued

3. Promote the stability of international commodity prices and supplies
4. Promote the economic development of Third World non-Communist countries

U.S. Goals Toward Communist States (Particularly the USSR and PRC)

1. Reduce chances of war with major Communist states
2. Contain/restrain/deter the expansion of Communist influence
3. Encourage "polycentrism" within the Communist world
4. Encourage liberalization trends in Communist states
5. Promote normalization of relations between the U.S. and the Communist world

Goals Toward Europe

1. Guarantee the security and independence of Western Europe
2. Maintain/enhance strong cooperative ties with countries of Western Europe
3. Work for the economic stability and the economic, military, and political integration of Western Europe
4. Promote the stabilization of potential or realized conflict arenas in Europe
5. Improve relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe

U.S. Goals Toward Asia

1. Avoid direct military confrontation with PRC and/or USSR (1960's)
2. Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia (1960's)
3. Promote the stability of and maintain defense forces for protecting Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan
4. Support the stability of other non-Communist Asian countries

Continued

Table 2
Major American Policy Goals, 1966-1978
Continued

5. Contain Soviet expansionism in Asia (1970's)
6. Maintain/enhance U.S. relations with Japan
7. Promote economic development/stability in non-Communist developing Asian countries

U.S. Goals Toward the Middle East

1. Promote an end to conflict in the Middle East
2. Guarantee Israeli security
3. Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East
4. Promote/support political stability in the Middle East
5. Promote economic stability/development of countries in the Middle East
6. Maintain/increase U.S. access to markets and raw materials in the Middle East

U.S. Goals Toward Latin America

1. Promote economic stability/development in Latin American countries
2. Continue/strengthen American economic presence in Latin America
3. Keep Latin America free of external "hostile" aggression and influence
4. Promote democratic institutions in Latin America
5. Promote/support the political stability of Latin American countries

U.S. Goals Toward Africa

1. Promote peaceful transition of African countries to independence (1960's)
2. Promote economic stability/development in African countries
3. Increase/promote U.S. economic relations with African countries

Continued

Table 2
Major American Policy Goals, 1966-1978
Continued

4. Promote democratic institutions in Africa
5. Promote/support non-Communist political stability in African countries
6. Promote security of Cape route and other major sea lines of communication around Africa
7. Promote better diplomatic relations with Africa

Enlightenment" (Wilcox, 1976: 36).⁶ American international policy for the last 200 years has been moralistic and crusading while at the same time often isolationist. America's geographical isolation and self-perception as a beacon of hope versus the traditional conflict-laden and secret diplomacy of the old European order contributed to a low international profile. It was not until after World War II that the United States found itself uncomfortably at the center of the international system. Yet even after firmly establishing itself as the most powerful state in the world, its international policy maintained strong ideological underpinnings. Spanier suggests that present American foreign policy attitudes are characterized by:

A high degree of moralism and missionary zeal stemming from the nation's long consideration of itself as a unique and morally superior society....Moralism in foreign policy thus reflected the awareness and pride of a society that believed it had carved out a better domestic order, free of oppression and injustice (Spanier, 1972: 325).

Even former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger whose diplomacy was structured around the "deideologization of foreign relations" focusing instead primarily on balance of power notions (Schlesinger, 1979: 511) found it necessary to reiterate the policy's ideological nature.

Our efforts to define, preserve, and enhance respect for the rights of man thus represent an ultimate test of international cooperation. We Americans, in the year of our bicentennial, are conscious and proud of our own traditions. Our founding fathers wrote 200 years ago of the equality and inalienable rights of all men. Since then the ideals of liberty and democracy have become the universal and indestructible goals of mankind (U.N. (1976) 32, 18: 185).

⁶ For an exhaustive analysis of this image and the effect it has had on the "style" of American foreign policy, see Hoffman (1968), Morgenthau (1951), and Spanier (1977).

Support Democratic Values and Countries

The preservation and protection of democratic values and countries has been a principal declaratory thrust of American foreign policy. It has been a primary rationale for many U.S. policy conflicts with international rivals. Since World War II the protection of democratic social orders as a policy rationale has been aimed primarily at the perceived threats presented to democracy from the two major Communist powers -- the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. While the United States has viewed itself as champion of freedom, self-determination, constitutionalism, and pluralism, the Soviet Union and China have been viewed as the world's primary advocates of a command economy, centralized control, and the subjugation of the individual to the state.⁷

Hence, the ideological goal of safeguarding democracy has helped the United States assume the role of the global leader of anti-Communist forces.⁸ Communism is perceived as diametrically opposed to the advancement of democracy in a zero-sum way. In fact the two roles are perceived to go hand-in-hand and their importance to American international policy has been clearly demonstrated by empirical analysis (Holsti, 1970). Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld lucidly pointed to the interdependent nature of these roles and goals when he posited that:

History has now cast the United States in a role of world leadership -- a role which requires large, ready forces and places the United States in the front line rather than in the rear of freedom's defense. The emblem of the American eagle, with an olive branch in one talon and a sheaf of arrows in the other, has become fully symbolic of our role (Rumsfeld, 1977: 36).

⁷ These attitudes are elaborated in the discussion of U.S. goals towards Communist states later in this chapter.

⁸ Harry Truman and John Foster Dulles were the ultimate examples of American decision-makers who followed this logic, but the "Cold War crusade" and idealism also marked the foreign policy of Presidents Nixon and Ford and is the dominant assumption of the new "Cold War idealists" personified by Senator Moynihan, for example, see Moynihan (1978).

The Promotion of Peace and Peaceful Resolution to Conflicts

Like the support of democracy, this goal is at least partially declaratory. One could argue that this ideological goal has often been contradicted by specific U.S. policy actions. American action in Southeast Asia, covert action against Allende's Chile, and recent Congressional findings and hearings concerning alleged CIA assassination attempts against foreign leaders are cases in point. Much of the apparent confusion and/or contradictions concerning this goal is due to the complex nature and definitional/conceptual controversies surrounding notions of "peace." For example, by the promotion of peace does one mean simply the quest for an absence of military conflict or the absence of war accompanied by certain structural "preconditions" for peace such as the absence of hunger, ignorance, and poverty? Stanley Hoffman, in criticizing the often stated goal of Nixon and Kissinger of an "honorable peace" and a "stable structure of peace" points to the conceptual confusions surrounding these objectives when he suggests that:

The ritual, incantatory assertion of our search for a "stable structure of peace" tells us very little of substance. At most, it indicates a vague, sound set of "philosophic" hunches, which neither amount to a genuine "fresh vision," nor account for all those tactical moves, or omissions, that are in flat contradiction with the stated goals (Hoffman, 1973: 3).

Nevertheless, the search for peace, particularly if defined as an absence of war, permeates U.S. international policy decision-makers' declarations. Absence of conflict is especially important, as would be expected, in American policy statements concerning regions of the world viewed as strategically vital to the national interest. Few observers would dispute, for example, that a major objective of American policy has been the maintenance and enhancement of the security of strategically "crucial areas" stretching from northern Norway to the Aleutian Islands. But this long-standing foreign policy objective cannot be thoroughly realized in a hostile world, so goes the argument, unless a peaceful, American-favored,

status quo exists in these areas. Hence, a major foundation of American foreign policy is based on policies of "collective security" among the U.S. and its allies and friends aimed at guaranteeing the peace, territorial integrity, and independence of areas such as Western Europe, the Middle East, northeast Asia, and Africa.⁹ The promotion of peace based on a strong military posture and deterrent capability is no anomaly in American foreign policy.¹⁰ President Carter reflected the general policy tendencies of all postwar Presidents when he argued before the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1977 that:

Peace will not be assured until the weapons of war are finally put away. While we work towards that goal nations will want sufficient arms to preserve their security. The United States' purpose is to ensure peace. It is for that reason that our military posture and our alliances will remain as strong as necessary to deter attack (UN, 1977, 32/18: 4-5).

Promotion of Human Rights

The domestic legislation and practices of the United States, for the most part, put it in a relatively good position to champion the third ideological goal -- the promotion of human rights around the world. Often, however, the commitment to human rights is more moral than legal and at times vague (Van Dyke, 1970: 105). Then again, this tends to be a characteristic of the majority of American ideological policy goals or, for that matter, most ideological goals. It must be remembered that any benchmark by which one examines ideological goals must necessarily be subjective in nature. The important point seems to be that, at least in a perceptual way, the promotion of human rights has been high on the policy agenda of American decision-makers. Although all administrations stressed this goal to one degree or another, examination of primary source materials showed that the Carter Administration, especially during its

⁹ See also the discussions concerning U.S. policy goals in these various regions.

¹⁰ See the discussion concerning U.S. military-security goals.

first year in office, gave it the greatest relative emphasis. "The basic thrust of human affairs," President Carter stated in his address before the United Nations in 1977, "points to a more universal demand for basic human rights."¹¹

Since World War II, U.S. actions in regard to the advancement of human rights include: ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various other treaties, membership in international organizations that promote human rights, promotion of foreign aid projects, and encouraging the expansion of the United Nations for humanitarian purposes. Furthermore, the United States has pledged support for various U.N. resolutions condemning and sanctioning regimes, such as Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, that have grossly violated basic human rights. Yet, at the same time the United States has pursued and expanded cooperative relations with governments of the authoritarian right (Greece, Portugal, Brazil, Chile) and of the totalitarian left (the Soviet Union, China, Rumania). This contradiction reveals, in part, the tension between ideological and other types of aims. The choices are often very unpleasant.

A nation's fundamental interest must be self-preservation, and, when national security and promotion of human rights [come] into genuine conflict, national security [has] to prevail though this [is] not at all to say that the national security bureaucracy [is] anywhere near to being the infallible expositor of national security (Schlesinger, 1979: 519).

Moreover, while the United States has emphasized and promoted individual human rights (for example, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties; freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press), it has paid relatively less attention to collective

¹¹ As quoted in Bull (1979: 460). For an excellent discussion of Carter's human rights policies, see Schlesinger (1979: 503-526).

rights and economic and social rights such as freedom from hunger, poverty, and ignorance. This relative stress on "classical" human rights factors create tension for U.S. relations with the Third World countries that emphasize economic/distributional goals (Bull, 1979: 460).

Support for International Law and Organizations

The ideological goal of American support of international law and organizations has generally been one of the more prominent declaratory goals of U.S. decision-makers in the period since the mid-1960's. Statements such as, "the rule of law in a world beset by global problems must of necessity be a matter of priority" (Nixon, 1973: 212) were expounded fairly frequently. In practice, the relevance and importance attached to this goal has varied markedly across situations. (For example, in situations involving expropriation of the property of American multinational firms, it has had high salience.)

Although officially promoting the United Nations, the last decade has seen the United States' view of this organization change drastically. During the early Cold War period, the U.S. had virtual control over the United Nations. Here one saw strong American promotion of U.N. activities, such as the utilization of peacekeeping forces in conflict arenas. With the emergence in the early 1960's the Afro-Asian/Third World majority in the U.N., however, the United States at times became disenchanted with the organization. This was especially prevalent during Daniel Moynihan's tenure as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.

Ensure U.S. Prestige and Dignity

The last ideological goal consistently found in the writings and public addresses of American foreign policy decision-makers was to ensure the prestige and dignity of the United States. Unlike some of the previous ideological goals, whose pursuit at time appear more symbolic than substantive, this goal appears to be consistently "sought." One of the

main substantive components of this objective is maintenance of the United States' image as a solid trustworthy alliance partner. American decision-makers between 1966 and 1978 constantly reiterated their commitments to the United State's alliances, treaties, and friends. Indeed, such commitments are a major requirement of a wide range of deterrence policies followed by the United States (George and Smoke, 1975: 4). Former Secretary of State William Rogers refers to this phenomenon when he suggests that:

Doubts about our ability to fulfill our security commitments would adversely affect our alliances, discouraging our allies from strengthening their contribution to the common defense. Our adversaries might conclude that they could resort to the threat or use of force to settle differences (Rogers, 1972: 76).

As with its relationship with policies of deterrence, the goal of ensuring the United States' prestige and dignity is seldom an end in itself. Rather, it is usually one of the instruments by which the United States seeks other objectives. For example, American prestige and dignity have been often used, particularly during the Cold War, to prove to developing countries that Western democratic systems deserved their support rather than rival Communist systems. More recently, many have argued that the United States' experience in Vietnam was an excellent example of the United States trying to uphold its prestige and dignity and avoid embarrassment. Once President Johnson realized that the U.S. was "over-committed," these observers argue, he proceeded to escalate the war not only to avoid defeat but also to avoid an embarrassing defeat that would tarnish America's global image and reputation. Indeed, once this dynamic was institutionalized, it was not only the American client who was at stake; rather it was the United States itself (Nathan and Oliver, 1976: 374). Henry Kissinger made a related point concerning the United States and Vietnam when he wrote:

The commitment of five hundred thousand Americans settled the issue of the importance of Vietnam for what is involved

now is confidence in American promises. However, fashionable it is to ridicule the terms "credibility" or "prestige" they are not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if they can count on our steadiness (Kissinger, 1969: 112).

No matter how abstract and exaggerated terms such as "prestige," "dignity," and "integrity," are in decision-maker's statements concerning international affairs, they are as real and as important to the relations of nation-states as they are to individuals in their relations with others (Morgenthau, 1973: 74).

MILITARY-SECURITY GOALS

The military-security goals of the United States are much more integrated and interdependent than the ideological goals just discussed. All of these goals concern enhancing and promoting the continued survival of the United States, for this has to be the utmost value sought by decision-makers. Since World War II, the major concern has been the avoidance and deterrence of thermonuclear war with the Soviet Union. Hence, the United States has found it necessary to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent to defend its immediate territorial integrity and the territory and interests of allies and friends who might be threatened by "nuclear blackmail." President Nixon, writing in 1973, echoed to one degree or another the statements of all recent Presidents when he suggested that:

Deterrence of war is the primary goal of our strategic policy and the principal function of our nuclear forces. Thus, our objective continues to be:

- To deter all-out attack on the United States or its allies,
- To face any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with unacceptable risks, and
- To maintain a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion against the United States or its allies is minimized (Nixon, 1973: 182).

Since World War II, the United States and Soviet Union together have spent well over \$2 trillion on defense. Much of this money has been spent in an attempt to maintain the ability to deter the other from a nuclear first strike. For the period prior to the early 1960's, the United States had a virtual nuclear monopoly. Since, the Soviet Union has accelerated its development of strategic capabilities and appears to have gained strategic parity.

The United States' nuclear policy has revolved around a "Triad" of forces -- ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and heavy bombers -- each of which presents different problems to a would-be attacker. This nuclear Triad is complemented by theater nuclear capabilities and conventional forces. The military-security goals of the United States presented in Table 2 recognize these different types of forces and capabilities and focus them to more specific objectives.

In addition to the goal of maintaining sufficient military capabilities to directly defend its own territorial integrity, maintaining the military capabilities for defending Western Europe is perhaps the United States' second important international policy commitment.¹² Actually these two goals are not easily separated. This defense strategy again depends on both nuclear and conventional deterrence. Both the U.S. and NATO policies have been aimed at denying the Soviets and/or any Warsaw Pact country the ability to control or coerce Western Europe through aggression. Just as the United States has its Triad of forces in its own direct defense, it maintains a Triad of forces to defend Western Europe. The overall American strategy in Western Europe has been governed largely by the treaty obligations of NATO. This basic strategy (Rumsfeld, 1977: 35) can be summarized as:

1. Maintain military deterrence capability for defending Western Europe,

¹² See the discussion of the United States' foreign policy goals towards Europe later in this chapter for a more detailed discussion of this relationship.

2. Promote the cohesion of NATO,
3. Encourage major European contributions to NATO and ensure their complementarity and effectiveness,
4. Encourage the collective strengths of Western Europe to be able to resist Soviet pressures and influence, and
5. Seek to reduce tension in East-West military relationships in Europe (for example, Berlin, MBFR, and so forth).

Although its relations with its NATO allies have not been free from major disagreements over military strategy, few could suggest a more important region of the world for American foreign policy. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown recently reaffirmed its importance when he wrote:

A goal of the highest priority for this administration is to ensure stability in the vital European region....The task is challenging and difficult. But we are determined to strive for a stronger and more rational NATO defense posture, with greater interoperability and standardization of armaments (Brown; 1978: 23).

While American security relationships with Japan lack the historical and cultural importance of those with Western Europe, the preservation of U.S. military capabilities for the defense of Japan is a key American policy goal. The American-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty is a major factor in America's world view.¹³ This alliance is viewed as central to the security of northeast Asia and America's position in the Pacific. The fundamental U.S. security objectives vis-a-vis Japan are:

1. Ensure Japanese security against a Soviet and/or Chinese nuclear attack,
2. Defend (or at least help defend) Japan against conventional attacks as outlined by the Mutual Security Treaty,

¹³ See also the later discussion of United States' foreign policy goals toward Asia.

3. Encourage Japan to "shoulder large responsibilities" for Asian regional security (Nixon, 1970: 54), and
4. Help Japan build up its military capabilities to defend itself but encourage close consultations, compatibility and complementarity between military doctrines and forces (Rumsfeld, 1977: 39).

In addition to maintaining capabilities for the defense of U.S. territorial integrity and that of other major industrial democracies (primarily Western Europe and Japan), the United States, for the years 1966-1978, also to one degree or another sought to maintain or increase their military capabilities for defending strategically important less developed countries (LDC's) (for example, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Saudi Arabia, and so forth).

A core dynamic of this objective has been based on the perceived necessity of containing the aggression and expansion of both the Soviet and Chinese versions of Communism which are perceived to threaten the Third World countries.¹⁴

If the military capabilities of the United States were not so devoted, the argument goes, Communist expansion could endanger American survival. Hence, a series of treaty commitments make clear the objective of defending strategic Third World countries from Communist aggression (for example, the Rio Pact, SEATO, and CENTO). Moreover, as a matter of general policy, the United States has been willing to directly use its military capabilities to preserve the status quo from the radical shifts of Communist expansion. The two most costly examples of this, of course, are the U.S. experience in Korea from 1950 to 1953 and in Southeast Asia from 1961 to 1975.

¹⁴ See the discussion of U.S. foreign policy goals toward Communist states.

In general terms, according to our examination of primary source materials, the goal of defending strategically important LDC's can be reduced to the following military objectives:

1. Maintain/acquire military bases and/or access to military facilities,
2. Help sustain regional cooperation and balances of power that will preserve the independence of U.S. friends,
3. Deter hostile aggression while seeking political resolutions to conflicts (for example, Vietnam and Korea),
4. Help non-Communist LDC's to strengthen their military capabilities by supplying financial and material assistance,
5. Maintain access for the U.S. and its allies to vital lines of communication through important areas,
6. Prevent the expansion of Communist or Communist-supported radical influence, and
7. Defend major neutral countries (for example, India and Yugoslavia) against hostile attack.

One final aspect of LDC security that deserves mention is the American assumption that underdevelopment and political instability are interrelated and that these phenomena often lead to international repercussions. According to this view, underdevelopment with its associated poverty often leads to frustrations that the United States views as easily exploitable by Communist penetration. Thus, internal Third World problems have on occasion spilled over into the external arena as the United States has attempted to counteract Communist penetration of these power vacuums. The most obvious examples of such events are: Southeast Asia (1962-1973), the Congo (1960), the Pakistan/Bangladesh war (1971), Angola (1975), and Ethiopia (1977). For this reason the United States has not only helped friendly LDC's to strengthen their military capabilities against external threats and for regional stability purposes, but has also assisted friendly or neutral LDC's in developing their internal paramilitary and

police forces. Foreign aid programs have often been sold to Congress and the American public as vital aspects of the fight against domestic instability. One objective here is to help LDC's deter any internal conflict before it has a chance to escalate and possibly spill over into a confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union.

One final military-security goal of American foreign policy has been to maintain the capabilities needed for defending U.S. citizens and commercial interests abroad. The two key dynamics of this goal, as evidenced by analysis of primary source materials, are:

1. Maintain/increase capability for rescuing American citizens and properties from hostile groups, and
2. Maintain the capability for punitive reprisals against groups or countries threatening American citizens and properties.

The three most spectacular recent examples of U.S. commitment to this goal were the April 1975 events in Saigon, the Lebanon evacuations of 1976, and the evacuation of Iran in February 1979. In all instances, the planning of American operations gained the attention of top foreign policy decision-makers.

ECONOMIC GOALS

While the United States is no longer the predominant economic power it was during the immediate postwar years, it must still be considered by all standards the leading global economic power. Although some states exercise more economic influence in certain regions, none comes near the United States in terms of the breadth and intensity of its economic linkages around the world. Consider, for example, that in 1978 alone the United States exported \$143 billion worth of goods and services representing over 7 percent of U.S. GNP and imported \$183 billion (IMF, 1979: 36-37). Moreover, American citizens and corporations own substantially more than these amounts in foreign assets.

The reasons for this immense economic power can be attributed not only to America's overall economic size, vigor, and stability but also to the fact that the United States was the only major power to emerge from World War II with its economic base and industrial sector intact. The early postwar years saw the United States account for half of the non-Communist world's economic output and the vast majority of international investment. Therefore, it was not surprising that the U.S. became the driving force in the creation of the postwar international economic order. It wanted this system to be based on institutions and policies that would prevent the explicitly competitive "beggar thy neighbor" foreign economic policies that characterized the 1930's. The three most important institutions created were the:

1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that codified the rules of conduct for international trade,
2. International Monetary Fund (IMF) designed to promote the stabilization and liberalization of international monetary transactions, and
3. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which was to help provide needed capital to support developing countries.

These organizations were later joined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) created to help coordinate policies among the individual countries of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. Together these economic institutions helped promote American economic interests by making the dollar the world's primary reserve and key transaction currency. The postwar international monetary system, which was devised at Bretton Woods in 1944, served the United States and the international system well for over a quarter of a century. This period was characterized by rapid and sustained economic growth and stability. But, finally in the early 1970's the U.S. balance of payment deficits, global inflation, and a wide variety of economic problems led to the collapse of the "Bretton Woods System" and the creation of new rules of conduct for international trade and monetary affairs. The role of the dollar as the

world's reserve currency was redefined and the United States gradually lost part of its dominant position.

The United States still remains the world's single greatest economic power, but phenomenal growth rates in Japan and Europe have altered its relative standing. Primary and secondary source materials for the years 1966-1978 revealed four general economic goals pursued over this time period by the United States (see Table 2);

1. Support orderly expansion and performance of U.S. commercial interests and relations,
2. Support international economic systems and processes compatible with U.S. economic interests,
3. Promote stability of international commodity prices and supplies, and
4. Promote the economic development of Third World non-Communist countries.

The first economic goal is obvious and noncontroversial considering that the United States is the world's major international economic actor and market. Within the structure of U.S. capitalism, the Government has played an active role in expanding American foreign markets, helping U.S. firms gain contracts abroad, promoting U.S. trade and investment, and so forth. Moreover, the United States has pursued very active policies in trying to improve the means by which U.S. firms adjust to foreign economic competition. Tariffs and quota agreements have been two major strategies followed to protect less competitive firms and promote more competitive ones.

Other key dynamics of the U.S. foreign economic goal of supporting the expansion and performance of its commercial interests and relations, revealed through policy primary sources, are to maintain/increase U.S. economic growth, promote a favorable balance of trade, dispose of U.S. agricultural surpluses overseas, protect against the impact of economic crises

abroad, promote a stable U.S. dollar, and discourage the uncompensated expropriations of U.S. firms.

The second general economic goal of American policy -- support international economic systems and processes compatible with U.S. economic interests -- is again self-evident. As suggested above, the postwar international economic system, to a large extent, has been a basic reflection of the economic wants and needs of the United States. It continues to support GATT, IMF, IBRD, and OECD, the key international economic institutions. A second major aspect of this goal revolves around promotion and support for the expansion of liberalized trading policies. Feeling that it has a comparative advantage in many economic sectors, the United States has traditionally fought against economic barriers and obstructions that would block the free flow of goods and capital across national borders. The 1930's and its intense economic rivalries and conflict proved to be a bitter experience for the United States. But such a general policy has not inhibited it from retaliating against countries that are following trade policies perceived to unfairly impede U.S. exports in the world market. In fact, the Nixon administration submitted trade legislation in 1969 that gave the President new authority to counter the actions of countries following "unfair" trade policies.

The realization of global economic interdependence has made the promotion of international economic growth and cooperation, especially among the world's industrial democracies, an additional salient characteristic of an international economic order compatible with American interests. As William Rogers suggested in 1972:

Bilateral approaches are no longer sufficient to handle the growing agenda of common political and economic concerns. A substantially higher level of worldwide coordination and cooperation is required among Japan, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States if we are to solve common trade and monetary problems, continue the rapid expansion of the world's economy, and assist in the growth

of the developing world....No longer can any of us satisfactorily think solely in Asian terms, in European terms, or in North American terms. For the health and strength of us all we must think and act in terms of us all (Rogers, 1972: XIII).

The 1970's have witnessed how events and policies in other countries can profoundly effect the well-being of the United States. Inflation and unemployment, for example, cannot be viewed as isolated national phenomena. The domestic economic trends in any one of a number of countries have a direct and real influence on the U.S. economy. Similarly, the dynamic exchange rate of the U.S. dollar depends as much upon the decisions and the flow of capital investments by non-Americans as by any policy made in Washington. The increasingly interdependent nature of the world economy has made economic relations more political.¹⁵

The last two general economic goals of American foreign policy -- promote the stability of the price and supplies of international commodities and promote the economic development of non-Communist Third World countries -- are primarily directed at U.S. relations with the Third World.

Although commodity price and supply stability is important to economic relations in the developed world, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 and 1974 explicitly focused future American attention concerning commodity price and supply stability in a large part on the Third World. Interest here, of course, primarily concerns the supply of Middle Eastern oil. The United States and the rest of the industrial world runs, quite literally, on oil and the Third World, especially the Persian Gulf, has the vast majority of the worlds' known oil reserves. The promotion of an uninterrupted flow of oil, the discouragement of raw material cartels, and policies aimed at stockpiling certain raw materials or finding alternative sources are additional key dynamics to this goal. The last decade has seen the traditional relationship between suppliers and consumers

¹⁵ For example, see Diebold (1972: 18-36).

of petroleum radically, and probably irrevocably, change. The goal of stabilizing raw material prices and supplies is an aim that most likely will continue to hold the attention of American policy planners.

The last general economic goal that permeates the writings of American decision-makers for the years 1966-1978 is that of promoting Third World economic development. Considering that the gap in wealth between the United States and most Third World countries is getting larger rather than smaller, this goal has been viewed by many, particularly Third World observers, as basically declaratory.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that some type of development policy is required by the United States to hopefully help offset hostile Third World nationalism and associated threats to a number of vital interests of the United States. Such a strategy was surely followed during the Cold War.

GOALS TOWARD THE MAJOR COMMUNIST STATES -- THE SOVIET UNION AND PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Relations with the major Communist states have been the dominant theme of American foreign policy since World War II, so dominant, in fact, that a close examination of the goals of American foreign policy presented in Table 2 will reveal few goals that are not associated in some degree to U.S. relations with the Soviet Union (USSR) and People's Republic of China (PRC).

As suggested earlier, the Soviet Union is perceived to represent the basic challenge to the "American way of life." This threat exists (in part) because the USSR is the only country in the world other than the U.S. with the capabilities to conquer Europe and Asia. Moreover, it is the only country that poses a serious and real threat to the United States. De Toqueville's prediction of a world eventually dominated by American and

Soviet (Russian) power has been realized, at least in part. But as discussed earlier, it is not merely the power capabilities of each country that has resulted in their highly competitive and at times conflictual relations. Rather, much of this must be attributed to the ideological nature of their rivalry. At its center has been the doctrine of containment -- a policy aimed at both the USSR and PRC. Indeed, containment has been the basic U.S. orientation toward the Communist world. As mentioned earlier, the essence of this policy has been based on a global alliance system and American deterrence of perceived Communist aggression. Although the United States would prefer to use conventional weapons to deter this expansion (for example, Korea, 1950-1953; Southeast Asia, 1961-1975), if necessary American policymakers have been willing to confront Communist countries with the full realization of the possibility of thermonuclear war (Cuban missile crisis (1962)).

The character of this containment has changed over the years just as the basic global political configurations and balance of power have changed. The military strategy followed during the 1950's, for example, which placed great reliance on the strategic nuclear capacity of the United States, was referred to as "massive retaliation." This strategy basically suggested that any hostile aggression against the United States would be countered by prompt nuclear punishment. The early 1960's saw the development of a new doctrine of "flexible response" as the Soviets began to first seriously counter American nuclear capabilities. This doctrine placed less emphasis on a nuclear response to threats while suggesting that the United States had to be prepared to fight a wide variety of wars from all-out nuclear exchanges to counter-insurgency operations. Present strategy is more difficult to classify because it recognizes a wide variety of dynamics that were not operable in the 1950's and 1960's.

By the end of the 1960's, the United States switched to a policy of "detente" toward both the Soviet Union and China. The basic principles of this policy are:

1. Avoid military confrontations and prevent the outbreak of war by reducing military tension,

2. Engage in negotiations in an effort to resolve outstanding issues,
3. Build rational relationships with potential adversaries,
4. Encourage constructive collaboration on such international problems as arms control, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and so forth, that affect the mutual national security interests of the U.S., USSR, and PRC,
5. Continue to deter unilateral Soviet or Chinese efforts to exploit local conflicts to their advantage, and
6. Encourage liberalization trends in Communist states.

Speaking before the United Nations in 1975, Henry Kissinger summarized this policy by suggesting that:

In recent years, the bipolar confrontation of the last generation has given way to the beginning of dialogue and an easing of direct conflict....We shall firmly defend our vital interests and those of our friends. But we shall also never lose sight of the fact that, in our age, peace is a practical necessity and a moral imperative. We shall pursue the relaxation of tensions on the basis of strict reciprocity. We know the differences between posturing and policy; we will not encourage the belief that anyone can benefit from artificial tensions. We are deeply conscious that we owe it to future generations not to be swayed by momentary passions (U.N., 31, 11: 180).

U.S. detente policies recognize that the international system has become more complex than the clear-cut bipolar relations that existed during the Cold War. But the focus of detente must still be viewed as an attempt to maintain American-Soviet balance and, therefore, an essential continuity in past policy. In the 1950's and 1960's the United States, in pursuing a balance of power, felt compelled to justify policy in terms of a crusading ideological style that was often inflexible (Halperin, 1974). This new policy recognized that all sides had something to gain from cooperating with each other. By establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, Moscow's bitter rival, Peking could be used to provide Moscow with an incentive to act with greater restraint (Spanier, 1977: 263). Likewise,

the U.S. could, therefore, be more flexible in its policies toward the Communist world and try to gain agreements and advantages with both regimes while remaining inflexible about preventing additional Communist expansion. As Secretary of Defense Brown (1979: 23) has suggested, "effective relations with the People's Republic of China are important... because China is a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union."

Of course, such a strategy is only operable as long as the USSR and the PRC do not exist in a monolithic Communist world. For this reason, an additional goal of American foreign policy evidenced in Table 2 is the encouragement of "polycentrism" within the Communist world. The disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance must be viewed as one of the most significant events of the postwar era for American foreign policy. Indeed, closer rapprochement between the Soviets and Chinese would undoubtedly have a profound effect on U.S. foreign policy. Policies of detente and coexistence must be viewed in the American case to be intimately linked to the Sino-Soviet split.

REGIONAL GOALS

This section summarizes recent U.S. goals in five regions: Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. Discussing the goals towards each of these regions separately is not meant to suggest that the region-specific goals of American policy are independent of one another. On the contrary, policies and goals in one region are often inextricably related to policies in another. Separate discussion of each region is utilized only to facilitate the overall discussion of American foreign policy.

U.S. Policy Goals Toward Europe

Europe is the core area of American international policy and through the years the United States has been strongly committed to these oldest and

closest allies. For Western Europe since World War II, the United States has been the sole source of military security and the ultimate provider of economic security as well (Walt, 1979: 572). American-European relations, however, have not been free of tension and disagreement. In the early 1960's, France's President de Gaulle led a major assault on the U.S. position in Europe and recent years have seen some ominous cracks in the Western alliance. During the late 1960's and early 1970's the United States was preoccupied with the war in Southeast Asia and its relations with the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. In Europe, the United States seemed to some observers to have lost its sense of priorities. Major strains resulted in NATO. Moreover, many European leaders accused the United States in the early 1970's of placing U.S.-Soviet detente before the interests of Europe (Stoessinger, 1976: 138). Eventually, Kissinger in 1973, called for a "New Atlantic Charter" and announced the "Year of Europe" in an attempt to shore up some of the leaks in trans-Atlantic relations. But the Middle Eastern war of October 1973 and the domestic Watergate crisis halted Kissinger's design for all practical purposes and American-European relations continued to be troubled.

The last decade has also been marked by increased economic tensions between the United States and Europe. Economic competition has widened between the two areas while individual governments have failed to hold down inflation and unemployment. Protectionist trade policies and the creation of trading blocs have further dampened relations.

President Carter, however, has recently placed more emphasis on America's relations with Europe. This has lead some observers to posit that Carter has repaired some of the damage done by the neglect of his predecessors, especially in the economic area where he has sought closer consultation and collaboration between the United States and Europe (Bull, 1979: 446).

Even though the years 1966-1978 have seen some troubled times in the relations between the United States and Europe, the maintenance of a stable

and secure Europe must still be considered vital to American policy as the U.S. continues to carry the responsibility for defending that area. No matter what future controversies unfold in these relations, the U.S. will remain a European-oriented society with a European set of values, interests, and expectations.¹⁶ Former President Nixon, writing in 1973, summarized the U.S. view of Europe succinctly when he wrote:

The alliance between the United States and Western Europe has been a fundamental factor in the postwar era. It provided the essential security framework for American engagement in Europe and for Western defense...and it was the principal means of forging the common policies that were the source of Western strength in an era of tension and confrontation (Nixon, 1973: 76).

Five general U.S. foreign policy goals toward Europe were identified from the review of primary source materials. They are:

1. Guarantee the security and independence of Western Europe,
2. Maintain/enhance strong cooperative ties with Western Europe,
3. Support the economic stability and the economic, military, and political integration of Western Europe,
4. Promote the stabilization of potential or realized conflict arenas in Europe, and
5. Improve relations between the United States and Eastern Europe.

The first three identified goals have already been commented on. The foreign policy goal of promoting the stabilization of conflict areas in Europe primarily concerns U.S. policies directed at the Soviet presence in Eastern and Central Europe. Especially relevant has been the promotion of Western access to Berlin which has been a major friction point in East-West relations during the postwar period. Other key dynamics

¹⁶ See Kaiser (1973).

of this goal relate to the promotion of peace and stability along NATO's southern flank (Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey), U.S. support (starting in the late 1960's) of policies initiated by West Germany to improve its relations with Eastern Europe, and the promotion of detente between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. The quadripartite accords on Berlin were one of several major milestones in this process.

Finally, improving U.S. relations with Eastern Europe has been a major policy directive. Although recognizing Eastern Europe as within the Soviet sphere of influence, major strides have been taken toward this goal since the early 1970's. Both Presidents Nixon and Carter visited this region in an effort to promote broader relations. In recent years the U.S. has sought ways to expand its economic, scientific, technological, and cultural contacts in Eastern Europe. Moreover, in the 1970's the United States has reaffirmed its cordial relations with Yugoslavia, perceived as the area's most important nonaligned country.

U.S. Foreign Policy Goals Toward Asia

Our research revealed seven general foreign policy goals pursued by the United States relative to Asia for the year 1966-1978:

1. Avoid direct military confrontation with the PRC and USSR,
2. Contain the expansion of Communist aggression and influence in Asia (1960's),
3. Promote the stability of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan and maintain the forces needed for protecting them,
4. Support the political stability of other non-Communist Asian countries,
5. Contain Soviet expansionism in Asia (1970's),
6. Maintain/enhance U.S. relations with Japan, and
7. Promote the economic development and stability of non-Communist developing Asian countries.

These goals, like so many other U.S. regional objectives, primarily involve America's view of and relationships with Communist states.

The 1960's and early 1970's were marked with the long U.S. involvement in the Southeast Asian war. In 1968, U.S. commitment to the defense of South Vietnam from Communist North Vietnam involved 550,000 troops and weekly combat deaths averaging nearly 300. Finally, in April 1975, Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese army marking the collapse of an ally in whom the United States had invested so much in energy and resources.

Although theories abound to explain the reasons for the Vietnam experience, for our purposes it suggests that the containment of Communist aggression and influence in Asia must be viewed as an important goal of American foreign policy.

The 1970's have witnessed dramatic changes in U.S. policy pursuits in Asia. The single most dramatic change (or series of events) has been the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China which on New Years Day 1979 resulted in establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Several factors in the 1970's made Sino-American reconciliation possible. The disappearance of the radicalism of the Chinese cultural revolution, Sino-Soviet border disputes, and the U.S. Vietnam war negotiations all contributed to the reconciliation in one way or another. A dominant factor contributing to these new relations, however, must be viewed as the effect they have on isolating Soviet influence in Asia (Ulam, 1979). Hence, the U.S. goal of containing Soviet expansion in Asia in the 1970's has been based on America's new China policy. Presently, the only firm area of Soviet influence in Asia is Vietnam, which has joined the Soviet-promoted CMEA and in 1978 concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the USSR and the United States has a vested interest in inhibiting the expansion of further Soviet influence in the area.¹⁷

¹⁷ See the discussion of U.S. goals towards the Communist states and military-security goals of the United States.

Moreover, the reconciliation of Sino-American relations in the context of Sino-Soviet disputes has explicit strategic implications for the U.S., as suggested by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld:

The United States continues to seek more normal relations.... We cannot wholly ignore the PRC for purposes of force planning....U.S. force planning cannot ignore the existence of the substantial military buildup that has occurred on the frontiers of the PRC, or the history of border clashes between the USSR and the PRC since 1969. The extent to which this situation should affect the defense posture of the United States, broadly defined, requires continuing review (Rumsfeld, 1977: 22).

The second most important object of American Asian policy is Japan. Japan's rapid economic growth in the 1960's has resulted in dramatic increases in Japanese-American economic interdependence. This can be seen in enormous increases in Japanese exports to the U.S. that have had a serious effect on U.S. balance-of-payment deficits and have provoked American countermeasures. On the other hand, Japan has important strategic implications to America's Asian policy, and, as a Western-style democracy has unique political kinship. The United States has continued to guarantee Japan's security against hostile threats. However, it has also encouraged Japan to "shoulder larger responsibilities" for the political-military security of Asia. This could be evidenced in the goals put forth by the "Nixon Doctrine."

The United States also continues to hold a number of treaty alliances in Asia. Through bilateral and multilateral agreements the United States, to one degree or another, has become the guarantor of the security of many non-Communist Asian nations from Japan and Korea around the rim of Asia and southward to Australia and New Zealand. Against this background, the United States served as a principal source of military and economic assistance in the area.

U.S. Policy Goals Toward the Middle East

U.S. Middle Eastern policy, for the years 1966-1978, was very dynamic and dominated by its close relationships with Israel, the strategic importance of the area, and the oil wealth of the Persian Gulf. In general terms these concerns can be summarized by the following goals pursued by the United States in the region:

1. Promote an end to conflicts in the Middle East,
2. Guarantee Israeli security,
3. Minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East,
4. Promote/support political stability in the Middle East
5. Promote the economic stability and development of friendly and neutral countries in the Middle East, and
6. Maintain/increase U.S. access to markets and raw materials in the Middle East.

While recognizing the strategic location of this area, the traditional primary focus of American attention in the region has centered on the 30 years of conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Since its creation as a state, Israel and the United States have had close relationships. Much of this stems from widely shared American beliefs that the U.S. has a special obligation to the security and survival of Israel. After the 1967 war and until 1973, the United States sought to guarantee the regional military superiority of Israel. This policy of the first Nixon administration saw Israel's role as an adversary of Soviet client states in the area. After 1973, however, basic American policy changed. Henry Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy in the area after the October 1973 war virtually shut out the Soviet Union from the peacemaking process. Moreover, in 1972 President Sadat expelled Soviet advisors from Egypt. The waning of Soviet influence in the area and changes in U.S. economic interests drastically affected the context of U.S. relations and policy.

These factors, together with increased Arab confidence and the substantial power displayed by several Arab oil-producing states during the 1973-1974 oil embargo proved to the United States that the Cold War considerations that drove U.S. policy in the 1960's and early 1970's were no longer viable.

Moreover, U.S.-Egyptian relations were greatly improved in the early 1970's while the United States took a new, vigorous diplomatic role as peace mediator. Eventually new understandings were developed with Egypt and Syria and the U.S. scored a major diplomatic victory in arranging the 1975 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, which split Arab solidarity, enhanced Israel's security, and further diminished Soviet presence in the area (Wilcox, 1976: 51). Hence, the United States found itself gaining influence in the Arab world, without losing its special relationship with Israel.

The United States further distinguished itself as a peacemaker after Egyptian President Sadat's historic trip to Israel in 1977. In 1978, it scored a dramatic success in the September Camp David agreements. Finally, in April of 1979 Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in Washington securing, at least for the time being, the U.S. goal of promoting an end to conflict in the area.

As suggested earlier, oil also has to be considered a key dynamic of American policy in the Middle East. In fact, the stability of the Persian Gulf region and American access to its oil reserves has great importance to the global balance of power and the economic well-being of the industrial world (Campbell, 1979: 613). In the past the United States has tried to preserve these interests by promoting the stability of the traditional regimes of Iran and Saudi Arabia. In fact, these two countries have been keystones to American policy in the area and major sources of Western oil. Moreover, both President Nixon and Ford saw these countries as the source of regional stability. The recent events in Iran that led

to the downfall of the Shah most likely will have profound repercussions to American presence in the Persian Gulf area and may very well be a major dynamic in the future global balance of power. Such an area, where the interests of the major power converge, will continue to play a major role in international political, economic, and military affairs and will continue to be high on the agenda of U.S. policy.

U.S. Goals Toward Latin America and Africa

Over the past 4 years, our interest has been focused on, and our energies dedicated to, a number of supremely important tasks in the world arena....The time and concentration that have gone into these complicated but absolutely crucial efforts have produced allegations that we were neglecting other problems, other areas, and especially other friendly nations. In Latin America this feeling has been particularly widespread, and it is quite understandable (Nixon, 1973: 115).

As the above statement suggests, the United States has often been criticized by the developing countries of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa for its lack of policy attention. Indeed, other than recent modest diplomatic attempts aimed at stabilizing conflicts in Southern Africa and rhetoric concerning Soviet and Cuban interaction in Africa, neither Black Africa nor Latin American has been a major focal point of American international policy since President Kennedy's Latin American policies concerning the Alliance for Progress. This has especially been true in Latin America where the last decade has seen American promotion of the Panama Canal Treaty in 1977 and little else in the way of major policy initiatives. Nevertheless, primary source materials reveal numerous policy statements concerning both Latin America and Africa. Because relatively little action has been taken to secure these goals, many can be considered basically declaratory. The goals of the United States in these two areas (see Table 2) can be summarized as:

1. Promote the economic development and stability of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa,

2. Promote/support the political stability of friendly regimes in Latin American and sub-Saharan Africa,
3. Promote democratic institutions and human rights in these two areas,
4. Continue/increase American economic presence in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa,
5. Promote better/positive diplomatic relations in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa,
6. Keep Latin America free of external "hostile" aggression and influence,
7. Promote a peaceful transition to independence for African countries, and
8. Promote/enhance the security of the Cape Route and other major sea lanes of communication around Africa.

In a relative sense, sub-Saharan Africa has received more attention by American political-military decision-makers than Latin America. Much of this attention has been focused on conflict areas such as Angola and the Horn of Africa where Soviet and Cuban activities have been realized. Hence, in many respects, one could argue that Africa only becomes salient to U.S. military policy in the context of the East-West struggle. In much instances Africa becomes a "testing ground" for the foreign policies of the superpowers. The United States has pursued positive bilateral relations, supported political and economic development, and promoted self-reliance and independence but not in a fashion comparable to other regions of the world.

The same dynamics basically hold for Latin America as well. Few observers would suggest that the last decade has witnessed an active U.S. policy in the region. Other than isolated incidents, the attention of American foreign policy-makers are focused at areas that are perceived as having a more immediate payoff in the global balance of power and superpower rivalries.

CHAPTER 4. SOVIET GOALS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter consists of five sections. The first discusses the general orientation of Soviet policy. The next two describe the sources and methodological approaches used to identify Soviet goals. The fourth and longest section discusses the major Soviet goals identified in this study while the final section describes five measures for assessing Soviet goal outcomes that were considered valuable enough to code for all crises without any consideration of their relevance to each specific crisis. The former correspond to the crisis-specific goals discussed in Chapter 2 while the latter are general crisis goals. To illustrate Soviet perspectives, portions of the discussion are deliberately written from a Soviet vantagepoint.

ORIENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY

Soviet writers see their international policy as having several Marxist-Leninist characteristics that set it apart from the bourgeois policies of capitalist countries. These distinctions include:

- A working class orientation that gives a socialist character to state political-military policy,
- A democratic and humane orientation that lifts Soviet external policy above narrow nationalist and chauvinistic tendencies,
- A peaceful orientation that encourages mutually beneficial cooperation between socialist and nonsocialist countries and averts war and nuclear holocaust,
- A scientific orientation that enhances the creative character of its international policy and allows proper adjustment to changes in the international scene, and
- A theoretical orientation that enhances the ideological unity of socialist societies and strengthens the

prestige of Marxism-Leninism (see Ovsyany et al., 1975; Sanakoyev and Kapchenko, 1976; Brezhnev, 1973 and 1976).

In contrast, Soviet writers view the external policy of capitalist countries as controlled undemocratically by ruling circles, for the benefit of the small capitalist class. This policy is seen as exploitative of working classes in the capitalist countries. In addition, developing countries are seen as being exploited by capitalist countries through imperial, colonial, and neocolonial relationships (see Marushkin, 1975; Panfilov et al., 1972; and Brezhnev, 1976).

Principal Objective of Soviet External Policy

Soviet writers see the external policy of any socialist country as an instrument in the service of the international socialist community. Moreover, they see Soviet policy as having a disproportionately greater role to play than other socialist countries because of the greater resources of the Soviet Union and its role as the first socialist state. Thus, the Soviet's principal international policy objective is:

To secure the most favorable external conditions for the building of socialism and Communism (Ovsyany et al., 1975: 12).

In the short run this objective requires united struggle for the survival and consolidation of the world socialist community. Soviet writers interpret this as material, political, and ideological support for Communist parties, socialist countries, and other progressive movements such as national liberation groups. In the longer run, Soviet international policy seeks to achieve more abstract goals of worldwide "peace, freedom, security, social progress, and socialism," (Ovsyany et al., 1975: 12). As would be expected, the distinction between general/long-term goals and more specific/immediate goals is somewhat arbitrary, but, wherever it can be identified, it provides a useful analytical framework for study.

General/Long-Term Goals

Soviet general/long term goals are very wide ranging and their scope is increasing as the Soviet Union's capabilities, interests, and activities increase. They include abstract and often vaguely defined goals that are not attainable in the foreseeable future, and goals such as survival of the Party and the State that are perennially of major importance. Some of the most commonly cited Soviet goals include:

- Defend "the first socialist state,"
- Support the proletarian movements for socialism,
- Support the national-liberation movements (even when led by bourgeois-democratic groups),
- Work toward elimination of the capitalist system,
- • Prevent thermonuclear war,
- Promote "peaceful coexistence,"
- Strengthen the "world socialist system,"
- Promote the economic independence of LDC's,
- Promote the unity of the "world socialist system,"
- Strengthen relations with fraternal countries and their Communist and Workers parties,
- Promote economic mutual assistance and cooperation among socialist countries,
- Promote socialist development through investment in science and technology,
- Frustrate imperialist aggressors' plans by maintaining a strong world socialist system and taking firm actions,
- Promote peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial co-production as the foundation for the relations between socialist and capitalist countries,
- Support elimination of the colonial system's remnants,

- Support the present day liberation movement that has begun to grow into a struggle against feudal and/or capitalist exploitative relations,
- Assist states (even small and weak nations) steering towards the building of socialism,
- Strengthen the economic and defense potential of the USSR and the socialist community,
- Strengthen international support for peace and prevent imperialist reaction from pushing peaceful competition into a world nuclear conflict, and
- Support U.N. peacekeeping efforts.

The above list is far from exhaustive. There are many other likely Soviet goals that are seldom mentioned by Soviet writers or are only stated in vague terms. Nevertheless, the list includes most of the basic general/long-term goals. Most potentially missing goals tend to be more specific or deal with military subjects, an area in which Soviet writers tread gingerly.

SOURCES

The Soviet goals in this study were obtained chiefly from primary sources.¹ That is, most goals are based on speeches and writings of Soviet leaders, academicians, and journalists. Western sources were used mainly to fill some of the gaps on sensitive political issues that Soviet writers tend to avoid. The vast majority of the sources used can be summarized by the following categories:

- Books published and distributed in the Soviet Union,
- Books published in the Soviet Union mainly for overseas distribution,

¹ The utility of such primary sources for the analysis of Soviet external policy has already been demonstrated in CACI (1978e).

- Speeches at the CPSU Party Congresses,
- Soviet daily newspapers and other periodicals,
- Soviet radio broadcasts (transcripts monitored by the West),
- Speeches by Soviet diplomats at the United Nations,
- Western press coverage of the Soviet Union,
- Western academic studies of the Soviet Union,
- Unclassified works on the Soviet Union by the U.S. military-security community, and
- Anti-Soviet literature published in the West.

The degree of goal consistency over time and among different Soviet sources was found to be quite high. Consistency of Soviet sources with the works of well established scholars of Soviet affairs (such as Dinerstein, 1968; Ulam, 1974; and Simes, 1977) was found to range from low to fairly high depending on the issue area.² But there was no agreement in any issue area between Soviet sources and Western anti-Soviet writers.

APPROACH

The approach used to identify Soviet goals consisted of five steps:

1. Soviet writings and speeches were examined to identify Soviet goals from their own point of view,
2. Soviet goals identified by Western Soviet scholars were examined for their consistency with the general Soviet foreign policy goals identified in the preceding step,
3. Selected goals were taken from the works of Western scholars of Soviet affairs to fill the gaps for some issue areas, such as military goals, which Soviet writers cover incompletely (Newhouse, 1973),

² The disagreements generally are greater over how goals are implemented by the Soviet leadership than over what the major goals are.

4. Soviet foreign policy behavior since the 1917 Revolution was examined to check the consistency of goals and infer additional goals from Soviet historical actions, and
5. Western anti-Soviet literature was examined to obtain a critical perspective for reviewing the above goals. (In most cases however, this exercise proved of little value.)

The final set of goals were organized under five issue areas and seven geographic/regional areas:

1. The issue-related or functional goals included:

- Ideological goals,
- Interparty affairs,
- Domestic stability,
- Military goals, and
- Economic goals.

2. Regional/geographic goals were:

- Goals toward the capitalist countries,
- European goals,
- Goals toward the Third World,
- Asian goals,
- Middle Eastern/South Asian goals,
- African goals, and
- Latin American goals.

Thus, there are a total of twelve goal sets. Each consists of a number of major goals (usually three to five) and generally each major goal encompasses several more specific related or associated goals. Frequently, the latter are goals formulated in order to implement the more general goals. Therefore, each of the more specific goals may be relevant to more than one general goal.

Problems

The most serious potential problems in dealing with Soviet goals result from Soviet secrecy including possible misinformation and Western anti-Soviet propaganda that combine to complicate attempts to separate fact from fiction. The approach taken in this study involves accepting Soviet writers' and policymakers' own views of their goals and supplementing these with some of the Soviet goals identified by more objective (nonpropagandistic) Western experts of Soviet affairs. In general, the goals reflect Soviet leaders' perception of their world policy. In other words, they do not reflect the view of the anti-Soviet Western writers.³ Some of the common criticisms of taking such an approach are:

1. It is not known whether Soviet leaders and writers "tell the truth" about their goals. They may hide their real intentions and in fact tell the public only what suits them.
2. Soviet public goal statements are designed to deceive the West, their own people, their Communist allies, or world public opinion.
3. Soviet leaders have a history of publicly emphasizing their peaceful intentions while secretly harboring more sinister, aggressive goals such as world conquest.
4. Soviet leaders pay little attention to goals but are opportunists who seek to expand their power wherever the West shows weakness.
5. Soviet goals obviously are world conquest and Communization. Everything else they say is meaningless propaganda.

The validity of the above criticisms is open to question. The most politically naive criticisms (such as the last two) can be dismissed easily, but the others present possibly valid points.

³ However, the major goals can sometimes be interpreted to reflect anti-Soviet views.

In defense of the approach taken in the present study, it can be stated that all nations have to state most of their major goals publicly in order to transmit correct signals to their allies and friendly forces and, in many instances, their potential adversaries. To do otherwise would create misinformation and lead to future difficulties in communicating with friends and foes. The most obvious self-defeating aspect of creating misinformation about one's national goals is that coordination of policies with friendly groups in other countries will become increasingly difficult as times passes.

Furthermore, even if Soviet leaders' publicly stated goals since 1917 have been mere propaganda, surely each succeeding leadership generation should find it more difficult to behave inconsistently from those goals without creating domestic popular discontent and friction in Soviet relations with fraternal parties and friendly regimes in other countries. From the Soviet perspective, it can be argued that long-term education (foreign and domestic) through public statements is far too important to be sacrificed for the short-term expediency of deceiving adversaries through public misinformation about Soviet goals. This is not to say, however, that the Soviets are completely explicit about each of their goals. The point, rather, is that publicly articulated Soviet goals are likely to identify many of the events and processes whose outcomes are of concern to the Soviet leadership.

MAJOR SOVIET GOALS

Table 1 presents the list of twelve goal sets and the major goals in each set. (The more specific goals can be seen in the detailed list presented in the last section of this chapter.)

Issue Related Goals

The five issue-related goals are the most basic or elemental Soviet aims that determine the general thrust of Soviet international policy. They

TABLE 1
Major Soviet Goals
(49 goals)^a

Ideology

1. Support Marxist-Leninist ideology
2. Maintain ideological unity of the fraternal Communist countries
3. Maintain/enhance ideological leadership of CPSU
4. Support other progressive ideologies

Interparty Affairs

1. Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's
2. Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs
3. Give support to CP's in capitalist countries
4. Give support to CP's in developing countries

Domestic Stability

1. Maintain/restore domestic stability
2. Oppose external interference in Soviet domestic affairs
3. Maintain/restore stability of non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union

Economic

1. Increase economic capacity of Soviet Union at a rapid pace
2. Increase economic cooperation with fraternal socialist countries
3. Expand mutually beneficial commercial relations with all countries
4. Assist economic independence of LDC's

Military

1. Defend the first socialist state against external threat
2. Defend the fraternal socialist countries (and Finland, Austria, and Sweden)
3. Support progressive and democratic forces abroad
4. Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces

Goals Toward Capitalist Countries

1. Reduce chances of war with the United States and NATO
2. Increase mutually beneficial exchanges
3. Press the anticapitalist ideological struggle

^a Written from a Soviet vantagepoint

Continued

Table 1
Major Soviet Goals
Continued

Europe

1. Maintain/increase security of East European buffer states
2. Oppose revival of militarism in West Germany
3. Promote the unity of fraternal socialist parties in Europe
4. Oppose anti-Soviet European-Chinese cooperation
5. Promote peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation with nonsocialist European countries

Goals Toward Third World Countries

1. Defend fraternal socialist countries in the Third World
2. Defend progressive regimes and movements and socialist oriented countries
3. Support economic independence of LDC's
4. Increase Soviet international prestige (among LDC's)
5. Contain Chinese influence among LDC's

Asia

1. Deter/oppose China from military adventures against USSR
2. Deter/oppose China from military adventures against fraternal socialist countries
3. Support/defend fraternal socialist countries against other external threats
4. Develop alternative transport routes to the Trans-Siberian railway
5. Undermine the legitimacy of China's territorial claims
6. Support progressive governments and countries with socialist orientation
7. Support peaceful relations with Asian countries

Middle East South Asia

1. Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to the Soviet Union
2. Support progressive and socialist oriented governments in the region
3. Support progressive and democratic movements in the region
4. Support economic independence of countries in the region
5. Secure Soviet naval access to the Indian Ocean

Africa

1. Defend/support countries proclaiming intention of building socialism
2. Support other progressive regimes and movements and socialist oriented countries

Continued

Table 1
Major Soviet Goals
Continued

3. Support economic independence of African countries
4. Increase Soviet influence/prestige among African countries
5. Contain Chinese influence among African countries

Latin America

1. Defend/support Cuba against external threats
2. Avoid direct military confrontation with the United States and OAS
3. Encourage independence of Latin American countries from the United States
4. Increase solidarity among progressive and democratic forces
5. Increase Soviet influence/prestige in Latin America

include ideological, interparty, domestic, military, and economic goals. In the following sections each goal set is briefly discussed and placed in the proper (Soviet) perspective.

Ideological Goals. It is not uncommon among Soviet area experts in the West to overemphasize the role of ideology and at the same time attribute Soviet "expansionism," for instance, in the Middle East, to such nonideological factors as the will of Peter the Great! Soviet writers' polemical style reinforces some Western scholars' tendency to overrate the role of ideology in general discussions of Soviet international policy. Lack of access to information on Soviet policy making processes, however, often leads Western scholars to fall back on historical and other nonideological factors in explaining specific instances of Soviet foreign policy behavior.⁴

Based on Soviet writers' own discussions, the two most important ideological goals of the Soviet Union appear to be:

1. Supporting the development of Marxist-Leninist ideology as a dynamic, practical doctrine for building socialism and Communism, and
2. Maintaining the ideological unity of the fraternal socialist countries in the face of the reactionary designs of capitalist and bourgeois elements.⁵

In addition, an examination of Soviet history shows that, under Lenin and the post-Stalinist regimes, the Soviet Union has given considerable support to other progressive ideologies and groups such as the national liberation and peace movements.

⁴ For a critical evaluation of ideology's role in Soviet foreign policy see Adomeit (1973: 15-20). For general Soviet views on this issue see Gililou (1975), Sanakoyev and Kapchenko (1976), and Ovsyany et al. (1975).

⁵ Soviet sensitivity on these issues can be seen in Gililov (1975), Sladkovsky (1972); Silin (1975); Momjan (1974); and Marushkin (1975).

A major sensitive point in the area of Soviet ideological goals is the question of the rank or status of the CPSU and Soviet government among other CP's and fraternal socialist countries, respectively. As the first socialist, Marxist-Leninist country and, therefore, the first country to have had to interpret Marxist-Leninist doctrine for practical application under extremely threatening conditions, Soviet leaders feel they deserve appreciation by and a certain degree of respect from other socialist countries and CP's. Moreover, Soviet sacrifices during the Great Patriotic War (WWII) and the postwar Soviet military umbrella have been beneficial for the growth and consolidation of the Marxist-Leninist socialist community. Thus, the Soviet Union sees itself as a leading and the most influential element of the fraternal socialist community which has always carried the major burden of developing and defending socialism.⁶

The Soviet regime, however, is very sensitive to charges of domination and "diktat" by other Communist countries and parties. When under such attacks, they have generally defended themselves as a country that is a banner bearer of socialism only in the sense that historically it was the first socialist state and the first to have had to practice building socialism by interpreting what then were untried Marxist-Leninist doctrines. This interpretation emphasizes the historical role of the CPSU and Soviet Union and deemphasizes their present leadership aspirations among the socialist countries. Soviet leaders see their party's present formal status as being "equal" to that of other CP's. Their informal national status is seen as being greater than other socialist countries by the virtue of their larger economic and military capabilities, but they claim they seek no special privileges on the basis of these resources.

In practice, the Soviet Union and CPSU have at times deliberately exercised control over other CP's through many different instruments of power including military force, financial assistance, party organization,

⁶ See Krushchev's speeches in defense of the Soviet ideological role at the 20th CPSU Congress.

infiltration, and terror. Such iron fist practices were most prevalent during Stalin's leadership and were definitely greatly reduced after his death. The degree to which the CPSU now controls or influences other CP's and socialist countries varies a great deal by case. Their influence over the Chinese, Albanian, and Yugoslav parties is minimal at best. Their control over most well established West European CP's is probably not very high and exercised mainly through financial assistance. On the other hand their control over the Mongolian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian CP's and governments is considerable though the exact degree is subject to wide ranging estimates. It is worth noting that two East European members of the Warsaw Pact -- Poland and Rumania -- have been increasingly independent of CPSU and Soviet policies.

The Soviet Union's ideological leadership of the socialist world probably could not be maintained peacefully if it did not demonstrate moral and material support for "progressive and democratic movements" around the world. Soviet leaders probably would like to support all Marxist-Leninist and other progressive movements around the world that are not unfriendly toward the Soviet Union. However, there are major constraints including:

1. Limited financial resources available for such operations,
2. Limited military capacity,
3. The danger of reaction by capitalists and imperialist major powers possibly leading to war, and
4. The danger of repressive reaction by capitalist and bourgeois elements in the region where the Soviet aid is targeted possibly leading to the destruction of the groups the Soviet Union is trying to aid.

Historically Soviet leaders have shown very high restraint in supporting progressive and democratic movements beyond their border areas in tangible terms. It was, therefore, natural that when China began to move away from the Soviet ideological leadership it increasingly attacked Soviet lack of support for world progressive movements as a major ideological deviation.

Interparty Affairs. The interparty goals of the Soviet Union are closely related to her ideological goals. Primary interparty goals relate to maintaining Soviet leadership and world socialist unity. Secondary goals involve maintaining some degree of influence among Communist parties (CP's) in the nonsocialist countries of the Third World and capitalist nations.⁷

Although Soviet writers generally avoid ascribing a leadership role to the Soviet Union or CPSU in external policy making for the socialist camp as a whole, the implication is present in much of their writing. For instance, they emphasize the innovative role of Lenin and the CPSU in the prewar years and seldom fail to mention the central role of the Red Army during the post-World War II period in defending the socialist world against the aggressive and reactionary policies of the capitalist circles in the West.⁸

The Soviet Union also attaches great emphasis to maintaining socialist unity through disciplined, united stands of fraternal parties (that is, Communist parties) against the capitalist countries. Soviet writers generally avoid discussing interparty disputes and tensions or, for that matter, other embarrassing topics. The Soviet leadership has generally tried to maintain interparty unity while maintaining the CPSU's leadership of the parties. When the two have become incompatible the leadership aspiration has been relaxed slightly but never enough to allow major deviations such as the 1956 Hungarian counterrevolution or Czechoslovakia's reformism.

⁷ Soviet writers generally ignore these issues. (See, for instance, Gililov et al 1975.) Therefore, these goals are mainly inferred from Soviet international policy behavior and writings of Western experts on Soviet affairs.

⁸ See Kovalenko et al (1977), Voroshilo (1971), and Marushkin (1975).

The growing independence of West European CP's and some East European parties (such as the Rumanian, Polish, and Yugoslavian parties) appears to be associated by design with another interparty development: the gradually increasing support of the CPSU for progressive movements in the Third World. Therefore, the latter may be a policy for compensating loss of influence among East European CP's. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, very often the progressive movements in the Third World turn against Communist parties with greater energy than the worst examples among the capitalist groups.⁹

Domestic Stability. The great sensitivity of Soviet leaders to any form of domestic instability and external interference cannot be overstated. These are reflected, respectively, by their emphases on "discipline" and their strong reactions to Western human rights policies, which they see as a smokescreen for tampering with the Soviet Union's Communist construction.¹⁰

The importance of maintaining domestic political stability to the Soviet leadership has its roots in the early, tumultuous history of the formation of the Soviet state, the national diversity of the country, and the Marxist-Leninist concept of discipline. The great value placed on national discipline has historically been reinforced by the October Revolution, the Civil War, collaborationism among certain ethnic groups during the Second World War, and the external exploitation of nationalistic ferment during the Cold War.

The cataclysmic birth of the Soviet state, during which the central government headed by the small Bolshevik party was faced with internal

⁹ The most recent example is the Baath Party in Iraq, which began mass execution of Iraqi Communists in 1978 and forced most party leaders to flee the country in 1979.

¹⁰ See the speeches at the 1976 CPSU Party Congress.

as well as external enemies, has framed most Soviet attitudes toward domestic stability. The tasks which faced the Soviet leadership during those early years included, first and foremost, establishing and maintaining discipline in the party, the bureaucracy, and the army under the complete control of party leaders.¹¹ Then using these instruments, the leadership was faced with accomplishing three major goals in order to establish domestic stability:

1. Repulse and crush the counterrevolutionary "white" forces,
2. Restore central control over the non-Russian nationalities in the territories of the former Tsarist Empire, and
3. Eliminate intervention and interference in Soviet affairs by foreign powers and neighboring countries.

For the most part these goals were accomplished by the mid-1920's but the price paid in terms of lives and economic dislocations were huge. The great costs of restoring order during the early years of the Soviet Union is probably a major reason why domestic stability became the sine qua non of Soviet policy.

The great value of internal stability to Soviet policy was further reinforced by the experiences of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War (WWII) and the Cold War, when external adversaries exploited internal Soviet weaknesses, particularly the nationalities problem.¹²

Military Goals. Soviet military goals are the most controversial subjects treated by Western students of Soviet affairs. In addition to the

¹¹ See Voroshilov (1971), Kovalenko et al. (1977), Zenushkina (1975), and Marushkin (1975).

¹² For Soviet sensitivity to their nationalities problem see Marushkin (1975), Zenushkina (1975), Shevtsov (1975), and Uvachan (1975).

usual pro- and anti-Soviet groups of experts, a host of pro- and antimilitary groups have staked their claims on this subject area. Since the degree of Soviet threat to the West (and consequently the size of Western military budgets) partly depends on Soviet military intentions, Soviet military goals have been a subject of contention between supporters and opponents of military spending in every major Western country.

In order to steer clear of the maze of claims and counterclaims about Soviet military goals, the approach used in identifying Soviet military goals was:

1. Soviet military publications and speeches by military leaders were used to identify many goals, and
2. Known Soviet military actions since the Second World War were examined to infer additional goals consistent with those identified previously.

None of the military goals are based on Western analytical studies (pro- or anti-Soviet). Since Soviet sources were used, the goals reflect a Soviet interpretation of their military policy. However, the individual military goals are not always inconsistent with anti-Soviet views. The anti-Soviet writers often begin with the same goals as identified in this study, but then interpret them differently than Soviet writers.

The Soviets view their armed forces as having an "internationalist duty." Of course, the primary task of the army to defend Communist construction in the motherland, but its secondary tasks are internationalist and generally involve the defense of socialism's achievements abroad.¹³

The most important secondary task involves the defense of fraternal socialist countries, which under current definition involves all Communist

¹³ See speeches by Soviet defense ministers at various CPSU Party Congresses since the 1952 Nineteenth Congress. Also see Voroshilov (1971).

countries except China and Albania. Among these, the defense of bordering countries in East Europe and Mongolia are the most important because of their close association to the defense of the Soviet Union itself and their linkages to the idea of the permanence of post-World War II Soviet borders.

Next to the defense of bordering countries, comes the defense of other Communist allies: Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, Cambodia (since early 1979), Cuba, and Yugoslavia. After these, the defense of the neutrality of non-Communist Finland, Austria, and Sweden closely follow.

The Soviet Union's other internationalist military duties involve giving aid to other "progressive" and "democratic" forces abroad. These include socialist and national liberation movements and nations fighting for their economic independence from neocolonialism and imperialism. This aid involves discouraging and deterring imperialist military intervention in the Third World and assisting the armies of developing countries.

Economic Goals. The heavy emphasis of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on economic variables is clearly reflected in Soviet economic policy since the establishment of a stable socialist regime in the Soviet Union in the early 1920's. After the Civil War, Soviet economic planners formulated and implemented a number of medium-term economic plans with such concentrated energy that, by the late 1930's, the economy had fully recovered from the destructions of World War I, the 1917 Revolution, and the Civil War. Furthermore, they had started a major military industrialization that proved crucial in stopping the German conquest and rolling the German army back across the Balkans and East Europe to Berlin. These and subsequent economic plans shed a great deal of light on Soviet long-term economic goals.

These goals are not different from those of most other countries: improvement of the economic capacity of the nation in order to improve welfare,

defense, and future growth. Over most of its short history, the Soviet Union has translated its long-term economic goals into formal medium-term plans of generally five years' duration.

The major objective to Soviet economic plans is, "further construction of the material and technical base of Communism in [the Soviet Union]," (Kosygin 1976: 112). That Soviet ideologists emphasize both economic base and capacity is not coincidental. Soviet 5-year plans have always reflected this bias clearly by emphasizing heavy industries and extractive (natural resource) industries. In the later 1930's the emphasis on heavy industries was partly justified as necessary for rapid expansion of the Red Army's fighting capacity. However, the bias has been present even during periods of military demobilization. In more recent plans, Soviet production of consumer goods has been expanding more rapidly, but according to Western intelligence estimates production has been slower than had been anticipated because of a high resource allocation for the military sector.

The economic goals most directly related to Soviet major objectives are: rapid increases in the output of the economy that are usually analyzed as requiring increased labor productivity; increased use of modern technology; improved efficiency in industrial management; more rapid exploitation of vast natural resources; and increased trade with other countries.

Soviet planners see trade expansion as serving their internationalist socialist duty with fraternal countries, improving detente, and helping them improve efficiency through greater specialization.

The Soviet economic goals are ultimately dependent on the rate at which the economy's output (or income) increases. Soviet planners' emphasis on investment at the expense of civilian consumption is a reflection of their bias toward heavy industries and natural resource extraction. Their stress of research and development is closely associated with the

Marxist-Leninist emphasis (some would say obsession) with "scientific" methods. This strategy of high investment, low present consumption, and overemphasis (by Western standards) on heavy industry, resource extraction, and research and development was spectacularly successful. By the early 1950's, the economy had largely recovered from the horrendous devastations of World War II and was effectively transforming large segments of partially (or yet to be) industrialized regions of the Soviet Union, east of the Ural mountains, to fully industrialized societies. After extremely rapid growth during the immediate postwar years, the rate of growth of aggregated income/product (GNP) declined gradually but still remained high. The annual growth of real GNP was 5.8 and 5.1 percent during the 1950's and 1960's respectively (see Gomulka, 1977 and Central Intelligence Agency, 1977a).

By the late 1960's, however, the Soviet economic strategy had apparently run into difficulties. GNP growth had slowed to about 4 percent. In the 1970's, Soviet economic planners began to substantially lower their sights, but still proved far more optimistic than actual experience warranted (see Central Intelligence Agency, 1977a, 1977b).

The future growth of the Soviet economy depends on successful implementation of projects in which Soviet planners and managers have been highly successful (such as heavy industries, resource extraction, building economic infrastructure, and scientific research) as well as progress in areas where they have been inefficient (such as large scale manufacture of mass consumer goods, efficient services industries, marketing, and distribution of goods and services). Since the 1960's the Soviet Union has been attempting to make progress in these areas through domestic innovation and limited imports of technology and managerial techniques from the West (see Central Intelligence Agency, 1977b).

The major Soviet economic goals identified for this study are:

- Increase the economic capacity of the Soviet Union at a rapid pace,

- Increase economic cooperation with fraternal socialist countries,
- Expand mutually beneficial commercial relations with all countries, and
- Assist the economic independence of the developing countries (see Kosygin, 1976).

The first goal, which is by far the most important, primarily involves the domestic economy of the Soviet Union. The other three goals involve primarily external economic relations. However, since Soviet leaders strongly believe in the mutual advantages of trade and economic specialization, external relations often have direct implications for domestic economic growth. Furthermore, in cases where external economic relations become a costly burden on the Soviet economy (for example, Cuba and Vietnam), the relationship will have a potentially direct negative impact.

It is important to always bear in mind the element of "struggle" in Soviet economic policy. All Soviet economic goals are in part designed to promote socialism and Communism vis-a-vis capitalism, imperialism and, in relevant situations, feudalism. Soviet economic goals are primarily oriented toward the economic development of the Soviet Union and friendly (fraternal) socialist countries. However, Soviet economic policy is also directed toward reducing the economic base (that is, markets) of capitalist countries. In practice, this policy involves encouraging the independence of developing nations' economies from neocolonialist relationships with capitalist countries, discouragement of "economic blocs" (such as the Common Market) that discriminate against Soviet goods, and encouragement of economic relations between socialist and capitalist countries.

Soviet economic goals toward the nonsocialist countries are constrained by a number of factors. First, Soviet imports have always been constrained by shortages of hard currency because Soviet exports cannot increase as rapidly as potential imports. Second, the Soviet Union has

been subject to discriminatory trade practices by other countries during most of its short history. Third, Soviet leaders appear ambivalent about allowing their economy to become dependent on outside economies. Although the deliberate isolationist practices of the first few decades of Soviet economic history were ended after the death of Stalin, Soviet leaders are very cautious in allowing rapid development of external linkages.

Regional/Geographic Goals

The seven regional/geographic goals of the Soviet Union are determined by the historical development of Soviet foreign relations with specific geographic regions and countries as well as the five basic issue-related goals: ideology, interparty affairs, stability, military strength, and economic growth. The seven regional/geographic goals are often organized into two separate sets:

1. Goals oriented toward the capitalist industrialized countries that are sometimes broken down into three categories: Europe, U.S.A., and Japan; and
2. Goals oriented toward developing Third World countries that are usually broken down into four categories: Asia, Middle East/South Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In this study the seven regional/geographic goal sets are:

- Goals towards capitalist countries,
- European goals (includes NATO),
- Goals toward Third World countries,
- Asian goals,
- Middle Eastern/South Asian goals,
- African goals, and
- Latin American goals.

Goals toward the United States and Japan are generally covered by goals toward capitalist countries and NATO (that is, Europe). Goals toward the Third World countries are detailed in a general form as well as separately for each of the four Third World regions.

Goals Toward the Capitalist Countries. Soviet relationships with capitalist countries have been a major concern of Soviet leaders from the beginning of the history of the Soviet state. From the Marxist-Leninist perspective this importance of capitalist countries has two sources:

1. Capitalism is the major adversary of socialism, and
2. Capitalist countries have been the only countries capable of destroying socialism through military aggression or more recently through worldwide nuclear destruction.

Soviet goals toward the capitalist countries are primarily determined by the Soviet Union's historical relationship with these countries and the more basic ideological, interparty, military, economic, and domestic stability goals. This historical relationship of the Soviet Union with the capitalist countries can be divided into seven stages:

1. The period of Soviet struggle against capitalist encirclement, 1917-1925;
2. The period of economic isolation from capitalist countries, 1925-1933;
3. The first period of limited interactions with capitalist countries, 1933-1940;
4. The period of military cooperation against fascism, 1941-1945;
5. The second period of capitalist encirclement, 1946-1953;
6. The second period of limited interactions with capitalist countries, 1954-1962; and

7. The period of increasing peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation, but continued ideological struggle, 1963-present.

During most of its history the major thrusts of Soviet policy toward capitalist countries have been:¹⁴

1. To reduce the chances of a worldwide war in which the capitalist countries unite against the Soviet Union to destroy the first socialist state,
2. To encourage capitalist countries to engage in trade and other "mutually beneficial exchanges" with the Soviet Union, and
3. To maintain the basic ideological struggle against capitalism and avoid the loss of socialist and Communist purpose as a result of capitalist inroads. (See Shershnev, 1978; Kirsanov, 1975; Nalin and Nikolayev, 1973; and Ovsyany, 1975.)

The Soviet Union's desire to avoid war with capitalist countries has been the major factor behind its cautious and conservative foreign and military policies during most of Soviet history. The Soviet leadership has seldom encouraged "adventurist" policies.¹⁵ Their advocacy of "peaceful coexistence" has not been inconsistent with their own interpretation of its meaning. Finally, Soviet leaders have generally tried to interpret their military actions as means of the last resort that should be used only when peaceful negotiations fail and then only if there is adequate military capability to assure a very high probability of success.

¹⁴ See the speeches of Krushchev and Brezhnev at various Party Congresses and Sivachev and Yakovlev (1979), Vladimirov and Teplov (1977), Arbatov (1973), Beryozkin (1969), and Tunkin (1969).

¹⁵ Adventurism in Soviet terminology usually implies a tendency to act with inadequate means or attempting to act when the "correlation of forces" is unfavorable. It also may mean attempting to achieve too much too soon.

Even in most "worst case" Western scenarios, Soviet military power has always been inadequate for successfully attacking major capitalist countries. Consequently, it is not surprising that the conservative Soviet leaders have preferred peaceful means of conflict resolution. Indeed, Soviet writers have strongly emphasized the value of peaceful coexistence during most of their history. It is unlikely that this line of argument has been purely Soviet propaganda or a hoax to catch the Western countries off guard. Furthermore, even in a totalitarian society it is unlikely that a propaganda line could be maintained for more than one generation without becoming a part of the real value system of the next generations. Soviet leaderships have shown far too great an appreciation for the impact of the spoken and written word on the Soviet people to consistently bombard them with the advantages of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries and then expect them not to believe in it.¹⁶

The anticapitalist ideological struggle of the Soviet Union has been generally peaceful. The Soviet leadership has been careful to emphasize that their peaceful policy toward capitalists is the most rational approach toward Communist construction at home and the growth of socialism abroad. Peaceful coexistence, they argue, discourages capitalist military adventurism and does not impede the hastening doom of the capitalist system. The rationale for this belief is that, as long as there is peace, socialism inherently gathers strength while the economic base of capitalism shrinks.

There are certain limiting factors to the Soviet concept of peaceful relations with capitalist countries. Even if one assumes a very high Soviet desire for rapid expansion of mutually beneficial, peaceful relations with the major capitalist countries, the growth of such relations will be limited by several factors:

1. Shortages of hard currency for importing goods and services,

¹⁶ For a sampling of speeches on peaceful coexistence, see those made at Party Congresses since the 20th Congress. For more recent ones see Brezhnev (1979).

2. The inferiority of the Soviet Union in many scientific, technological, and cultural areas,
3. The closed nature of Soviet society compared to most major capitalist societies, and
4. Possible fears by the Soviet leaders that too much contact may lead to an infiltration of Soviet society by capitalism.

Goals Toward the Third World. Shortly after the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union began to seek out potential friendly countries in the Third World probably in order to establish broader diplomatic relations with nonsocialist countries and break out of the isolationism that Stalin's foreign policy and Western containment had imposed on the Soviet Union and her socialist allies. The first major breakthroughs came in the mid-1950's in relations with the "progressive" regimes of Indonesia, India, and Arab countries. These successes were reinforced by the establishment of the nonaligned group of nations which the Soviets saw as the first stage in the breakup of the Western containment policy. The popularity of nonalignment among Third World countries gathered momentum in the 1960's when many new nations gained independence from colonial powers. By the early 1970's the coalition of nonaligned countries was strong enough to finally bring about victory on an issue that had become a symbolic trial of strength between nonaligned countries and those Western nations that still held to some aspects of the containment policy. The issue was seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations in place of Taiwan as the sole representative of the Chinese people and the victory took place in the fall of 1971.

Many Western analysts interpret Soviet policy in the Third World as opportunistic. The Soviet Union is viewed as constantly on the prowl for "power vacuums" to fill with Soviet presence or accused of creating instability in order to "fish in muddy waters." Such interpretations generally ignore the historical Soviet policy positions toward a region.

Opportunism implies no policy momentum and assumes far more flexibility in Soviet foreign policy than appears practical.

Soviet writers generally present the capitalist countries as the exploiters and opportunists in foreign policy. From their view, Soviet goals toward the developing countries (Third World) are determined by historical Soviet foreign policy experiences toward these countries as well as interactions of major Soviet goals in areas such as ideology, interparty relations, domestic stability, economy, and military affairs.¹⁷ In the early years of Soviet history the major thrust of Soviet policy in the Third World involved supporting small, local Communist parties or giving symbolic support to the liberation of colonial subjected peoples. Currently, Soviet support for progressive and democratic groups in the Third World appears to be growing in scope and intensity.

Simultaneously, Soviet support for socialist-oriented countries and regimes proclaiming a Marxist orientation has been growing. To date, the Soviet Union's support for Third World groups has been mainly concentrated in Indochina, Africa, and the Middle East. Latin American groups other than Cubans have received very little support and Southeast Asian groups other than the Indochinese have been largely ignored.

There are obvious economic, political, and ideological constraints on Soviet support for progressive and democratic movements in the Third World. These put varying limits on Soviet involvement in developing countries that depend partly on Soviet stakes in each country or region. The constraints are likely to be low in inaccessible or hostile regions and greatest among Third World regimes deemed most deserving of Soviet assistance. For instance, an attack by China or capitalist countries against a socialist Third World country is very likely to lead to Soviet intervention. The likelihood increases in proportion to the proximity

¹⁷ See Brutents (1972), Zhukov et al. (1970), Ulyanovsky (1974), Stainis et al. (1976), Ovsyany (1975), and Sanakoyev and Kapchenko (1976).

of the fighting to the Soviet border and centers of Soviet military power. There is little doubt that an attack against Mongolia will lead to direct Soviet military involvement. A major attack against Vietnam is likely to lead to limited Soviet intervention. An attack against a Soviet socialist-oriented ally, such as India or Iraq, is likely to lead to more limited involvement. Finally, an attack against a nonsocialist friendly country such as Libya is not likely to lead to any significant Soviet direct action.

In most cases, Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World is benign and symbolic. The Soviet Union is quick to pick up popular causes that do not harm Soviet interests, such as antiapartheid policy in Southern Africa, political independence of colonial peoples, and economic independence from the foreign monopolies and capitalists. The fact that these causes may harm Western interests may not be coincidental, but the causes are not purely opportunistic. At least at a symbolic level, Marxist-Leninist doctrine is committed to humanistic values that lend support to these policies independent from their anticapitalist position. The opportunism that Stalin and, more subtly, Lenin brought to Marxism may have obscured its humanistic values but the symbols remain and can be used to attempt to elicit support for such popular causes particularly among the Third World audiences.

A relatively recent Soviet goal toward developing countries has been the isolation of Chinese influence. This began in the mid-1960's as relatively peaceful competition for influence among liberation movements and a controversy over strategy and tactics for fighting capitalism and imperialism.¹⁸ By the 1970's it degenerated into an aggressive struggle for the leadership of progressive movements in the Third World. The

¹⁸ For the Soviet view of the Sino-Soviet dispute see Sladkosky (1972), Zhelokhovtsev (1975), Borisov and Koloskov (1975), and Feoktistov (1972).

Soviet view of this struggle blames all the problems on China's adventurism and dogmatic unrealism that:

1. Led to setbacks for progressive movements in many Third World countries such as Indonesia, Burma, and Cambodia,
2. Created divisions among the world progressive and democratic forces,
3. Finally, after two decades of extreme left policies that created havoc in China and among her misguided allies, led China to turn to the extreme right, advocate reactionary policies, and align herself with the worst enemies of socialism.

Popular Soviet writers consider China as deserving no sympathy for deserting the socialist path. The more official Soviet view still holds that Chinese people are part of the socialist camp and once the leaders of China abandon their extremism of right or left they would be welcomed back to the socialist camp with open arms. Meanwhile, Soviet policy appears to be one of diplomatically isolating and militarily containing China in order to minimize her mischiefs in the Third World and deter her from military adventures against the Soviet Union and her allies. (See Sladkovsky (1972), Sladkovsky et al. (1975), Zhelokhovtsev (1975), Vladimirov and Ryazantsev (1976)).

Detailed Listing of Soviet Goals

In the following pages a detailed listing of Soviet goals is provided. Each goal set is preceded by a heading that describes an issue-related or regional/geographic goal set. Each goal set consists of a number of major goals and each major goal is accompanied by a set of more specific associated goals. The latter are indented in order to distinguish them from the general goals (which are underlined). All of these aims are crisis-specific goals whose relevance varies across crises.

IDEOLOGICAL GOALS^a

1. Support Marxist-Leninist Ideology

- 1.1 Oppose reactionary ideologies

2. Maintain/Enhance Ideological Unity of the Fraternal Communist Parties

- 2.1 Oppose extremists of the right and the left
- 2.2 Oppose narrow nationalism
- 2.3 Support diverse development of socialism
- 2.4 Avoid charges of domination of CP's or socialist countries

3. Maintain/Enhance Ideological Leadership of CPSU

- 3.1 Maintain leadership in interpreting Marxist-Leninist doctrine in foreign policy
- 3.2 Maintain leadership in interpreting Marxist-Leninist doctrine in domestic policy
- 3.3 Maintain/enhance prestige of CPSU

4. Support Other Progressive Ideologies

- 4.1 Support national liberation movements
- 4.2 Support democratic tendencies of social-democratic parties
- 4.3 Support peace movements in capitalist countries

INTERPARTY AFFAIR GOALS

1. Maintain/Enhance Leadership of CPSU in International Policy Making of CP's

- 1.1 Oppose revisionist CP's
- 1.2 Oppose adventurist CP's
- 1.3 Support progressive movements
- 1.4 Deter imperialist/capitalist adventures against CP's
- 1.5 Oppose Chinese attempts to split the CP's

^a Goals are deliberately written from a Soviet vantagepoint.

2. Maintain/Enhance Unity of CP's in Foreign Affairs

- 2.1 Allow for some national diversity in domestic policies among foreign CP's
- 2.2 Maintain the unity of fraternal parties in foreign policy
- 2.3 Oppose Chinese attempts to split CP's
- 2.4 Oppose capitalist attempts to split CP's

3. Give Support to CP's in Developed Capitalist Countries

- 3.1 Support peaceful transition to socialism

4. Give Support to CP's in Developing Countries

- 4.1 Give moral and financial support
- 4.2 Oppose persecution of CP members by military/police forces

DOMESTIC STABILITY GOALS

1. Maintain/Restore Domestic Stability in the Soviet Union

- 1.1 Maintain/restore domestic discipline (law and order)

2. Oppose External Interference in Soviet Domestic Affairs

- 2.1 Oppose interference by bourgeois intellectuals from capitalist countries
- 2.2 Oppose interference by governments of capitalist countries
- 2.3 Oppose interference by social-democratic parties

3. Maintain/Restore Stability of Non-Russian Nationalities in the Soviet Union

- 3.1 Maintain/restore stability among Moslem nationalities
- 3.2 Maintain/restore stability among European nationalities
- 3.3 Maintain/restore stability among Eastern nationalities (e.g., Mongols, Koreans, Chinese)
- 3.4 Maintain/restore stability among the Northern nationalities

MILITARY GOALS

1. Defend the First Socialist State Against External Threats

- 1.1 Avoid worldwide nuclear war
- 1.2 Survive a nuclear attack

2. Defend the Fraternal Socialist Countries (and Finland, Austria, Sweden)

- 2.1 Increase military cooperation with fraternal armies of socialist countries
- 2.2 Oppose militarism and foreign military bases in Finland, Austria, and Sweden

3. Support Progressive and Democratic Forces Abroad

- 3.1 Assist national liberation movements
- 3.2 Support countries fighting against imperialist domination
- 3.3 Support forces fighting against white racism
- 3.4 Support progressive Arab states against Israeli aggression

4. Increase the Prestige of Soviet Armed Forces

- 4.1 Deter capitalist/imperialist adventurism
- 4.2 Deter Chinese military adventurism against Asian Communist countries

ECONOMIC GOALS

1. Increase Economic Capacity of the Soviet Union at a Rapid Rate

- 1.1 Increase investment in industry, manpower, and natural resources
- 1.2 Increase investment in welfare of Soviet citizens
- 1.3 Increase investment in defense forces and military industries

2. Increase Economic Cooperation with Fraternal Socialist Countries

- 2.1 Increase trade and specialization among socialist countries
- 2.2 Increase integration of economic plans among socialist countries
- 2.3 Cooperate in resolving regional problems such as energy shortages

3. Expand Mutually Beneficial Peaceful Relations With all Countries

- 3.1 Increase trade with capitalist countries
- 3.2 Increase trade with developing countries
- 3.3 Cooperate with other countries in solving international economic problems

4. Assist Economic Independence of Developing Countries

- 4.1 Give economic credit for expansion of trade with developing countries
- 4.2 Assist development of industries in developing countries
- 4.3 Assist developing countries in exploration and development of their natural resources
- 4.4 Assist developing countries in training and education of their technical manpower
- 4.5 Oppose imperialist and neocolonialist domination of developing countries

GOALS TOWARD CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

1. Reduce Chances of War With U.S.A. and NATO

- 1.1 Deter capitalist adventurism against fraternal socialist countries
- 1.2 Encourage military detente with U.S. and NATO
- 1.3 Discourage militarism and nuclear proliferation in Germany/Japan
- 1.4 Encourage noninterference in internal affairs of socialist countries

2. Increase Mutually Beneficial Exchanges with Capitalist Countries

- 2.1 Increase mutually beneficial trade with capitalist countries
- 2.2 Increase selected cultural and scientific exchanges
- 2.3 Increase practical science and technology exchanges
- 2.4 Increase cooperation in resolving world problems (e.g., energy, oceans, environment)

3. Press the Anticapitalist Ideological Struggle

- 3.1 Support CP's and progressive forces in capitalist countries

- 3.2 Expose the aggressive nature of capitalism
- 3.3 Expose the hollowness of revisions of capitalist ideology
- 3.4 Reject capitalist concepts of convergence of the two systems

EUROPEAN GOALS

1. Maintain/Increase Security of the East European Buffer States

- 1.1 Reduce sources of international tension in central Europe
- 1.2 Promote arms reduction and dismantling of aggressive blocs in Europe
- 1.3 Promote withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe
- 1.4 Promote recognition of existing boundaries in Europe
- 1.5 Promote recognition of East Germany by all governments
- 1.6 Promote independence of West Europe from the United States
- 1.7 Avoid inducing arms race mentalities in NATO countries
- 1.8 Support a European collective security system

2. Oppose Revival of Militarism in West Germany

- 2.1 Oppose nuclear weapon acquisition by West Germany
- 2.2 Oppose stationing of NATO nuclear weapons in West Germany
- 2.3 Encourage nuclear nonproliferation in Europe
- 2.4 Discourage increased military spending by West Germany
- 2.5 Discourage West German participation in overseas military adventures

3. Promote the Unity of Fraternal Socialist Parties in Europe

- 3.1 Discourage anti-Soviet activities by Yugoslavia and Albania
- 3.2 Promote normalization of relations with Yugoslavia and Albania
- 3.3 Oppose narrow nationalism, regionalism, and Euro-Communism
- 3.4 Oppose reformism among East European CP's
- 3.5 Support further integration of CMEA and Warsaw Pact countries

4. Oppose Anti-Soviet European-Chinese Cooperation

- 4.1 Oppose European military assistance for China

- 4.2 Oppose anti-Soviet economic cooperation between Europe and China

5. Promote Peaceful, Mutually Beneficial Cooperation with Nonsocialist Europe

- 5.1 Promote increase of trade with nonsocialist Europe
- 5.2 Increase practical science and technology exchanges
- 5.3 Increase selected cultural exchanges with nonsocialist Europe
- 5.4 Increase cooperation in resolving regional European problems

GOALS TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD

1. Defend Fraternal Socialist Countries in the Third World

- 1.1 Deter capitalist/imperialist military intervention
- 1.2 Deter Chinese military intervention against fraternal Third World countries
- 1.3 Assist military development of fraternal armies

2. Defend Progressive Regimes and Movements and Socialist Oriented Countries

- 2.1 Support national liberation in the developing countries
- 2.2 Oppose colonial and white racist regimes
- 2.3 Oppose capitalist/imperialist intervention

3. Support Economic Independence of Developing Countries

4. Increase Soviet International Prestige Among Developing Countries

- 4.1 Increase Soviet aid, trade, and cultural contacts

5. Contain Chinese Influence Among Developing Countries

- 5.1 Provide alternative support for countries subject to Chinese penetration

ASIAN GOALS

1. Deter/Oppose China from Military Adventurism Against the Soviet Union

2. Deter/Oppose China From Military Adventurism Against Fraternal Socialist Countries

2.1 Increase the capability of Asian fraternal armies

3. Support Socialist Countries in Asia Against Other (Imperialist) Threats

3.1 Increase the capability of Asian fraternal armies

4. Develop Alternative Transport Routes to the Present Trans-Siberian Railway

4.1 Improve long-range air transport

4.2 Improve security of Indian Ocean sea route

4.3 Improve/expand the second Siberian rail route (BAM)

4.4 Improve road transport in Siberia

5. Undermine the Legitimacy of China's Territorial Claims Against Its Neighbors (except Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao)

5.1 Oppose China's territorial claims against the Soviet Union

5.2 Oppose China's territorial claims against Vietnam and Laos

5.3 Oppose China's territorial claims against India and Burma

6. Support Progressive Governments and Countries With Socialist Orientation

6.1 Give material and moral support to progressive regimes

6.2 Support mutual defense and friendship agreements

7. Support Peaceful and Mutually Beneficial Relations With Nonsocialist Countries

7.1 Support Asian collective security system

7.2 Support concepts of "nuclear free" and "peace" zones

7.3 Increase trade and mutually beneficial exchanges

7.4 Support nonaggression pacts with nonsocialist countries

MIDDLE EASTERN/SOUTH ASIAN GOALS

1. Reduce NATO/CENTO Threats to the Soviet Union

1.1 Encourage dissolution of NATO/CENTO

- 1.2 Discourage cooperation of regional governments with NATO forces
- 1.3 Encourage peaceful relations with all countries in the region
- 1.4 Maintain/improve relations with Malta and Cyprus
- 1.5 Increase aid to neutral and friendly countries

2. Support/Defend Progressive and Socialist-Oriented Governments in the Region

- 2.1 Give military support to Arab countries fighting aggression
- 2.2 Give economic and moral support to Arab countries
- 2.3 Give moral and material support to the Palestine Liberation Organization

3. Support/Defend Progressive and Democratic Movements in the Region

- 3.1 Support national liberation movements
- 3.2 Support the idea of a national homeland for Palestinians
- 3.3 Oppose Zionist expansionism
- 3.4 Oppose reactionary forces
- 3.5 Support Arab socialism
- 3.6 Support the right of Israel to exist

4. Support Economic Independence of the Region from Capitalist Countries

- 4.1 Support nationalization of foreign businesses
- 4.2 Support OPEC/OAPEC attempt to gain control of oil resources
- 4.3 Improve industrial base of countries in the region

5. Secure Soviet Naval Access to the Indian Ocean

AFRICAN GOALS

1. Defend/Support Countries Proclaiming Intention of Moving Toward Building Socialism

2. Support Other Progressive Regimes and Movements and Socialist-Oriented Countries

- 2.1 Support national liberation

- 2.2 Oppose colonial and white racist regimes
- 2.3 Oppose neocolonialism and economic exploitation
- 2.4 Oppose capitalist/imperialist intervention

3. Support Independence of African Countries

4. Increase Soviet Influence/Prestige Among African Countries

- 4.1 Increase aid, trade, and cultural contacts

5. Contain Chinese Influence Among African Countries

- 5.1 Provide alternative support for countries subject to Chinese penetration

LATIN AMERICAN GOALS

1. Defend/Support Cuba Against External Threats

- 1.1 Defend Cuba against U.S. military intervention
- 1.2 Defend Cuba against U.S. economic blockade
- 1.3 Defend Cuba against reactionary Cuban exiles
- 1.4 Provide support for progressive Cuban military actions overseas
- 1.5 Increase/maintain the capability of Cuban military forces

2. Avoid Direct Military Confrontation with U.S. (and OAS) in Latin America

- 2.1 Discourage provocative acts by Cuba against major U.S. interests
- 2.2 Avoid deploying excessive military forces in Latin America
- 2.3 Oppose excessive adventurism by Latin American CP's (support peaceful transition to socialism)
- 2.4 Support normalization of relations between Cuba and U.S. (and rest of Latin America)
- 2.5 Encourage acceptance of local CP's and socialist governments by Western Hemisphere countries

3. Encourage Independence of Latin American Countries from the U.S.

- 3.1 Increase trade with Latin American countries
- 3.2 Increase cultural and scientific exchanges

- 3.3 Assist the development of local armed forces
- 3.4 Encourage dissolution of OAS and other anti-Soviet blocs

4. Increase Solidarity Among Progressive and Democratic Forces in Latin America

- 4.1 Oppose anti-Communist fascist regimes in Latin America
- 4.2 Expose torture and persecution of progressive elements
- 4.3 Give financial and moral support to local CP's
- 4.4 Give moral and material assistance to progressive governments
- 4.5 Oppose China's anti-Soviet activities in Latin America

5. Increase Soviet Influence/Prestige in Latin America

- 5.1 Support peaceful resolution of conflicts
- 5.2 Support nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America

SELECTED GENERAL GOAL OUTCOME MEASURES

In addition to the goals listed in the preceding sections, which are coded only for crises where they are judged relevant, five additional outcomes measures for goals will be coded for each crisis. These measures were selected for their general importance to Soviet foreign policy goals. To the degree feasible, they were selected in order to minimize coder judgment. The five measures are:

- 1. Soviet trade relations,
- 2. Soviet economic assistance,
- 3. Soviet military transfers,
- 4. World perceptions of Soviet international standing, and
- 5. The number of local Communist party members in parties friendly to the Soviet Union.

These measures are important indicators for several major Soviet goals, particularly the goals of decreasing the historical isolation of the Soviet Union and increasing Soviet international prestige.

CHAPTER 5. FURTHER RESEARCH

The remainder of the project¹ will have two principal thrusts:

- Completion of the collection of data concerning Soviet and U.S. crisis outcomes (including both crisis-specific and more general goal/outcome indices), and associated data generation efforts.
- Integration of the new databases into the executive aid for crisis decision-makers previously developed by CACI for the analysis of U.S. and Soviet crises (1978b, 1978f).

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Two types of data collection will take place during the remainder of the project. The first involves updating both the Soviet and U.S. crisis lists through the end of 1978 and coding all of the cases identified over the period 1966-1978 for crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and problems. The second, and major, data collection task entails the coding of crisis outcomes (both general and crisis-specific) for all Soviet and American cases over the period 1966-1978.

These new data files, coupled with information on Soviet and U.S. crises previously collected by CACI for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency/Cybernetics Technology Office (DARPA/CTO) (for example, 1978a, 1978c, 1978e) will provide the basis for two interrelated sets of analyses. In the first, the comprehensive database dealing with recent U.S. and Soviet crisis attributes (1966-1978) will be examined to identify key trends and patterns. This analysis is required to determine if previous conclusions regarding crisis behavior during this period (for example, those of CACI, 1976) need to be modified, if at all, following the

¹ As has been the case throughout this volume, this discussion omits the collection and analysis of data regarding Chinese crisis concerns and operations. This aspect of the research is treated in detail in a separate volume (CACI, 1979).

addition of new cases to the databases, to identify significant trends and evolutions in crisis behavior over this span,² and to provide U.S. crisis planners and managers with a summary analytical overview of the crisis operations of the superpowers during the period.

The principal thrust will be the integration and analysis of the crisis outcomes data collected for U.S. and Soviet crises from 1966-1978. Major research emphases will include:

- Comparative analyses of Soviet and U.S. crisis performances (complementing the preceding analytical thrust), focusing on the relative extents to which each superpower achieved certain types of goals during the period surveyed.
- Identification of the types of outcomes that are most or least often achieved.
- Assessments of the relative efficacy of actions and mixes of actions.
- Identification of the types of crisis management problems that are most often associated with the achievement (or nonachievement) of certain classes of goals.

The primary emphasis during this analysis will be placed on the first two types of investigations, which focus on the outcomes themselves.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE AID FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

When a crisis occurs or is anticipated as part of a planning exercise, U.S. crisis managers and planners customarily seek information concerning past crises (U.S., Soviet, and Chinese). Their objective is to inform

² This form of analysis could not be performed previously because of the gaps in coding coverage.

their selection of action options and contingency planning. The information requirements of these planners encompass several categories of data:

- Information regarding previous U.S. crisis operations similar to the situation being considered, including the characteristics of these incidents, U.S. actions and objectives, and the typical crisis management problems encountered in the operation.
- Comparable data on the crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and problems of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China -- both actors of tremendous salience to U.S. crisis managers.
- Information concerning the consequences and concomitants of previous crises that are prerequisites for evaluating the efficacy of the actions undertaken in past operations.
- Direct comparisons of the crisis experiences of the two superpowers.

CACI's Executive Aid (1978b, 1978f) is a highly user-oriented decision aiding system designed to respond to these requirements. It is deliberately structured for the noncomputer-oriented policy user. The aid is designed to allow planners to conduct precedent searches in the course of considering and evaluating crisis management options.

At the beginning of the present fiscal year, the Executive Aid consisted of six databases:

- U.S. crisis characteristics,
- U.S. crisis actions and objectives,
- U.S. crisis management problems,
- Soviet crisis characteristics,
- Soviet crisis actions and objectives, and
- Soviet crisis management problems.

Two significant types of enhancements will be made to this aiding system. The first will employ the expanded (through the end of calendar 1978) Soviet and U.S. crisis databases developed under Task 1 of the project to produce a "two-sided" aid module that will allow U.S. and Soviet crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and problems to be directly compared for crises in both databases.

The second enhancement involves incorporation of the databases developed in Tasks 1, 2, and 3 of the research into the Executive Aid. These databases concern:

- Outcome assessments developed for Soviet and U.S. crises, 1966-1978.
- Updated data files on Soviet and U.S. crises through the end of 1978.
- Data on Chinese crisis characteristics.³

By providing these databases in highly usable forms, the Executive Aid will significantly enhance the analytical capabilities of U.S. crisis managers. The aid will be made available in two forms: a stand-alone Tektronix 4051 version and as part of the integrated system of crisis management and indications and warning aids available at DARPA/CTO's Demonstration and Development Facility. Associated with the aid will be sample output and program documentation; the first will play an essential role in the transfer and demonstration of the expanded aiding system; the second, in transfer to user facilities.

³ These data are discussed in a companion report (CACI, 1979).

CHAPTER 6. INTRODUCTION TO THE APPENDICES

OVERVIEW

Appendices A and B present the codebooks used for the assessment of Soviet and U.S. crisis outcomes. The methodological strategy underlying the codebooks is presented in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 explicate the rationales for the superpower crisis goals whose outcomes are assessed using this coding document. The codebooks have been designed for use, and therefore do not read as standard narrative exposition of the variety presented in the main body of the report.

Two codebooks are presented:

- U.S. Crisis Goals (Appendix A).
- Soviet Crisis Goals (Appendix B).

Some stylistic differences exist between the U.S. and Soviet goals/outcomes sections. These are primarily due to the differing research problems each poses (Soviet materials are, for example, more difficult to obtain than comparable information concerning U.S. crisis objectives.) To a lesser extent they are due to the research styles of the analysts who serve as coordinators for the collection of each type of data (Dr. Farid Abolfathi for the Soviet outcomes and Mr. Thomas H. Johnson for the U.S. materials). Despite the minor differences in presentation format, both are designed to produce the same type of final data: general crisis goals/outcomes for all U.S. and Soviet incidents from 1966 through 1978 and codings for the relevant crisis-specific goals.

GENERAL OUTCOME MEASURES

As argued in Chapter 2, the most important goals (and associated outcomes) in superpower crisis diplomacy are likely to be those that apply to only a subset of the crises and are best assessed (because of their intrinsic complexity) in terms of judgmental indices. Such crisis-specific goals/outcomes make up the bulk of both appendices.

At the same time, however, there is merit in engaging in some basic "score-keeping" regarding general factors that might be affected by almost any type of crisis and are likely to be of at least moderate salience to the two superpowers. This section pertains to these general outcome measures which are assessed for each crisis. These variables address the basic dimensions of Soviet and U.S. contacts with crisis-affected nations: economic, military, and political.

CODEBOOK STRUCTURE

Both the U.S. Crisis Goals and Soviet Goals appendices are structured into the same subsections:

- Description of the crisis,
- General outcome measures,
- Assessment of the relevance of goals, and
- Crisis-specific goals:
 - Outcome,
 - Measures,
 - Technical Notes,
 - Outcome Assessment, and
 - Notes.¹

¹ Notes and Technical Notes are provided only when necessary.

For convenience, the remainder of this overview describes the substantive sections and subsections in terms of these categories.

Description of the Crisis

This is a straightforward section. It provides a set of standard questions concerning the crisis and its background. Use of standard questions helps to ensure uniformity of treatment over the entire set of cases considered. It also focuses coder attention on the crisis as a whole, in context, rather than simply upon one aspect of the situation. The contextual focus is important because crisis-specific goals are only coded when relevant and both crisis-specific and general goals' outcomes are assessed only over the range of relevant affected actors. Both factors are highly context-dependent.

Assessing the Relevance of Goals

For the purposes of this appendix, "relevance" has several meanings, all of which are touched upon in this subsection of the U.S. and Soviet presentations.

Most obviously, goal relevance relates to the crisis-specific goals. Because of their nature, not all of these goals will be applicable in any given crisis (for example, some crises do not involve significant economic interests). An assessment of the crisis performance of either the U.S. or the Soviet Union that did not take this into account would unwittingly misrepresent their actual performance (as viewed from the perspective of the performers) in these events. It would, for example, be unreasonable from this vantagepoint to evaluate the achievement of economic goals in those crises in which this was not a crisis-relevant outcome for either superpower.

The assessment of the crisis-specific goals in terms of their relevance also has broader utility. Some goals are unlikely to be seriously

challenged in crises; others may occur in a majority of incidents. To understand how superpower interests are affected by and in crises and to see how their crisis policies interact with their broader structures of political-military policy, it is important to examine these broader ensembles in their entirety. The relevance data for the crisis-specific goals provides information that is of substantive interest in its own right. One component of the analysis in the final report will deal with exactly this issue -- examining how the relevance of goals varies across crises and superpowers.

Another dimension of relevance addresses the extent to which goals are threatened during crises; relevance is clearly more than simply a dummy variable. Accordingly, for each crisis-specific goal assessed as having some appreciable relevance for a given crisis, a further gradation of the degree to which this goal was threatened or challenged by the crisis situation is provided.²

A third dimension of relevance concerns the basic reliability of the data coded for each crisis-specific goal. Reliability has some obvious interactions with the overall assessment of relevance itself. In the same subsection, some additional technical information concerning the treatment of variables is also included, for example, the ways "state" and "change" variables are handled in the analysis.

Crisis-Specific Goals

This section comprises the bulk of both the Soviet and U.S. appendices. In many ways (as argued in Chapter 2 and documented in Chapters 3 and 4)

² In the codebooks, multiple value scales, usually ranging from 5-7 items, are employed for this evaluation. Intercoder reliability checks and comparisons of similar codings (e.g., the same goal in different crises and similar crises across goals) will show the extent to which such ranges can be supported. As required, items will be collapsed to fewer categories to provide for more reliable analyses, much as is done in many Likert scaling-type evaluations (Summers, 1970.)

these are the most substantively interesting indicators to consider, given the ways in which the two superpowers have practiced crisis management in recent years. Accordingly, this section documents in considerable detail (much more detail than is normally provided for this type of variable) the types of information that go into the assessments of outcomes and the ranks on the outcome assessment scales themselves.

This level of detail has been dictated by the importance and complexity of the question being addressed. Evaluating goal achievement, while an essential prerequisite for the development of justifiable evaluations of superpower crisis performances, is a most involved process, more involved than (say) the coding of data on basic crisis attributes and actions. Accordingly, at least three, and up to five, subsections are provided for each goal. Following the presentation of the goal itself, a general statement of the outcome is provided. The outcome assessment question is stated in the form of a coding scale with multiple values. A measure section is provided that lists the types of evidence used in the assessment of the goal outcome. As before, scale values (usually ranging from 1 to 5-7 scale points) will be collapsed, if reliability evaluations suggest this is necessary. The wider ranges are used at the outset because, while one can always collapse items, one cannot expand them, and it is extremely useful for subsequent analyses to capture as wide a range of outcome performances for each goal as is practical. Where necessary, technical notes pertaining to measures and notes having to do with the outcome assessment variables are also provided. In sum the format is:

Crisis-Specific Goal

- Outcome,
- Outcome Assessment Question,
- Measures,
- Notes (if required), and
- Technical Notes (if required).

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APPENDIX A. U.S. CRISIS GOALS

DESCRIPTION OF THE CRISIS

This section is provided to allow the coder to write a brief, general narrative of the crisis. All relevant information, notes, and future reminders/instructions can be written in this space. In addition, there are a number of standard questions to serve as a guide for gathering relevant information. Some of the more important questions include:

- The general historical background of the crisis.
- Major events leading up to the crisis,
- The principal actors and their objectives in the crisis,
- Initial U.S. perceptions and definition of the crisis situation,
- The United States' initial reactions to the crisis,
- Other important actors' actions during the crisis, and
- The situation at the end of the crisis period -- both long-term (five years after the crisis) and short-term (one year after the crisis).

GENERAL OUTCOME MEASURES

General outcome measures are coded for all crises. To the extent possible these measures were selected because of their theoretical importance and based on the magnitude of coder judgment required. We basically sought "hard" indicators that minimized coder subjectivity.

Trade

Orientation value of total American trade (total imports plus total exports) with the relevant¹ countries as a percentage of the countries' total foreign trade. IMF's publication The Direction of Trade will serve as the main data source.

Economic Assistance

Value of total American economic aid (total grants plus total loans) to the relevant countries. The main data source here will be the USIDA publication, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations.

Military Transfers

Value of American military sales and aid to the relevant countries. Arms transfer data will be those published by SIPRI and the aid data will come from the USIDA publication cited above.

Military Agreements/Alliances

Number of formal multilateral or bilateral security agreements between the United States and the relevant countries. Agreements regarding arms transfers, basing, training, etc. are included. The main sources for these data are Treaties and Alliances of the World (1968, 1975), Military Balance (1966-1978), and Treaties in Forces (1966-1978).

Diplomatic Missions

Size of U.S. diplomatic missions to and from the relevant countries.

¹ "Relevant" countries are those that are the primary targets of threats from countries "hostile" to the United States or U.S. goals in a given crisis.

Various State Department publications and diplomatic directories for the relevant states will serve as the primary data source.

World Perceptions of the United States' Standing

Percent of public (for countries that have public opinion polling) in Europe and Japan with favorable attitudes towards the United States/percent of public with favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union (see, Richman, 1979). There will be substantial amounts of missing data for this index.

TECHNICAL NOTES

Whenever possible the currency units of monetary data should be converted into U.S. dollars at current exchange rates and then converted to constant prices.

GOAL RELEVANCE

Relevance

The relevance of a goal to a crisis is coded whenever a primary or secondary American foreign policy goal is threatened.

Primary Goals

Primary goals are those foreign policy goals that are most directly related to the crisis involvement of the United States or are most threatened by the crisis adversaries of the United States.

Secondary Goals

Secondary goals are those foreign policy goals that by themselves are

unlikely to lead to American involvement in the crisis or are indirectly threatened by the crisis.

Threat to Goals

The level of threat to each primary and secondary goal is coded separately. The level of threat for each relevant goal is judged separately and by its own standards. In other words, there is no common standard such as monetary costs or psychological value by which all goals are to be judged comparatively.

1. Very low:

- No significant threat or danger to U.S. interests, objectives, or security.

2. Moderately low:

- Little threat and/or danger to U.S. interests, objectives, or security; requires small sacrifices or effort to secure or save them.

3. Moderate:

- Poses some threat and moderate danger, but not severe, to U.S. personnel, facilities, interests, or relations; requires moderate sacrifice or effort to secure or save them.

4. Moderately high:

- Moderate threat and danger to U.S. interests and objectives; requires costly, but limited sacrifice and effort to save or secure them.

5. Very high:

- Severe threat to U.S. interests and objectives, including personnel, facilities, and relations; danger requires massive effort to save and secure interests.

Reliability

Reliability of information used to code relevance, outcomes, and the causal linkages between crisis and outcomes are coded by the following six point scale.

1. MISSING DATA - Codes are based on coder judgment and highly unreliable information.
2. L - Codes are based on limited information and informed coder judgments.
3. M - Codes are based on reliable information with a few major inconsistencies.
4. H - Codes are based on reliable information with minor inconsistencies.
5. VH - Codes are based on highly reliable and consistent data.
6. EH - No significant doubt about reliability of codes.

Type of Data Source

The type of source primarily utilized in the coding are indicated by the following seven codes.

1. Public speeches and interviews of major American foreign policy decision-makers.
2. American decision-makers' memoirs, books, articles.
3. Official United States Government publications.
4. Scholarly texts.
5. Elite newspaper articles (New York Times, Washington Post, etc.).
6. Coder inference from a mix of these sources.
7. Other.

OUTCOME

The outcome of each crisis is described by either a level or change variable. The variable outcome is coded four times:

1. Immediately before the crisis,
2. During the crisis,
3. One year after the crisis (short-term), and
4. Five years after the crisis (long-term).

When a change (i.e., in variables, state, or level) score is used, only the last two periods are coded. The first two periods serve as a "benchmark" by which change is measured.

Impact (Causal) of the Crisis on the Outcome of the Goal

The impact of the crisis on the goal's outcome is a measure of the degree to which the change of the variable state of the goal can be directly linked to the crisis. In other words, it measures the direct causal effect the crisis had on the goal:

1. Very low:
 - Insignificant or nonexistent causal linkage.
2. Moderately low:
 - Weak causal linkage.
3. Moderate:
 - Moderate causal linkage with many possible exogenous factors.
4. Moderately high:
 - Strong causal linkage with several moderate exogenous factors.

5. Very high:

- Complete (or near complete) and powerful direct causal linkage.

CRISIS-SPECIFIC GOALS

There are nine categories of U.S. Crisis-Specific Goals for which detailed sets of variables have been developed; these are:

- U.S. Ideological Goals,
- U.S. Military Goals,
- U.S. Economic Goals,
- U.S. Goals Toward Communist States,
- U.S. Goals Toward Europe,
- U.S. Goals Toward Asia,
- U.S. Goals Toward the Middle East,
- U.S. Goals Toward Latin America, and
- U.S. Goals Toward Africa.

The remainder of this Appendix will introduce the categories in turn and present the detailed coding instructions for the crisis-specific goals within each.

1. U.S. Ideological Goals

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1.1 Goal: Support Democratic Values and Countries

Outcome. Was there any significant change in the status of democratic institutions and values? Did democratic regimes replace authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in the area?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, democratic values and institution in the area/region have been:

1. Greatly advanced/increased:

- Major increases in the number of democratic regimes in the area (replacing authoritarian/undemocratic ones).
- Major increase in the advancement/adherence to democratic procedures (e.g., constitutional procedures; development and treatment of opposition parties; increase in number of eligible voters who vote; majority rule, etc.).

2. Moderately advanced/increased:

- Moderate increase in the number of democratic regimes in the area (replacing authoritarian/undemocratic ones).
- Moderate increase in the advancement/adherence to democratic procedures (present regime(s) promises gradual democratic reforms and makes conciliatory democratic gestures, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset/decreased:

- Moderate decrease in the number of democratic regimes in the area (or increase in the number of authoritarian/undemocratic ones).
- Moderate decrease in the advancement/adherence to democratic procedures (e.g., freely elected regime loses some of its power to undemocratic groups; military obtains stronger voice in government; democratic rights of citizens obstructed, etc.).

5. Greatly offset/decreased:

- Major decrease in the number of democratic regimes in the area (major increases in the number of authoritarian regimes).
- Major decrease in the advancement/adherence to democratic procedures (e.g., many democratic rights of citizens repealed; numerous human rights violations; election mandate obstructed by authoritarian coup; etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Status of human rights (e.g., rights of person -- freedom from torture, and inhuman or degrading punishment.
2. Status of civil and political liberties (e.g., freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press.
3. Number of democratic regimes.
4. Number of authoritarian/totalitarian regimes.
5. Adherence to constitutional procedures.
6. Development and treatment of opposition parties.
7. Percent of eligible voters who vote.
8. Extent to which power is vested in elected officials.

Technical Notes. It should be noted that data concerning this goal are usually highly subjective. The coder should first check the description of the relevant regime and its policies in the Political Handbook of the World (published in six editions since 1963). Here pay particular attention to sections describing government and politics, political parties, and national legislature. Useful information on "political liberties" can also be found in the annual surveys published by the Freedom House. Additional background data, especially in regard to changes over time, can be found by examining such annual publications as the U.S. Department of State Background Notes, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, New York Times Index, and the World Almanac.

1.2 Goal: Promote Peace and Peaceful Resolution to Conflicts

Outcome. Was there any significant conflict deescalation/resolution in the area? Have the chances for peace in the area improved?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, chances for peace (i.e., absence of conflict) in the area/region have been:

1. Greatly improved/realized:

- Major decrease/deescalation in overt military conflict in the area (e.g., conflicting parties sign peace treaty).
- Major increase in negotiation processes between conflicting parties in the area over substantive issues.
- Major increase in the confidence/trust between the conflicting parties.

2. Moderately improved/increased:

- Moderate decrease/deescalation in overt military conflict in the area (e.g., conflicting parties recognize military disengagement, but limited small-scale conflict engagement continues).
- Moderate increase in negotiation processes between conflicting parties in the area over substantive issues (e.g., conflicting parties open limited dialogue/negotiations, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/deteriorated.

4. Moderately decreased/deteriorated:

- Moderate increase/escalation in overt military conflict in the area (but not full scale conflict).
- Moderate decrease in negotiation processes between conflicting parties in the area over substantive issues (e.g., movement away from negotiations/dialogue).

5. Greatly decreased/deteriorated:

- Major increase/escalation in large-scale, overt military conflict in the area (e.g., appearance of new conflict actors, etc.).
- Major decrease in (or absence of) negotiation processes (e.g., no negotiated settlement to conflict in sight, etc.).

Measures. Relative Changes in:

1. Cooperation/conflict interactions between states as measured by event data files (e.g., WEIS, COPDAB, CREON, etc.).
2. Number of overt conflict engagements.
3. Number of battle deaths.
4. Intensification/abatement of the conflict and/or degree of spread of the conflict.
- 5. Negotiations/constructive dialogue between adversaries.
6. Official state visits/diplomatic recognition.
7. Utilization and support of mechanisms to arbitrate disputes.
8. Respect for final settlements.

Technical Note. Although nonverbal or direct physical conflict is relatively easier to assess for changes, pay particular attention to verbal conflict and tacit communication. Here examine chronological news sources, such as Keesing's and the New York Times Index, for changes in statements made by the relevant decision-makers over time. Also, events data can be useful indicators for modifications in relations between countries.

1.3 Goal: Advance the Welfare and Human Rights of All People

Outcome. Was there any significant change in the human rights and welfare of the people involved? Were the personal liberties and freedoms of the people in the area enhanced or hindered?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the human rights (e.g., rights of person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press) of people living in the area/region have been:

1. Strongly improved:

- Major increase or realization of the people's fundamental human rights in the area (e.g., human rights legally institutionalized; repeal of undemocratic/racist laws; decolonialization; freedom to all political prisoners, etc.).

2. Moderately improved:

- Moderate increase in people's fundamental human rights in the area (e.g., personal liberties expanded; freedom of the press established/expanded; advancement of civil rights, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately obstructed/disrupted:

- Moderate decrease in (or violation of) people's fundamental human rights in the area (e.g., violations of freedom of the press, speech, religion, assembly, etc; detention of political prisoners, etc.).

5. Strongly obstructed/disrupted:

- Major decrease in (or violation of) people's fundamental human rights in the area (e.g., genocide; large scale arrest/mistreatment of political prisoners; establishment of undemocratic laws; large scale refugee problems/abuse; etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Treatment of political prisoners.

2. Extent of violation of U.S. Bill of Rights (e.g., denial of religious freedom, confiscation of property without due process of law).
3. Undemocratic/racist laws.
4. Refugee problems.

1.4 Goal: Support International Law

Outcome. Has international law been followed, advanced, or developed? Were there violations of accepted international conduct or semilegalistic bilateral agreements between parties?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis observance and/or development of international law in the area/region has been:

1. Greatly improved/realized:

- Norms governing territorial boundaries, space and routine rights, sovereignty, human rights, etc., are developed and/or followed without violations.
- Conflicting parties submit to impartial adjudication/scrutiny and adhere to rulings.
- U.N. resolutions followed; treaties signed.

2. Moderately improved:

- Some but not all of the legal disputes of relevant actors are codified and accepted.
- Actors participate in discussions/negotiations concerning international legal questions.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset/obstructed:

- Some international agreements are violated by conflicting actors.
- Some international agreements/treaties repealed unilaterally by actors.
- Norms regulating diplomatic and consular exchange circumvented.

5. Greatly offset/obstructed:

- Agreed upon international laws completely neglected by actors.
- U.N. resolutions not abided by, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Violations or adherence to norms governing territorial boundaries, space, and maritime rights, sovereignty, etc.
2. Respect for U.N. resolutions, bi- and multilateral treaties.
3. Violations or adherence to international conventions.
4. Status of U.S. actions in the area.

Notes. This is basically a symbolic goal that is often used or referred to only to justify actions that have already taken place. Therefore, treat the goal as usually symbolic and examine the event for the deeper, more important goals. This goal will often relate to actions taken by states in regard to the United Nations.

1.5 Goal: Ensure the Prestige and Dignity of the United States

Outcome. Was the prestige and dignity or respect for the United States significantly altered? Was the United States "embarrassed" in any way? Was its position of leadership questioned?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the prestige and dignity of the United States in the area/region have been:

1. Strongly improved/advanced:

- Most/majority of U.S. allies and friends favorably respond to U.S. actions/policies.
- Global opinion is generally supportive of U.S. actions/policies.
- U.S. maintains image of a solid, trustworthy alliance partner.

2. Moderately improved/advanced:

- Most allies favor U.S. actions/policies but not in an overly enthusiastic fashion.
- Global opinion is somewhat supportive, but there is some verbal criticism of U.S. actions.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset:

- Many U.S. allies criticize U.S. policy but not in a strongly overt fashion.
- General negative global opinion of U.S. actions.
- U.S. allies and friends questions U.S. commitments.

5. Strongly offset:

- U.S. action openly criticized by its traditional allies and friends.
- World opinion strongly questions and criticizes scope and breadth of U.S. actions/foreign policy.
- U.S. criticized for not upholding commitments.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall global prestige of the United States.
2. Image of the U.S. as a solid, trustworthy alliance partner.
3. Image of the U.S. as a prudent, rational international actor.
4. Treaty commitments of the U.S.
5. Response of U.S. allies concerning U.S. policies.
6. General global opinion or statements concerning the policies of the United States.
7. Preservation of U.S. diplomatic channels of communication.
8. Receptivity to U.S. military aid and presence.

Technical Note. Be aware that this goal could be loosely related to almost any international action taken by the United States. (Few, if any crisis actions are completely devoid of symbolism.) Code this goal only in instances where the U.S. appears to be directly defending its "honor and prestige" through its policies and actions.

2. U.S. Military Goals

2.1 Goal: Maintain/Increase Military Capabilities for Defending U.S. Territorial Integrity and Possessions

Outcome. Has the United States remained free from external threats and invasion by maintaining strong military capabilities? Has the security of the United States increased? Has the United States maintained relative military superiority over other states?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military capabilities of the United States for defending its territorial integrity and possessions have:

1. Strongly increased/improved:

- U.S. clearly has increased its ability to deter any nuclear first strike.
- U.S. clearly has increased its ability to defend against any surprise air and/or naval attack (conventional).
- U.S. clearly has increased its nuclear war survival capabilities (e.g., civil defense, warning time, etc.).

2. Moderately increased/improved:

- U.S. has numerically and qualitatively increased its strategic capabilities but only relative to Soviet increases.
- U.S. has moderately increased its conventional forces.
- U.S. has moderately increased its civil defense and warning time capabilities.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- U.S. has not increased its strategic capabilities relative to USSR changes.
- U.S. conventional forces have been moderately decreased.
- U.S. "second strike" ability is partially questioned.

- U.S. nuclear war survival capabilities have moderately decreased.

5. Strongly decreased:

- USSR has clearly gained strategic superiority over the U.S.
- U.S. conventional forces have greatly decreased in quantity and quality, etc.
- U.S. nuclear war survival capabilities are highly questionable.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. U.S. nuclear deterrent forces (NORAD, Triad, SAC, etc.) quantity and quality.
2. U.S. nuclear war survival capabilities (civil defense programs, warning time, etc.).
3. U.S. general purpose ground and air forces.
4. Military capabilities of NATO and/or Warsaw Pact.
5. Military capabilities of the USSR and PRC.
6. Capability differentials between U.S. and USSR strategic defense system (operational ICBM launches, SLBM launches, intercontinental bombers, total intercontinental strategic offensive delivery vehicles).

2.2 Goal: Maintain/Increase U.S. Military Capabilities for Defending the Major Industrial Democracies (Western Europe and Japan)

Outcome. Have the military capabilities of the U.S. to deter any hostile country from overthrowing or acutely threatening Western Europe and/or Japan been maintained? Did any country in Western Europe and/or Japan have to submit to hostile threats? Have American capabilities prevented major hostile incursions in these vital areas?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military capabilities of the United States for defending the major industrial democracies (e.g., Western Europe and Japan) have:

1. Strongly increased:

- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against NATO Europe has clearly increased.
- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet and/or PRC attack against Japan has clearly increased.

2. Moderately increased:

- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against NATO Europe has moderately increased as far as quantity and quality of forces is concerned, but capability increases are about equal to Soviet/Warsaw Pact changes.
- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet and/or PRC attack against Japan has moderately increased as far as quantity and quality of forces is concerned, but capability increases are about equal to Soviet and/or PRC changes.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet and/or PRC attack against NATO Europe or Japan has moderately decreased by not keeping pace with Soviet and/or PRC military capabilities.

5. Strongly decreased:

- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet and/or PRC attack against NATO Europe or Japan has strongly decreased because of major American cutback and/or major improvements in Soviet and a PRC military capabilities.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Qualitative and/or quantitative capabilities of U.S. European and Pacific strategic and conventional forces.
2. Qualitative and/or quantitative military capabilities of NATO.
3. Degree of Soviet and Chinese military threat to these areas.
4. Alliance cohesion between the U.S. and Western Europe, or Japan.
5. American military presence/access to Europe and Japan.

2.3 Goal: Maintain/Increase Military Capabilities for Defending Strategically Important LDC's

Outcome. Have the military capabilities of the United States to defend strategically important LDC's been significantly affected? Has the perception of U.S. power/presence in the region increased?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military capabilities of the United States for defending strategically important LDC's (e.g., Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Saudi Arabia, etc.) in the area/region have:

1. Strongly increased:

- U.S. military capabilities have greatly increased in quantity and quality in the area.
- U.S. has acquired or improved military bases/facilities in the area.
- Number of American advisors in area has greatly increased.
- Scope of U.S. basing rights has greatly increased.

2. Moderately increased:

- U.S. military capabilities have moderately increased in quantity and quality in the area.
- U.S. has moderately increased the quantity and quality of its military bases/facilities, basing rights, and advisors in the area.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- U.S. military capabilities have moderately decreased in quantity and quality in the area.
- Quantity and quality of U.S. military bases/facilities, basing rights, and advisors have moderately decreased in the area.

5. Strongly decreased:

- Quantity and quality of U.S. military capabilities in the area have strongly decreased.

- U.S. has drastically cut back or lost numerous military bases/facilities, basing rights, and advisors in the area.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of U.S. military personnel stationed in the area.
2. Quantity and quality of American military bases/facilities in the area.
3. Military capabilities of local armed forces.
4. Military capabilities, alignments, and installations of hostile countries in the area.
5. U.S. multilateral and bilateral military agreements/alliances in the area.

2.4 Goal: Maintain Military Capability for Defending U.S. Overseas Maritime Interests

Outcome. Have the military capabilities of the United States for defending its overseas maritime interests been significantly affected? Has the United States maintained the capability to deter or defend against hostile interdiction of vital maritime lines of communication and shipping.

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military capabilities of the United States for defending U.S. maritime interests in the area/region have:

1. Strongly increased:

- Major improvements in U.S. naval fleet (and presence) in the area.
- All major waterways in the area are secure/safe for U.S. naval and merchant ships.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate improvements in U.S. naval fleet (and presence) in the area.
- Most of major waterways in the area are secure/safe for U.S. naval and merchant ships.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Quantity and quality of U.S. naval fleet (and presence) in the area has moderately decreased.
- Secure/safe passage of U.S. naval and merchant ships is questionable/challenged in a number of major waterways in the area.

5. Strongly decreased:

- Quantity and quality of U.S. naval fleet (and presence) in the area has greatly decreased.
- Many major waterways in the area are closed for U.S. naval and merchant ships.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number or quality of U.S. ships and ship-days in the region.

2. Number of U.S. port visits in the region.
3. Capability of the U.S. Navy for independent operations in the region.
4. U.S. basing rights and other forms of facilities access in area.

2.5 Goal: Maintain/Increase Military Capability for "Show of Force" and Ability to Intervene in Overseas Conflict Arenas

Outcomes. Has the ability of the United States to "show force" and/or intervene militarily in overseas conflict arenas been significantly affected?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the ability of the United States to "show force" or intervene militarily in the area/region has:

1. Strongly increased:

- Major increase in quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in the area.
- U.S. military assistance in area has greatly increased.
- U.S. relations with strategically located countries in the area have greatly improved.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in the area.
- U.S. military assistance in area has moderately increased.
- U.S. relations with strategically located countries in the area have improved.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in the area.
- U.S. military assistance in the area has moderately decreased.
- U.S. relations with strategically located countries in area have become relatively more conflictual.

5. Strongly decreased:

- Major decrease in quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in the area.
- U.S. military assistance in the area has strongly decreased or has been halted.
- U.S. relations with strategically located countries have greatly deteriorated (have become much more conflictual).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in the area.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. military assistance to the area.
3. U.S. relations with strategically located countries.
4. Capability of U.S. Navy to project power onshore in the region (e.g., presence of Marines, amphibious landing craft, helicopters, etc.).
5. U.S. capability for rapid, large scale military logistical support.

Notes. Although measured by military capability variables, this goal is basically symbolic. Military strength is obviously a measure of a nation's "power," but its ability to project or demonstrate this power is aimed at impressing other nations. Therefore, this goal of military preparedness has direct links to symbolic policies of prestige.

2.6 Goal: Maintain/Increase the Safety and Security of U.S. Government Officials, U.S. Citizens, and U.S. Property Overseas

Outcome. Have the safety and security of U.S. citizens and property in the area been significantly affected? Has the United States been able to protect its citizens and property in the area from hostile elements?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the safety and security of U.S. Government officials, U.S. citizens, and U.S. property in the area have been:

1. Greatly strengthened/improved:
 - Major decrease in (or absence of) acts of violence (e.g., bombings; assassinations, kidnappings, etc.) against U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and property.
 - Major increase in activities by countries in the area to protect U.S. Government officials and U.S. citizens and U.S. property.
2. Moderately strengthened/improved:
 - Moderate decrease in acts of violence (e.g., bombings, assassinations; kidnappings; etc.) against U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and U.S. property.
 - Moderate increase in activities by countries in the area to protect U.S. Government officials and U.S. citizens and property.
3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately weakened/threatened:
 - Moderate increase in acts of violence (e.g., bombings, assassinations; kidnappings; etc.) against U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and U.S. property.
 - Moderate decrease in activities by (or success of) countries in the area to protect U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and property.

5. Greatly weakened/threatened:

- Major increase in acts of violence (e.g., bombings; assassinations; kidnappings; etc.) against U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and property.
- Major decrease in activities in the area to protect U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and property.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Actual acts of violence against the U.S. in the area (e.g., bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, etc.).
2. Local countries' activities to protect U.S. citizens and property in the area.
3. U.S. military capabilities to protect U.S. citizens and property in the area.
4. Latent danger to U.S. citizens and property.
5. Capacity of insurgents or hostile element to carry out acts of violence.
6. Attitudes of locals towards terrorist activities.

2.7 Goal: Assist Friendly or Neutral Developing Countries in Strengthening Their Military Capability for Purposes of Promoting Regional Stability

Outcomes. Has the United States through the granting of military aid and assistance helped strengthen the military capabilities of important (strategic) LDC's? Has such aid and assistance helped secure the LDC regime against external threats?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military capabilities of LDC's friendly to the United States in the area/region have:

1. Strongly increased:
 - Major increase in the quantity and quality of friendly LDC's military capabilities in the area (strong ability to deter both internal and external hostile threats).
 - Military capabilities of LDC have become major regional stabilizing force.
2. Moderately increased:
 - Moderate increase in the quantity and quality of friendly LDC's military capabilities in the area.
 - Military capabilities of friendly LDC appear possibly able to serve as a regional stabilizing force.
3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately decreased:
 - Moderate decreases in the quantity and quality of friendly LDC's military capabilities in the area.
 - LDC has questionable ability to deter/defend against external and/or internal hostile attack.
5. Strongly decreased:
 - Major decrease in the quantity and quality of friendly LDC's military capability in the area.

- LDC does not have the ability to deter/defend against external and/or internal hostile attack.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of U.S. military personnel and/or advisers in the area.
2. Quality and quantity of U.S. military aid (grants and loans) to the area.
3. Overall capability of U.S. military forces stationed in the area.
4. Capability of local LDC's' armed forces.
5. Quality and quantity of actual external attacks against the LDC's.

Note. Reliance on "strategic" LDC's was one of the cornerstones of the Nixon Doctrine, which itself was a reflection of earlier U.S. policy priorities.

2.8 Goal: Help Secure the Regime Stability of Countries Allied or Friendly to the United States

Outcome. Was the security and stability of friendly regimes affected in any significant way? Were any friendly regimes in the area replaced by regimes hostile to the United States?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the regime stability of countries friendly to the U.S. in the area has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major increase in popular support for the regime(s).
- Major decrease in domestic instability.
- Major decrease in the capacity of insurgents to overthrow the regime(s).
- Major increase in the regime(s)' capability to maintain domestic order.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate increase in the popular support for the regime(s).
- Moderate decrease in domestic instability.
- Moderate decrease in the capacity of insurgents to overthrow the regime(s).
- Moderate increase in the regime(s)' capability to maintain domestic order.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased/weakened:

- Moderate decrease in the popular support for the regime(s).
- Moderate increase in domestic instability.
- Moderate increase in the capacity of insurgents to overthrow the regime(s).
- Moderate decrease in the regime(s)' capability to maintain domestic order.

5. Greatly decreased/weakened.

- Major decrease in (or lack of) popular support for the regime(s).
- Major increase/escalation in domestic instability.
- Major increase in the capacity (or realization) of insurgents to overthrow the regime(s).
- Major decrease in the regime(s)' capability to maintain domestic order.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of friendly regimes in the area.
2. Capability of friendly countries' security and military forces.
3. Quantity and quality of hostile attacks on friendly regimes.
4. Acts of violence/domestic turmoil in the area (e.g., riots, strikes, guerrilla warfare, etc.) including threats and attempts.
5. Capacity of insurgents to overthrow friendly regimes as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity and quality of their arms.
6. Popular support of friendly regimes.
7. Overall domestic political stability of friendly regimes (e.g., government's average length of time in office, peaceful succession of governments, etc.)

2.9 Goal: Discourage or Deter the Expansion of the Military Influence of Countries Hostile to the United States

Outcome. Have countries hostile to the United States gained military influence and presence in the area?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military presence in the area of countries hostile to the U.S. has:

1. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in Communist and/or radical leftist military bases/facilities, military personnel and advisors stationed in the area, arms transfers, military aid to the area, etc.

2. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in Communist and/or radical leftist military bases/facilities, military personnel and advisors stationed in the area, arms transfer, military aid to the area, etc.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in Communist and/or radical leftist military bases/facilities, military personnel and advisors stationed in the area, arms transfers, military aid to the area, etc.

5. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in Communist and/or radical leftist military bases/facilities, military personnel and advisors stationed in the area, arms transfers, military aid to the area, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of regimes supported by countries hostile to the U.S. in the area.
2. Number of military bases/facilities controlled by hostile countries in the area.
3. Number of hostile military personnel stationed in the area.

4. Scope of basing rights of hostile countries in the area.
5. Quantity and quality of military assistance and/or arms transfers from hostile states to the area.

3. U.S. Economic Goals

3.1 Goal: Support the Orderly Expansion and Performance of U.S. Firms Commercial Interests, and Relations

Outcomes. Have the commercial interests or relations of United States firms been significantly affected? Have the overall U.S. economic relations in the area contributed positively to U.S. economic growth? Have the economic relations been marked by cooperation or conflict?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the performance and expansion of U.S. commercial interests in the area/region have:

1. Greatly improved/increased:

- Major increase in U.S. trade, aid, and investment in the area.
- Major increase in cooperative economic relations between U.S. firms and countries in the area.

2. Moderately improved/increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. trade, aid, and investment in the area.
- Moderate increase in cooperative economic relations between U.S. firms and countries in the area.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased/obstructed:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. trade, aid, and investment in the area.
- Moderate increase in economic "conflict" between U.S. firms and countries in the area.

5. Greatly decreased/obstructed:

- Major decrease in (or lack of) U.S. trade, aid, and investment in the area.
- Very conflictual economic relations between U.S. firms and countries in the area (e.g., "beggar thy neighbor" policies, uncompensated expropriation of U.S. firms/industries, etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. The ability of U.S. firms to conduct business on at least a most favored nation (MFN) basis in the area.
2. Absolute and relative levels of U.S. trade, investment, and aid in the area.
3. Economic agreements between relevant countries and U.S. companies in the area.
4. Degree of cooperation or conflict in economic relations/interactions.
5. U.S. balance of payments with the area.
6. Quantity of U.S. economic credits to the area.

3.2 Goal: Support International Economic Order/Systems Compatible with U.S. Economic Interests

Outcome. Has there been significant economic growth in the area? How stable are the economies of the countries in the area? Has there been an expansion of free enterprise in the area?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the economic growth and stability of the countries in the area/region have:

1. Greatly improved:

- High rates of economic growth have been realized by the countries in the area.
- Major decrease in rates of inflation and/or unemployment in the countries of the area.
- Major increase in the expansion of the infrastructures in the region.

2. Moderately improved:

- Moderate rates of economic growth have been realized by the countries in the area.
- Moderate decrease in countries' rates of inflation and/or unemployment.
- Moderate increase in the expansion of the infrastructure in the region.

3. Not significantly affected/ changed.

4. Moderately offset:

- Moderate decrease in the rates of economic growth have been realized by the countries in the area.
- Moderate increase in countries' rates of inflation and/or unemployment.
- Moderate decrease in the expansion of the infrastructure in the region.

5. Greatly offset:

- Large decrease in the rates of economic growth in the countries of the area.

- Large scale economic instability has been realized with high rates of inflation and/or unemployment.
- Major decrease in the expansion of the infrastructure in the region.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Growth rate of GNP's in the area.
2. Growth rate of agricultural and/or industrial production in the area.
3. Public investment in the area -- absolute amount and rates of growth.
4. Economic stability of the area -- rate of inflation, rate of unemployment.
5. Countries' balance of payments.
6. Amount of capital flight from the area.
7. Expansion of free enterprise institutions in the area.
8. Expansion of the countries' infrastructure.

3.3 Goal: Promote the Stability of International Commodities' Prices and Supplies

Outcome. Has the United States had adequate access to markets and raw materials? Have there been attempts to interrupt economic exchange with the United States? Have commodity prices been relatively stable? Has U.S. dependence on regional raw materials or commodities been disruptive to the U.S. economy?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the prices and supplies of the areas'/regions' commodities have become:

1. Very stable:

- Very little fluctuation in commodity prices and supplies has been realized.
- U.S. access to markets in the area has greatly increased.

2. Moderately stable:

- Some fluctuation in commodity prices and supplies has been realized, but they are not overly disruptive to the U.S.
- U.S. access to markets in the area has moderately increased.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately unstable:

- Fluctuations in commodity prices and supplies have increased and are proving disruptive to the U.S.
- U.S. access to markets in the area has moderately decreased.

5. Very unstable:

- Major fluctuations in commodity prices and supplies have greatly increased and are proving very disruptive to the U.S. (e.g., establishment of commodity/resource cartels).
- Limited (or lack of) access of U.S. to markets in the area.

- Interruption of economic exchange with the U.S. has greatly increased.

Measures. Relative change in:

1. Quantity and quality of embargoes against the U.S. in the area.
2. The price stability of the areas' commodities.
3. The dependence of the U.S. on the areas' commodities and/or raw materials (U.S. import of the regions' commodities or raw materials/U.S. total import of the commodities or raw materials).
4. Commodity or raw material cartels in the area.
5. Overall stability of the production and supply of the regions' commodities or raw materials.

3.4 Goal: Promote the Economic Development of Non-Communist Third World Countries

Outcome. Has there been any significant change in the level of economic development in the country?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the economic development of "Third World" countries in the area/region has been:

1. Greatly improved/realized:

- Rates of economic growth of LDC's in the region have greatly increased.
- Expansion of LDC's' infrastructures has greatly increased.
- Major increases in industrial and/or agricultural production in the LDC's in the area.

2. Moderately improved/realized:

- Rates of LDC's' economic growth have moderately increased.
- Some expansion of LDC's' infrastructure has been realized.
- Moderate increases in LDC's' industrial and/or agricultural production.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset:

- Moderate slowdown in rates of LDC's' economic growth.
- No expansion of LDC's' infrastructure.
- Moderate slowdown in growth rates of industrial and/or agricultural production.

5. Greatly offset/hindered:

- Major slowdown in rates of LDC's' economic growth (or negative growth is experienced).

- No new attempts/programs at expanding LDC's' infrastructure.
- No growth or negative growth in LDC's' industrial and/or agricultural production.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. LDC's' GNP growth rate.
2. LDC's' agricultural and/or industrial production growth rates.
3. LDC's' domestic public investment.
4. LDC's' energy consumption/capita.
5. LDC's' infrastructure development (e.g., number of access roads built).

4. U.S. Goals Toward Communist States

4.1 Goal: Reduce Chances of War With the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)

Outcome. Has the United States managed to keep the likelihood of war with the PRC at a low level? Has there been an increase in constructive relationships between the U.S. and PRC?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the chances of direct military confrontation between the United States and Peoples Republic of China (PRC) have been:

1. Greatly reduced:

- Both U.S. and PRC have greatly increased attempts to normalize relations with one another.
- Major reduction in (or lack of) aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc., by both U.S. and PRC toward the other.
- Greatly increased cooperation between the U.S. and PRC in attempts to resolve regional and global problems.

2. Moderately reduced:

- Both U.S. and PRC have moderately increased their attempts to normalize relations with one another.
- Moderate reduction in explicit verbal threats and accusations and very few, if any, aggressive acts and/or demonstrations by either the U.S. or PRC towards the other.
- Moderate increase in constructive negotiations and arbitration attempts between the U.S. and PRC.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased/escalated:

- Moderate increase in explicit verbal threats accusations, isolated aggressive acts, and demonstrations by either the U.S. or PRC towards the other.

- Both U.S. and PRC view each other as exploiting some local/regional conflicts but not in areas viewed as strategically important.
- Moderate increase in military alerts by either U.S. or PRC.

5. Greatly increased/escalated:

- Large scale escalation of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc. by both the U.S. and PRC towards the other.
- Both U.S. and PRC view and accuse the other as exploiting local/regional conflicts by aiding and abetting "client" states in an area viewed as strategically important.
- Major increase in number of military alerts by both U.S. and PRC.
- Near total absence of constructive negotiations and/or mechanisms to arbitrate dispute between the U.S. and PRC.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc. between the U.S. and PRC (as measured by events data sources -- COPDAB, WEIS).
2. Quantity and quality of Chinese aggression against U.S. friend or allies.
3. Quantity of PRC promoted "people's wars."
4. Number of serious international crises involving the U.S. and PRC.
5. Quantity and quality of negotiations and attempts at normalization of relations between the U.S. and PRC (i.e., the Warsaw talks).

4.2 Goal: Reduce Chances of War With the USSR

Outcome. Has the United States managed to keep the likelihood of war with the Soviet Union at a low level? Has there been an increase in constructive relationships between the U.S. and USSR?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the chances of direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union have been:

1. Greatly reduced:

- Both U.S. and USSR restrain actions towards each other.
- Greatly increased cooperation between the U.S. and USSR in attempts to resolve regional and global problems.
- Military threats and/or actions greatly reduced by both actors.
- Major increase in mutually beneficial cooperative enterprises between the U.S. and USSR (e.g., peaceful coexistence, detente, reduction in tensions, etc.).

2. Moderately reduced:

- Moderate reduction in explicit verbal threats and accusations and very few if any aggressive acts and/or demonstrations by either the U.S. or USSR towards the other.
- Moderate increase in negotiations and arbitration attempts between U.S. and USSR.
- Moderate increase in mutually beneficial cooperative enterprises between the U.S. and USSR (e.g., peaceful coexistence, detente, reduction in tensions, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased/escalated:

- Moderate increase in explicit verbal threats and accusations but few (or

isolated) aggressive acts and demonstrations by either the U.S. or USSR toward the other.

- Both U.S. and USSR view each other as exploiting some local/regional conflicts but not in areas viewed as strategically important.
- Moderate increase in military alerts by either U.S. or USSR.

5. Greatly increased/escalated:

- Large scale escalation of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc., by both the U.S. and USSR towards the other.
- Both U.S. and USSR view and accuse the other as exploiting local/regional conflicts by aiding and abetting "client" states in an area viewed as strategically important.
- Major increase in number of military alerts by both U.S. and USSR.
- Near total absence of constructive negotiations and/or mechanisms to arbitrate disputes between the U.S. and USSR.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc., between the U.S. and USSR (as measured by events data sources -- COPDAB, WEIS) and level of international tension.
2. Number of military alerts in the U.S. or USSR.
3. Quantity and quality of USSR and/or U.S. "client" states' conflicts.
4. Number of Soviet-promoted "wars of national liberation."
5. Number of serious international crises involving the U.S. and USSR.
6. Number of conflicts or quality of domestic instability in countries (or regions) viewed as strategically important by the U.S. or USSR.
7. Quantity and quality of negotiations between the U.S. and USSR (e.g., SALT).

4.3 Goal: Contain/Restrain/Deter the Expansion of Communist Influence

Outcome. Has Communist influence in the area expanded? Have friendly countries been overrun by Communist forces or has a friendly regime been overthrown?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the expansion of Communist influence in the area/region has been:

1. Greatly reduced:

- Major reduction or absence of Communist promoted "wars of national liberation" and/or major reduction in (or lack of) capacity of Communist insurgents to carry out acts of violence in the area.
- Major reduction in (or lack of) Communist controlled military bases/facilities and/or arms contact in the area.
- Major increase in non-Communist regime stability in the area.
- Major reduction in (or lack of) Communist backed or allied regimes in the area.

2. Moderately reduced:

- Moderate reduction and/or absence of Communist promoted "wars of national liberation" and/or moderate reduction in capacity of Communist insurgents to carry out acts of violence in the area.
- Moderate reduction in Communist controlled military bases/facilities and/or arms contact in the area.
- Moderate increase in non-Communist regime stability in the area.
- Moderate reduction in Communist backed regimes in the area.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased:

- Moderate escalation and/or presence of Communist promoted "wars of national liberation" and/or improvement in the capability of Communist insurgents to carry out acts of violence in the area.
- Moderate increase in Communist controlled military bases/facilities and/or arms contact in the area.
- Moderate increase in non-Communist and regime instability in the area.
- Moderate increase in Communist backed or allied regimes in the area.

5. Greatly increased:

- Major escalation and/or presence of Communist promoted "wars of national liberation" and major improvement in the capability of Communist insurgents to carry out acts of violence in the area.
- Major increase in Communist controlled military bases/facilities and arms contact in the area.
- Major increase in non-Communist and domestic regime instability in the area.
- Major increase in Communist backed or allied regimes in the area.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of Communist aided (e.g., those receiving military aid from USSR and/or PRC) regimes in the area.
2. Quantity and quality of formal or informal acts establishing closer relations between countries in the area and Communist states (as measured by event data sources -- COPDAB, WEIS).
3. Size of Communist diplomatic missions in the area.
4. Size of Communist trade and aid with the area.

5. Number of Communist military bases/facilities in the area.
6. Quantity and quality of Communist military assistance and/or arms transfers to the area.
7. Capacity of Communist insurgents to overthrow friendly regimes (as measured by organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quality, and arms types).

4.4 Goal: Encourage "Polycentrism" Within the Communist World

Outcome. Has there been a significant change in the degree of independence or diversity displayed in the ideologies, policies, and actions between the USSR and PRC? What degree of autonomy do Communist states and parties have from the USSR or PRC?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, movement towards "polycentrism" within the Communist world has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Complete or near complete "independence" (e.g., autonomy, diversity) of PRC and USSR in their ideologies, policies, and actions.
- Major increase in ideological, domestic, and foreign policy diversity among Communist parties and states (e.g., greater independence of Eastern Europe from USSR, etc.).

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in independence (diversity) of PRC and USSR in their ideologies, policies, and actions.
- Moderate increase in ideological, domestic, and foreign policy diversity among Communist parties and states (e.g., moderate independence of Eastern Europe from USSR, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate increase in the unity of PRC and USSR in their ideologies, policies, and actions.
- Moderate increase in the unity of Communist parties and states (e.g., less autonomy of Eastern Europe from USSR, etc.).

5. Greatly decreased:

- Complete or near unity (little diversity) of PRC and USSR in their ideologies, policies, and actions (e.g., "monolithic" Communist world).

- Great increase in the unity (lack of diversity) of Communist parties and states (e.g., little autonomy/greater unity between Eastern Europe and USSR, etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall degree of autonomy/independence between the PRC and USSR.
2. Quantity and quality of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc., between the USSR and PRC.
3. Overall degree of autonomy/independence between the USSR and Eastern Europe and between satellites dependent on PRC.
4. Percentage of trade and aid of Communist states with non-Communist states.

4.5 Goal: Encourage Liberalization Trends in Communist States

Outcome. Have the internal policies of Communist states been modified in any way to allow for greater personal freedom and liberties for their citizens? Have the positions of those leaders in Communist states who perceive coexistence as possible been reinforced?

Outcome Assessment Questions. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, liberalization trends in major Communist states (e.g., USSR and PRC) have:

1. Greatly increased/promoted:

- Major increase in human rights and "political freedoms" of people living in Communist states (e.g., increased emigration of Soviet Jewry).
- Major increase in selected social and economic interaction between U.S. and Communist states.
- Major increase in free enterprise trends in Communist states, etc.

2. Moderately increased/promoted:

- Moderate increase in human rights and "political freedoms" of people living in Communist states (e.g., moderate increase in emigration of Soviet Jewry).
- Moderate increase in selected social and economic interaction between U.S. and Communist states.
- Moderate increase in free enterprise trends in Communist states.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased/offset:

- Moderate decrease in human rights and "political freedoms" of people living in Communist states.
- Moderate decrease in selected social and economic interaction between U.S. and Communist states.
- Moderate decrease in free enterprise trends in Communist states.

5. Greatly decreased/offset:

- Major increase in human rights violations and lack of "political freedoms" of people living in Communist states.
- Major decrease in (or lack of) selected social and economic interaction between U.S. and Communist states.
- Major decrease in (or lack of) free enterprise trends in Communist states, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Human rights and political freedoms of people living in Communist states (e.g., violations).
2. Government control of immigration and travel (e.g., number of immigrant visas issued).
3. Societal interactions (e.g., commercial, social) between Communist states and the West (e.g., number of U.S. citizen passports issued or renewed).

4.6 Goal: Promote Normalization of Relations Between the U.S. and the Communist World (e.g., USSR and PRC)

Outcome. Has there been a reduction in tensions between the United States and the USSR and/or PRC? Have relations between the U.S. and the USSR and/or PRC become more positive and stable with more collaboration resulting concerning international problems such as arms control, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, law of the sea, etc?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, normalization of relations between the United States and the major Communist states (e.g., USSR and PRC) has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in cooperation between the U.S. and Communist states in resolving regional and global problems (e.g., detente, reduction of tensions, peaceful coexistence, etc.).
- Major increase in negotiations concerning and proscriptions of certain military behavior between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g., SALT).
- Major increase in mutually beneficial exchanges between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g., trade, cultural, and scientific exchanges, etc.).

2. Moderately increased/promoted:

- Moderate increase in cooperation between the U.S. and Communist states in resolving regional and global problems (e.g., detente, reduction of tensions, peaceful coexistence, etc.).
- Moderate increase in negotiations concerning and proscription of certain military behavior between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g. SALT).
- Moderate increase in mutually beneficial exchanges between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g., trade, cultural, and scientific exchange, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased/offset:

- Moderate increase in conflict (tensions) between the U.S. and Communist states concerning regional and global problems.
- Moderate decrease in negotiations concerning and proscription of certain military behavior between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g., nuclear nonproliferation, test bans, etc.).
- Moderate decrease in mutually beneficial exchange between the U.S. and Communist states.

5. Strongly decreased/offset

- Major increase in conflict (tensions) between U.S. and Communist states concerning regional and global problems.
- Major decrease in (or lack of) negotiations concerning and proscriptions of certain military behavior between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g., nuclear nonproliferation, test bans, etc.).
- Major decrease in (or lack of) mutually beneficial exchanges between the U.S. and Communist states.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall degree of cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR and PRC (as measured by events data -- WEIS, COPDAB).
2. Level of international tension.
3. Quantity and quality of negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR and/or PRC (e.g., SALT).
4. Total trade between the U.S. and the USSR and/or PRC.
5. Pro-U.S. votes or positions in U.N. and other international groups taken by USSR and/or PRC.
6. Status of diplomatic channels (e.g., size of diplomatic mission).
7. Control of immigration and travel (e.g., number of U.S. citizen passports issued or renewed).

5. U.S. Goals Toward Europe

5.1 Goal: Guarantee the Security and Independence of Western Europe

Outcome. Has the stability, security, and confidence of Western Europe been affected in any significant way? Has the United States maintained a strong defense posture in Western Europe? Have there been any threats or challenges to Western European order and security?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the security and independence of Western Europe have been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major decrease in the probability of Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against Western Europe.
- Major increase in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Western Europe (e.g., strong nuclear and conventional U.S. forces).
- Major increase in military capabilities of NATO and Western European countries.
- Major increase in economic and political stability of Western Europe.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate decrease in the probability of Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against Western Europe.
- Moderate increase in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Western Europe (e.g., nuclear and conventional U.S. forces).
- Moderate increase in economic and political stability of Western Europe.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:

- Moderate increase in the probability of Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against Western Europe.
- Moderate withdrawal/reduction in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Western Europe.

- Moderate decrease in military capabilities (or cohesion) of NATO and Western European countries.
- Moderate decrease in economic and political stability of Western Europe.

5. Greatly threatened/disrupted:

- Major increase in the probability of Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against Western Europe.
- Major withdrawal/reduction in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Western Europe.
- Major decrease in the military capabilities (or cohesion) of NATO and Western European countries.
- Major decrease in Western European regime stability.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Hostile Western European regimes in power or overthrow of friendly regime.
2. Likelihood of a Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against Western Europe.
3. Quantity and quality of Soviet aggression against Western Europe.
4. Quantity and quality of U.S. military capabilities in Europe (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
5. Quantity and quality of NATO military capabilities (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
6. Quantity and quality of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military capabilities (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
7. Political and economic stability of Western European regimes.

5.2 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Strong Cooperative Ties With Western European Countries

Outcome. Has the maintenance and/or expansion of cooperative relations between the United States and Western Europe been affected in any way? Is there a strong sense of political, military, and economic interdependence between the United States and Western Europe?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, cooperative relations between the United States and Western Europe have been:

1. Greatly increased/strengthened:

- Major increase in cooperative consultations and interdependence between the U.S. and Western European allies and friends.
- U.S. greatly expands its influence, contacts, and presence in Western Europe.
- Major reduction in (or lack of) regimes and/or groups hostile to the U.S. in Western Europe.
- Major reduction (or absence of) political or economic conflicts between the U.S. and Western Europe.

2. Moderately increased/strengthened:

- Moderate increase in cooperative consultations and interdependence between the U.S. and Western European allies and friends.
- U.S. moderately expands its influence, contacts, or presence in Western Europe.
- Moderate reductions in (or virtual lack of) regimes and/or groups hostile to the U.S. in Western Europe.
- Moderate reduction in political or economic conflict between the U.S. and Western Europe.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset/frustrated:

- Moderate decrease in cooperative consultations and interdependence between the U.S. and Western European allies and friends (greater autonomy and disagreement concerning major issues).
- Moderate decrease in U.S. influence, contacts, and presence in Western Europe.
- Moderate increase in regimes and/or groups hostile to the U.S. in Western Europe, etc.
- Moderate increase in political or economic conflicts between the U.S. and Western Europe.

5. Greatly offset/frustrated:

- Major decrease in cooperative consultations and interdependence (or major increase in conflict) between the U.S. and Western Europe.
- Major decrease in U.S. influence, contacts, and presence in Western Europe.
- Major increase in regimes and/or groups hostile to the U.S. in Western Europe.
- Major increase/escalation in political or economic conflicts between the U.S. and Western Europe.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall political cooperation consultation between the United States and Western Europe (as measured by events data -- WEIS).
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. -- Western European trade and economic aid.
3. Status of diplomatic channels between the U.S. and Western Europe.
4. Pro-U.S. votes or positions in U.N. and other international groups.
5. U.S. access to key Western European decision-makers.

6. Western European responsiveness to U.S. requests and suggestions.
7. Overall economic cooperation and consultation between the United States and Western Europe.

5.3 Goal: Work for the Economic Stability and the Economic, Military, and Political Integration of Western Europe

Outcome. Has the economic, political, and military collaboration between Western European countries been maintained or increased? What is the status of organizations such as the EC that promote Western European integration?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American promotion of the stability and integration of Western Europe has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in the diplomatic support of the U.S. for integrationist moves in Western Europe.
- Major increase in economic, political, and military collaboration among Western European countries.
- Major increase in American support for the EC and its policies, etc.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in the diplomatic support of the U.S. for integrationist moves in Western Europe.
- Moderate increase in economic, political, and military collaboration among Western European countries.
- Moderate increase in American support for the EC and its policies.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in the diplomatic support of the U.S. for integrationist moves in Western Europe.
- Moderate decrease in economic, political, and military collaboration among Western European countries.

- Moderate decrease in American support for the EC and its policies.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in the diplomatic support of the U.S. for integrationist moves in Western Europe.
- Major decrease in economic, political, and military collaboration among Western European countries.
- Major decrease in American support for the EC and its policies.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Intra-European political, military, and economic cooperation and consultation.
2. Quantity of intra-European trade (vs. total trade) and investment (vs. total investment).
3. U.S. support for Western European integration and the EC and its policies.
4. Quality of Western European support for EC policies.

5.4 Goal: Promote the Stabilization of Potential or Realized Conflict Arenas in Europe

Outcome. Has there been a reduction in or resolution of conflicts involving European countries or groups? Has there been any significant increase in the possibility of future conflict between hostile countries or groups?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, potential or realized conflict arenas (e.g., Berlin, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, etc.) in Europe have been:

1. Greatly stabilized:

- Conflicting parties/regimes greatly decrease (or end) conflict and/or resolve potential dispute (parties negotiate in absence of military conflict, parties sign a peace treaty, etc.).
- Major advances in detente between adversaries in Europe.

2. Moderately stabilized:

- Conflicting parties/regimes moderately decrease conflict and/or move towards resolving potential conflicts (constructive negotiations take place between conflicting actors).
- Moderate advances in detente between adversaries in Europe.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately agitated:

- Moderate conflict escalation and potential for future conflicts/disputes increases.
- Little movement towards negotiations/dialogue and/or conciliation between hostile parties.

5. Greatly agitated:

- Major conflict escalation.
- Appearance of new conflict actors as conflict spreads/widens.

- No (or very little) movement towards conflict arbitration/negotiations, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Abstention from acts of aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes.
2. Quantity and quality of acts of domestic violence (e.g., bombings, assassinations, kidnappings).
3. Negotiations between hostile groups.
4. Outside attempts at mediation or conciliation.
5. Adherence to international law and conventions.
6. Degree of conflict spread or escalation.

5.5 Goal: Improve Relations Between the United States and Eastern Europe

Outcome. Has there been an improvement in the political, economic, and social relations between the United States and Eastern Europe?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, relations between the United States and Eastern Europe have:

1. Greatly improved:

- Major movement towards normalization of relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Major increase in political, commercial, and cultural interactions between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Major decrease in tension between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.

2. Moderately improved:

- Moderate increase in movement towards normalization of relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Moderate increase in political, commercial, and cultural interactions between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Moderate decrease in tension between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately worsened/deteriorated:

- Moderate increase in tension between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Little (or no) increase in movement towards normalization of relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Moderate decrease in political, commercial, and cultural interactions between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.

5. Greatly worsened/deteriorated:

- Major increase in tension between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Major decrease (or lack of) movement towards normalization of relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Major decrease (or lack of) political, commercial, and cultural interactions between the U.S. and Eastern Europe, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall cooperation between the United States and Eastern Europe (as measured by WEIS and other types of events data).
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. trade with Eastern Europe.
3. U.S. access to key decision-makers in Eastern Europe (official state visits).
4. Status of diplomatic channels between U.S. and Eastern Europe (size of diplomatic missions).
5. Number of Eastern European students in U.S. educational institutions.
6. Number of U.S. citizen passports issued or renewed for Eastern Europe travel.

6. U.S. Goals Toward Asia

6.1 Goal: Avoid Direct Military Confrontation with the Chinese Peoples' Republic (PRC) and the Soviet Union (USSR) in Asia

Outcome. Has the United States avoided direct military confrontation or events that might lead to military conflict with the PRC and/or USSR in Asia? Has the likelihood of an Asian war between the U.S. and the PRC and/or USSR decreased?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, chances of military confrontation between the United States and the PRC and/or USSR in Asia have:

1. Greatly decreased:

- Major deescalation (or elimination) of local/regional conflicts in Asia between client states or allies of the U.S. and PRC and/or USSR (e.g., Southeast Asia, Korea, Taiwan, etc.).
- Major decrease in (or elimination of) threats directed at U.S. allies or friends by the PRC and/or USSR in Asia or their clients/allies.
- Major decrease in the expansion of USSR and/or PRC influence and aggression in Asia.
- Overall increase in the reduction of tensions between the U.S. and USSR and/or PRC.

2. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate deescalation of local/regional conflicts in Asia between client states or allies of the U.S. and PRC and/or USSR.
- Moderate decrease in threats directed at U.S. allies or friends by the PRC and/or USSR in Asia or their clients/allies.
- Moderate decrease in the expansion of USSR and/or PRC influence and aggression in Asia.
- Moderate overall reduction of tensions between the U.S. and USSR and/or PRC.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased/escalated:

- Moderate escalation of local/regional conflicts in Asia between client states or allies of the U.S. and PRC and/or USSR.
- Moderate increase in threats directed at U.S. allies or friends by the PRC and/or USSR in Asia or their clients/allies.
- Moderate increase in the expansion of USSR and/or PRC influence and aggression in Asia.
- Moderate increase in overall tension between the U.S. and USSR and/or PRC.

5. Greatly increased/escalated:

- Major escalation of local/regional conflicts in Asia between client states or allies of the U.S. and PRC and/or USSR.
- Major increase in threats directed at U.S. allies or friends by the PRC and/or USSR or their clients/allies.
- Major increase/escalation of USSR and/or PRC influence and aggression in Asia.
- Major deterioration of overall relations between the U.S. and USSR and/or PRC.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. U.S. perception of PRC and/or USSR aggression in Asia.
2. Quantity and quality of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc., between the U.S. and the PRC and/or USSR in Asia (as measured by events data sources -- WEIS, COPDAB).
3. Number of serious Asian crises including the U.S. and PRC and/or USSR.
4. Escalation and/or spread of local or regional Asian wars.
5. Utilization and support of mechanisms to arbitrate local/regional Asian disputes.

6. U.S., PRC, USSR respect for final settlements of Asian conflicts/disputes.
7. Capacity of Communist insurgents to overthrow a friendly Asian regime.

6.2 Goal: Contain the Expansion of Communist Aggression and Influence in Asia

Outcome. To what degree have the USSR, PRC or local Communists and/or insurgents gained influence in Asia? Has there been a significant increase in Communist military aggression in Asia? Has the United States maintained a strong presence in Asia?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, Communist influence and aggression in Asia have been:

1. Greatly reduced:

- Major reduction in (or elimination of) PRC promoted "people's wars" in Asia and/or comparable Soviet-backed efforts.
- Major reduction in (or elimination of) the capacity of Communist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.
- Major reduction in (or elimination of) Communist controlled military bases) facilities and/or arms contact in Asia.
- Major increase in the stability of non-Communist or neutral regimes in Asia.

2. Moderately reduced:

- Moderate reduction in (or deescalation of) PRC/USSR promoted "people's war" in Asia.
- Moderate reduction in Communist insurgents' capacity to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.
- Moderate reduction in Communist controlled military bases/facilities and/or arms contact in Asia.
- Moderate increase in the stability of non-Communist or neutral regimes in Asia.

3. Not significantly affected/changed:

4. Moderately increased/escalated:

- Moderate increase in (or escalation of) PRC/USSR promoted "people's wars" in Asia.

- Moderate increase in (or success of) Communist insurgents capacity to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.
- Moderate increase in Communist controlled military bases/facilities and/or arms contacts in Asia.
- Moderate decrease in the stability of non-Communist or neutral regimes in Asia.

5. Greatly increased/escalated:

- Major increase/escalation in (or success of) PRC/USSR promoted "people's wars" in Asia.
- Major increase in (or success of) Communist insurgents' capacity to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.
- Major decrease in the stability of non-Communist or neutral regimes in Asia, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number and/or escalation of Communist promoted "wars of national liberation" in Asia.
2. USSR and/or PRC influence in Asia as measured by:
 - Total trade with Asian states.
 - Total economic and military aid to Asia.
 - Status of diplomatic channels (size of PRC and/or USSR diplomatic missions).
 - Formal or informal alliances/treaties between Asian countries and PRC and/or USSR.
 - PRC and/or USSR military bases/facilities.
3. Number of hostile Asian regimes.
4. Capacity of Communist insurgents to overthrow friendly regimes (as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity, and quality of arms).
5. U.S./Asian political, economic, and military presence in Asia as measured by:
 - Total U.S. troops in the area.
 - Quantity and quality of U.S. military bases/facilities in Asia.

- Quantity and quality of U.S. military and economic assistance to Asia.
- Total U.S. trade in Asia (both absolute and relative levels).
- Status of U.S. diplomatic channels in Asia (size of U.S. diplomatic missions).

Notes. The wording of this goal is primarily relevant to the 1960's.

6.3 Goal: Promote the Security and Stability of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan

Outcome. Has the stability, security, and confidence of the major industrial states of Asia been affected in any significant way? Has the United States maintained a strong defense posture in Asia. Have there been any significant threats or challenges to the order and security of the major Asian industrial states?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the security and independence of the major industrial states in Asia (e.g., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan) have been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major decrease in the probability of a PRC and/or USSR attack against any or all of the major Asian industrial non-Communist states.
- Major increase in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Asia.
- Major increase in the military capabilities and cooperation among U.S./Asian allies and friends (e.g., major increase in regional role of Japan).
- Major increase in economic and political stability of non-Communist, industrial, Asian regimes (or region as a whole).

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate decrease in the probability of PRC and/or USSR attack against any or all of the major Asian industrial, non-Communist states.
- Moderate increase in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Asia.
- Moderate increase in the military capabilities and cooperation among U.S./Asian allies and friends (e.g., moderate increase in regional role of Japan).
- Moderate increase in the economic and political stability of Asian industrial non-Communist regimes (or region as a whole).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:

- Moderate increase in the probability of a PRC and/or USSR attack against any or all of the major Asian industrial non-Communist states.
- Moderate withdrawal/reduction in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Asia.
- Moderate decrease in the military capabilities and cooperation among U.S. Asian allies and friends (e.g., moderate decrease in regional role of Japan).
- Moderate decrease in economic and political stability of Asian industrial non-Communist regimes (or region as a whole).

5. Greatly threatened/disrupted:

- Major increase in the probability of a PRC and/or USSR attack against any or all of the major Asian industrial non-Communist states.
- Major withdrawal/reduction in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Asia.
- Major decrease in the military capabilities and cooperation among U.S./Asian allies and friends.
- Major decrease in economic and political stability of Asian industrial non-Communist regimes (or region as a whole).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Hostile influence in or regime control of the major Asian industrial states.
2. Likelihood of PRC and/or USSR attack against U.S. Asian industrial allies.
3. Quantity and quality of PRC and/or USSR aggression against U.S. Asian industrial allies.

4. Quantity and quality of U.S. military capabilities Asia (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
5. Quantity and quality of local allies' armed forces (e.g., troops, bases/facilities, materials).
6. Quantity and quality of PRC and USSR military capabilities in Asia (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
7. Political and economic stability of Asian regimes.

6.4 Goal: Support the Stability of Non-Communist Developing Asian Countries

Outcome. Have any of the non-Communist developing countries in Asia been wholly or partly overrun by forces hostile to U.S. interests? Have any of these countries been forced to submit to external threats or aggression?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the regime stability of non-Communist less developed Asian countries has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Stability of predominantly friendly regimes in Asia is greatly increased or many Communist regimes in the area lose power.
- Border security of non-Communist Asian regimes is greatly enhanced.
- Major reduction in (or elimination of) local/regional Asian conflicts.
- Major reduction in (or elimination of) the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Stability of predominantly friendly regimes in Asia is moderately increased or some Communist regimes in the area lose power.
- Border security of non-Communist Asian regimes is moderately enhanced.
- Moderate reduction in (or elimination of) local/regional Asian conflicts.
- Moderate reduction in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:

- Moderate decrease in the stability of predominantly friendly regimes in Asia or Communist regimes in the area gain some power/influence.

- Moderate decrease in the border security of non-Communist Asian regimes.
- Moderate increase/escalation in local/regional Asian conflicts.
- Moderate increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents.

5. Greatly threatened/disrupted:

- Major decrease in the stability (or overthrow of) predominantly friendly regimes in Asia or Communist regimes in the area come to power.
- Major decrease in the border security of non-Communist Asian regimes.
- Major increase/escalation in local/regional Asian conflicts.
- Major increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression.

Measures. Relative change in:

1. Number of pro-U.S. non-Communist LDC Asian regimes (e.g., overthrow of friendly regimes).
2. Degree of threats/aggression by hostile insurgents against friendly Asian LDC regimes.
3. Military capabilities of friendly Asian LDC regimes.
4. Capacity of insurgents to overthrow friendly Asian LDC regimes as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity, and quality of their arms.
5. Escalation and spread of local/regional conflicts.
6. Overall domestic political stability of Asian LDC regimes (e.g., regimes' average length of time in office, peaceful succession of governments, etc).

6.5 Goal: Contain Soviet Expansionism in Asia

Outcome. Has the Soviet Union expanded its political, military, economic influence and/or presence in Asia? Have groups or regimes friendly to the Soviet Union either come to power or gained influence in Asia?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American containment of Soviet influence in Asia has been:

1. Very successful:

- Major decrease in Soviet influence and/or aggression in Asia.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) Soviet exploitations of regional/local conflicts in Asia.
- Major increase toward normalization of relations between the U.S. and PRC.
- Major increase in U.S. presence and influence in Asia.

2. Moderately successful:

- Moderate decrease in Soviet influence and/or aggression in Asia.
- Moderate decrease in Soviet exploitations of regional/local conflicts in Asia.
- Moderate increase toward normalization of relations between the U.S. and PRC.
- Moderate increase in U.S. presence and influence in Asia.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately unsuccessful:

- Moderate increase in Soviet influence and/or aggression in Asia.
- Moderate increase in Soviet exploitation of regional/local conflicts in Asia.

- Moderate hardening of relations (or moderate increase in tension) between the U.S. and PRC.
- Moderate withdrawal/reduction of U.S. presence and influence in Asia.

5. Very unsuccessful:

- Major increase in Soviet influence and/or aggression in Asia.
- Major increase in Soviet exploitation of regional/local conflicts in Asia.
- Major increase in tension between the PRC and U.S.
- Major withdrawal/reduction of U.S. presence influence in Asia.

Measures. Relative changes in:

- 1. Number of pro-Soviet regimes in Asia.
- 2. Quantity and quality of Soviet military presence in Asia (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
- 3. Total Soviet trade in Asia.
- 4. Total Soviet economic aid to Asia.
- 5. Status of Soviet diplomatic channels in Asia (size of Soviet diplomatic missions).
- 6. Quantity and quality of Soviet formal or informal acts establishing closer relations with Asian regimes (e.g., recognition, alliances, treaties, acceptance of missions).

Notes. This goal is more relevant for the 1970's than the 1960's when Soviet rather than "Communist" expansion gained greater salience for American policymakers.

6.6 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Relations with Japan

Outcome. Have the United States and Japan maintained close cooperative relations based on mutual consultations and confidence? Have both the United States and Japan avoided policies and actions that might undermine U.S./Japanese relations?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, cooperative relations between the United States and Japan have been:

1. Greatly increased/strengthened:

- Major reduction in (or absence of) political or economic conflict/disputes between the U.S. and Japan.
- Major increase in consultations/compatibility/complementarity between U.S. and Japanese military forces and doctrines.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S. or Japanese policies and actions that would undermine U.S./Japanese relations and/or confidence in one another.

2. Moderately increased/strengthened:

- Moderate reduction in (or absence of) political or economic conflicts/disputes between the U.S. and Japan.
- Moderate increase in consultation/compatibility/complementarity between U.S. and Japanese military forces and doctrine.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. or Japanese policies and actions that undermine U.S./Japanese relations and/or confidence in one another.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset/frustrated:

- Moderate increase in political or economic conflicts/disputes between the U.S. and Japan.

- Moderate decrease in consultations/compatibility/complementarity between U.S. and Japanese military forces and doctrine.
- Moderate increase in U.S. or Japanese policies and actions that undermine U.S./Japanese relations and/or confidence in one another.

5. Greatly offset/frustrated:

- Major increase in (or presence of) political or economic disputes between the U.S. and Japan.
- Major decrease in (or lack of) consultations/compatibility/complementarity between U.S. and Japanese military forces and doctrine.
- Major increase in (or presence of) U.S. or Japanese policies and actions that undermine U.S./Japanese relations and/or confidence in one another.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall U.S./Japanese cooperation (as measured by events data sources -- WEIS and COPDAB).
2. Maintenance of pro-U.S. attitudes in Japan:
 - Japanese students in U.S. educational institutions.
 - Official government visits to and from the U.S.
 - Relations between U.S. and Japanese attaches and military personnel.
 - Anti-U.S. acts or demonstrations in Japan.
 - Pro-U.S. votes on positions in U.N. and other international groups taken by Japan.
 - U.S. access to key Japanese decision-makers.
 - Japanese responsiveness to U.S. requests and suggestions.
 - Status of diplomatic channels (size of diplomatic missions).
3. U.S./Japanese trade and U.S./Japanese balance of payments.

6.7 Goal: Promote Economic Development and Stability in Asian Non-Communist LDC's

Outcome. Has the United States established or expanded programs and policies to assist Asian non-Communist LDC's to economically develop? Was the development aid or assistance significant in maintaining/improving cooperative relations between the country and the U.S?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American support and promotion of the economic development/stability of non-Communist Asian LDC's has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Asian LDC's.
- Major increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Asian LDC's.
- Major increase in domestic and American foreign investment in Asian, LDC's.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Asian LDC's.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Asian LDC's.
- Moderate increase in domestic and American foreign investment in Asian LDC's.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance in Asian LDC's.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Asian LDC's.
- Major increase in domestic and American foreign investment in Asian LDC's.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S. economic and technical assistance to Asian LDC's.
- Major decrease in (or lack of) U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Asian LDC's.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) domestic and American foreign investment in Asian LDC's, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. economic assistance programs (e.g., grants and loans) in Asia.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. development projects in Asia.
- 3. U.S. economic credits to Asia.
4. Quantity and quality of U.S. technological assistance and transfers in Asia.
5. U.S. support of multilateral (e.g., World Bank, IMF, etc.) economic aid to Asia.
6. U.S. support of Asian regional economic development organizations/agencies.

7. U.S. Goals Toward the Middle East

7.1 Goal: Promote an End to Conflicts in the Middle East

Outcome. What are the chances for peace in the Middle East? Has there been a deescalation of military confrontations in the Middle East? Has there been a reduction in the potential of superpower conflict in the Middle East?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, chances of peace (e.g., absence of military conflict) in the Middle East have:

1. Strongly improved:

- Major increase in the chances of success in negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and an absence of direct military confrontations.
- Major steps taken towards military disengagement between Israel and Arab states.
- Chances of major power conflict in the Middle East greatly reduced.
- Major movement towards creation of regional balances of power in the Middle East.

2. Moderately improved:

- Moderate increase in the chances of success in negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and an absence of direct military confrontation.
- Moderate steps taken toward military disengagement between Israel and the Arab states.
- Moderate reduction in chances of major power conflict in the Middle East.
- Moderate movement toward creation of regional balances of power in the Middle East.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately deteriorated:

- Moderate decrease in the possibility of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.

- Moderate escalation in conflict behavior between Israel and the Arab states.
- Moderate increase in the chances of major power confrontation in the Middle East.
- Moderate escalation of the Middle Eastern "arms race."

5. Strongly deteriorated:

- Little, if any, possibility of constructive negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.
- Large scale escalation of conflict between Israel and the Arab states.
- Major increase in the chances of major power confrontation in the Middle East
- Major escalation of the Middle Eastern "arms race."

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of actual military confrontations in the Middle East (e.g., battle deaths).
2. Overall cooperation/conflict in the Middle East (as measured by events data sources -- WEIS, COPDAB).
3. Quantity and quality of aggressive actions in the Middle East (e.g., military alerts).
4. Utilization and support of mechanisms to arbitrate disputes in the Middle East.
5. Quantity and quality of negotiation processes in the Middle East.
6. Chances of superpower confrontation in the Middle East.
7. Adherence/violation of U.S. resolutions/cease-fires.

7.2 Goal: Guarantee Israeli Security

Outcome. Has there been any significant change in the United States' commitment to the security of Israel? Has Israel maintained or increased its military capabilities? Have there been significant threats to Israel's "right to exist" and/or territorial integrity (pre-1967 borders)?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, Israeli security has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:.

- Major decrease in the probability of an Arab military attack against Israel.
- Major increase in military capabilities of Israel to deter/defend against a surprise Arab attack.
- Major increase in U.S. commitment to Israel's territorial integrity and security.
- Major increase in the border security of Israel.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate decrease in the probability of an Arab military attack against Israel.
- Moderate increase in military capabilities of Israel to deter/defend against a surprise Arab attack.
- Moderate increase in U.S. commitment to Israel's territorial integrity and security.
- Moderate increase in the border security of Israel.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:

- Moderate increase in the probability of an Arab military attack against Israel.
- Moderate decrease in military capabilities of Israel to deter/defend against a surprise Arab attack.

- Moderate decrease in U.S. commitment to Israel's territorial integrity and security.
- Moderate decrease in the border security of Israel.

5. Greatly threatened/disrupted:

- Major increase in the probability (or realization of) an Arab military attack against Israel.
- Major decrease in the military capabilities of Israel to deter/defend against a surprise Arab attack.
- Major decrease in U.S. commitment to Israel's territorial integrity and security.
- Major decrease in the border security of Israel.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. U.S.'s commitment to Israel's security.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. military assistance to Israel.
3. Quantity and quality of U.S. arms exports to Israel.
4. Israel's overall military capabilities (e.g., men under arms, military/defense budget).
5. Quantity and quality of aggressive actions directed at Israel by hostile neighbors.

Notes. Between 1967-1973 this goal should read "maintain/increase Israel's military superiority in the Middle East."

7.3 Goal: Minimize Soviet Influence in the Middle East

Outcome. Has the presence and influence of the Soviet Union decreased in the Middle East?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, Soviet military influence in the Middle East has:

1. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in the number of Soviet naval vessels in the Middle East.
- Major decrease in Soviet military assistance and advisers in the Middle East.
- Major decrease in Soviet controlled military bases/facilities in the Middle East.
- Major decrease in Soviet arms contact with countries of the Middle East.

2. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in the number of Soviet naval vessels in the Middle East.
- Moderate decrease in Soviet military assistance and advisers in the Middle East.
- Moderate decrease in Soviet controlled military bases/facilities in the Middle East.
- Moderate decrease in Soviet arms contact with countries of the Middle East.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in the number of Soviet naval vessels in the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in Soviet military assistance and advisers in the Middle East.

- Moderate increase in (or acquisition of) Soviet controlled military bases/facilities in the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in Soviet arms contact with countries of the Middle East.

5. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in the number of Soviet naval vessels in the Middle East.
- Major increase in Soviet military assistance and advisers in the Middle East.
- Major increase in (or acquisition of) Soviet controlled military bases/facilities in the Middle East.
- Major increase in Soviet arms contact with countries of the Middle East.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of pro-Soviet regimes in the Middle East.
2. Quantity and quality of formal or informal acts establishing closer relations between the USSR and countries in the Middle East (as measured by event data sources -- WEIS, COPDAB).
3. Status of Soviet diplomatic channels in the Middle East (e.g., size of diplomatic missions).
4. Quantity and quality of USSR trade and aid with the Middle East.
5. Number of Soviet military bases/facilities in the Middle East and amount of use Soviets are permitted to make of same.
6. Quantity and quality of USSR military assistance, advisors, and arms transfers to the Middle East.

7.4 Goal: Promote/Support Political Stability in the Middle East

Outcome. Has the political stability of pro-Western and neutral regimes in the Middle East increased? Have threats to the political stability of pro-Western and neutral regimes in the Middle East increased?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the political stability of friendly Middle Eastern countries has:

1. Greatly increased/secured:

- Major reduction (or elimination) of military conflict in the Middle East.
- Major reduction of terrorism in the Middle East.
- Major loss of power/influence (or elimination) of "radical" leftist regimes and organizations in the Middle East.
- Major increase in the stability of pro-West or "traditional regimes" in the Middle East (e.g., Israel, Jordan, Iran (pre-1979), Saudi Arabia, Morocco, etc.).

2. Moderately increased/secured:

- Moderate reduction of military conflict in the Middle East.
- Moderate reduction of terrorism in the Middle East.
- Moderate loss of power/influence of "radical" leftist regimes and organizations in the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in the stability of pro-West or "traditional regimes" in the Middle East (e.g., Israel, Jordan, Iran (pre-1979), Saudi Arabia, Morocco, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased/threatened:

- Moderate escalation of military conflict in the Middle East.

- Moderate increase of terrorism in the Middle East.
- Moderate increase of power/influence of "radical" leftist regimes and organizations in the Middle East.
- Moderate decrease in (or increase of threats to) the stability of pro-West or "traditional regimes" in the Middle East (e.g., Israel, Jordan, Iran (pre-1979), Saudi Arabia, Morocco, etc.).

5. Greatly decreased/threatened:

- Major escalation of military conflict in the Middle East.
- Major increase of terrorism in the Middle East.
- Major increase of power/influence of "radical" leftist regimes and organizations in the Middle East.
- Major decrease in (or the elimination/overthrow of) the stability of pro-West or "traditional regimes" in the Middle East (e.g., Israel, Jordan, Iran (pre-1979), Saudi Arabia, Morocco, etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Pro-Western and neutral regimes length of time in office.
2. Peaceful succession of governments in pro-Western and neutral countries.
3. Quality of regimes' popular support.
4. Capacity of insurgents to overthrow the government (as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity, and quality of arms).
5. Capacity of terrorists to carry out acts of violence.
6. Quality and quantity of pro-Western and neutral regimes' internal security forces.

7.5 Goal: Promote the Economic Stability and Development of Middle Eastern Countries

Outcome. Has the United States established or expanded programs and policies to assist in the economic development of Middle Eastern countries?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American support/promotion of the economic development/stability of Middle Eastern countries has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to the Middle East.
- Major increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multi-lateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Middle Eastern countries.
- Major increase in the economic interdependence of the Middle East and the United States, etc.
- Major increase in U.S. support for the diversification of the economies of the Middle East.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multi-lateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Middle Eastern countries.
- Moderate increase in the economic interdependence of the Middle East and the United States.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support for the diversification of the economies of the Middle East.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance to the Middle East.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Middle Eastern countries.
- Moderate decrease in the economic interdependence of the Middle East and the U.S.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support for the diversification of the economies of the Middle East.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S. economic and technical assistance to the Middle East.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S. support for economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Middle Eastern countries.
- Major decrease in the economic interdependence of the Middle East and the U.S.
- Major decrease in U.S. support for the diversification of Middle Eastern countries.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. economic assistance programs (e.g., grants and loans) in the Middle East.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. development projects in the Middle East.
3. U.S. economic credits to the Middle East.
4. Quantity and quality of U.S. technological assistance and transfers to the Middle East.

5. U.S. promotion of economic interdependence between Middle Eastern countries.
6. U.S. support for the diversification of Middle Eastern economies.
7. U.S. encouragement of the recycling of Arab oil wealth.

7.6 Goal: Maintain/Increase United States' Access to Markets and Raw Materials in the Middle East

Outcome. Has there been any interruptions or threat of interruptions of the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the United States? Has the United States had unlimited access to Middle Eastern markets and commodities other than oil?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American access to markets and raw materials (e.g., oil) in the Middle East has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major decrease in (or absence of) the interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern petroleum to the U.S.
- Major increase in U.S. foreign investment and trade in the Middle East.
- Major increase in the stability of the major oil producing states and in their cooperative relations with the U.S.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate decrease in the interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern petroleum to the U.S.
- Moderate increase in U.S. foreign investment and trade in the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in the stability of the major oil producing states and in their cooperative relations with the U.S.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate increase in the interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern petroleum to the U.S.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. foreign investment and trade in the Middle East.

- Moderate decrease in the stability of the major oil-producing states and in their cooperative relations with the U.S.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major increase in the interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern petroleum to the U.S. (e.g., OPEC embargo).
- Major decrease in U.S. foreign investment and trade in the Middle East.
- Major decrease in the stability of the major oil-producing states and a major decrease in cooperation with the U.S.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Ability of the United States to conduct business on at least a most favored nation (MFN) basis in the Middle East.
- 2. Threat of an OPEC oil embargo against the United States.
3. Use (or threat of use) of oil as a political weapon.
4. U.S. foreign investment and trade in the Middle East.

8. U.S. Goals Toward Latin America

8.1 Goal: Promote Economic Stability/Development in non-Communist Latin American Countries not Opposed by U.S.

Outcome. Has the United States established or expanded programs and policies to assist Latin American economies to stabilize and develop?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American support of the economic development/stability of Latin American countries has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Latin America.
- Major increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Latin American Countries.
- Major increase in U.S. sponsored programs to offset domestic economic instability in Latin America (e.g., inflation, unemployment, etc.).
- Major increase in U.S. support programs for Latin American infrastructure development.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance in Latin America.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc) to Latin American countries.
- Moderate increase in U.S. sponsored programs to offset domestic economic instability in Latin America (e.g., inflation, unemployment, etc.)
- Moderate increase in U.S. supported programs for Latin American infrastructure developments.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Latin America.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Latin American countries.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. sponsored programs to offset domestic instability in Latin America (e.g., inflation, unemployment, etc.).
- Moderate decrease in U.S. supported programs for Latin American infrastructure development.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Latin America.
- Major decrease in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Latin America.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S. sponsored programs to offset domestic economic instability in Latin America (e.g., inflation, unemployment, etc.).
- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S. supported programs for Latin American infrastructure development.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. economic assistance programs (e.g., grants and loans) in Latin America.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. development projects in Latin America.
3. U.S. economic credits to Latin America.
4. Quantity and quality of U.S. technological assistance and transfers to Latin America.

5. U.S. support of economic aid provided through multi-lateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Latin American Countries.
6. U.S. sponsored programs to offset Latin American economic instability (e.g., inflation, unemployment).
7. U.S. encouragement of countries to "untie" their aid to Latin America.
8. U.S. programs to help Latin America ease their debt burdens.

8.2 Goal: Continue/Strengthen American Economic Presence in Latin America

Outcome. Has the United States' position as a major economic force in Latin America been affected in any significant way? Have there been any threats to the United States' economic presence in Latin America?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American economic presence in Latin America has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. trade in Latin America.
- Major increase in U.S. access to raw materials and markets in Latin America.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) expropriations of U.S. firms in Latin America.
- Major increase in U.S. investment in Latin America.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. trade in Latin America.
- Moderate increase in U.S. access to raw materials and markets in Latin America.
- Moderate decrease in expropriations of U.S. firms in Latin America.
- Moderate increase in U.S. investment in Latin America.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. trade in Latin America.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. access to raw materials and markets in Latin America.
- Moderate increase in expropriations of U.S. firms in Latin America.

- Moderate decrease in U.S. investment in Latin America.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. trade in Latin America.
- Major decrease in U.S. access to raw materials and markets in Latin America.
- Major increase in expropriation of U.S. firms in Latin America.
- Major decrease in U.S. investment in Latin America.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. trade in Latin America.
2. Latin American trade with the U.S./total Latin American trade.
3. Size of U.S. foreign investment in Latin America.
4. Ability of U.S. to conduct business on at least a most favored nation basis.
5. Number of violent acts against U.S. commercial interests and property in Latin America.
6. U.S. access to Latin American raw materials.
7. Agreements between Latin American countries and U.S. companies.
8. Expropriations/nationalizations of U.S. companies in Latin America.

8.3 Goal: Keep Latin America Free of External, Hostile Aggression and Influence

Outcome. Has the United States maintained its alliance and security relationships in Latin America? Have hostile countries gained alignments, installations, or influence in Latin America?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, external "hostile" aggression and influence in Latin America has:

1. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in (or absence of) formal or informal acts establishing closer relations between Latin America and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries (e.g., recognition, furtherance of trade, acceptance of missions).
- Major increase in the strength of alliances and security relationships between U.S. and Latin America (e.g., OAS, Rio treaty, etc.)
- Major decrease in alignments or installation of hostile forces and/or material in Latin America.

2. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in formal or informal acts of establishing closer relations between Latin America and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries (e.g., recognition, furtherance of trade, acceptance of mission).
- Moderate increase in the strength of alliances and security relationships between U.S. and Latin America (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).
- Moderate decrease in alignments or installations of hostile forces and/or material in Latin America.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in formal or informal establishment of closer relations between Latin America and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries (e.g., recognition, furtherance of trade, acceptance of mission).
- Moderate decrease in the strength of alliances and security relationships between the U.S. and Latin America (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).
- Moderate increase in alignments or installations of hostile forces and/or material in Latin America.

5. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in formal or informal acts establishing closer relations between Latin America and the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries (e.g., recognition, furtherance of trade, acceptance of missions).
- Major decrease in the strength of alliances and security relationships between the U.S. and Latin America (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).
- Major increase in alignments or installations of hostile forces and/or material in Latin America.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of hostile regimes in Latin America.
2. U.S./Latin American alliances and security relationships (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, bilateral military agreements).
3. Latin American countries' reaction to Cuban threat.
4. Quantity and quality of formal or informal acts establishing closer relations with countries hostile to the United States (e.g., recognition, furtherance of trade, acceptance of missions).

5. Capacity of externally-promoted insurgents to overthrow friendly regimes (as measured by their organizational and numerical strength; popular support; quantity and quality of arms).
6. Quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in Latin America (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
7. Quantity and quality of local regimes' military capabilities.

8.4 Goal: Promote Democratic Institutions in Latin America

Outcome. Was there any significant change in the status of Latin American democratic institutions? Did any democratic regimes replace any authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in Latin America?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, democratic institutions and free enterprise in Latin America have:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in the number and stability of democratic regimes in Latin America.
- Major increase in the adherence to human rights by Latin American regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Major increase in Latin American economic development in the capitalist mode.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in the number and stability of democratic regimes in Latin America.
- Moderate increase in the adherence to human rights by Latin American regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Moderate increase in economic development in the capitalist mode.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in the number and stability of democratic regimes in Latin America.

- Moderate decrease in the adherence to human rights by Latin American regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Moderate decrease in economic development in the capitalist mode.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in the number and stability of democratic regimes in Latin America.
- Major decrease in the adherence to (or major increase in the violations of) human rights by Latin American regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Major decrease in economic development in the capitalist mode.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of democratic regimes in Latin America.
2. Status of human rights in Latin America (e.g., rights of person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest, or imprisonment).
3. Status of civil and political liberties in Latin America (e.g., freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
4. Adherence to constitutional principle by Latin American regimes.
5. Development and treatment of opposition parties in Latin America.
6. Percent of Latin American eligible voters who vote.
7. Extent to which power is vested in elected officials in Latin America.

8.5 Goal: Promote/Support the Political Stability of Latin American Countries

Outcome. Has the political stability of Latin American regimes increased? Have any friendly regimes in Latin America been wholly or partly overrun by forces hostile to the United States?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the political stability of Latin American countries has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major increase in the capabilities of friendly regimes to maintain domestic order.
- Major decrease in (or elimination of) the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against Latin American regime.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) disputes (e.g., border) between Latin American countries.
- Major increase in the development and support of regional cooperation and organizations (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate increase in the capabilities of friendly regimes to maintain domestic order.
- Moderate decrease in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against Latin American regimes.
- Moderate decrease in disputes (e.g., border) between Latin American countries.
- Moderate increase in the development and support of regional cooperation and organizations (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:

- Moderate decrease in the capabilities of friendly regimes to maintain domestic order.
- Moderate increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against Latin American regimes.
- Moderate increase in disputes (e.g., border) between Latin American countries.
- Moderate decrease in the development and support of regional cooperation and organizations (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).

5. Greatly threatened/disrupted:

- Major decrease in the capabilities of friendly regimes to maintain order or stay in power.
- Major increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against Latin American regimes.
- Major increase in disputes (e.g., border) between Latin American countries.
- Major decrease in the development and support of regional cooperation and organizations (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of friendly regimes in power.
2. Degree of threats/aggression by hostile insurgents against friendly Latin American regimes.
3. Capabilities of internal security forces of friendly Latin American regimes.

4. Capacity of insurgents to overthrow friendly Latin American regimes as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity and quality of their arms.
5. Overall domestic political stability in Latin America (e.g., governments' average length of time in office, peaceful succession of governments, etc.).
6. Friendly regimes' popular support.
7. Border disputes between Latin American countries.

9. U.S. Goals Toward Africa

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9.1 Goal: Promote Peaceful Transition of African Countries to Independence

Outcome. Has the United States helped and/or promoted sub-Sahara African countries in peacefully reaching independence? Has there been increased independence? Has there been an increased movement towards "majority rule" in Africa?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American promotion for the peaceful transition to independence of African countries has:

1. Greatly increased/successful:

- Major increase in American encouragement of imperial powers (e.g., U.K., France, Portugal, etc.) to voluntarily decolonize in Africa.
- Major increase in American support for majority rule in Southern Africa.
- Major increase in American promotion of U.N. involvement in difficult African decolonization cases (e.g., Rhodesia, South West Africa).
- Major increase in American discouragement of Soviet involvement in African countries fighting for independence.

2. Moderately increased/successful:

- Moderate increase in American encouragement of imperial powers (U.K., France, Portugal, etc.) to voluntarily decolonize in Africa.
- Moderate increase in American support for majority rule in Southern Africa.
- Moderate increase in American promotion of U.N. involvement in difficult African decolonization cases (e.g., Rhodesia, South West Africa).
- Moderate increase in American discouragement of Soviet involvement in African countries fighting for independence, etc.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased/unsuccessful:

- Moderate decrease in American encouragement of imperial powers (e.g., U.K. France, Portugal, etc.) to voluntarily decolonize in Africa.
- Moderate decrease in American support for majority rule in Southern Africa.
- Moderate decrease in American promoted U.N. involvement in difficult African decolonization cases (e.g., Rhodesia, South West Africa).
- Moderate increase in Soviet involvement in African countries fighting for independence.

5. Greatly decreased/unsuccessful:

- Major decrease in the imperial powers voluntary decolonization in Africa.
- Major decrease in American support for majority rule in Southern Africa.
- Major decrease in American promoted U.N. involvement in difficult African decolonization cases (e.g., Rhodesia, South West Africa).
- Major increase in Soviet involvement in African countries fighting for independence.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. U.S. support for decolonization in Africa.
2. Number of "independent" sub-Saharan African states.
3. Formal U.N. activities or participation in African decolonization process.
4. Status of U.S.-African diplomatic channels.

Notes. This goal is relevant primarily for American foreign policy in the 1960's as it relates to decolonization processes. In the 1970's, focus primarily on U.S. promotion of "majority rule" in Southern Africa.

9.2 Goal: Promote Economic Stability and Development of Sub-Saharan African Countries not Opposed by U.S.

Outcome. Has the United States established or expanded programs and policies to assist, economically develop, and stabilize sub-Saharan Africa?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American support and promotion of the economic development/stability of African LDC's have been:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Africa.
- Major increase in U.S. support and encouragement of economic aid provided through multi-lateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) and of aid provided from former European colonial powers.
- Major increase in U.S. supported programs for African infrastructure development.
- Major increase in U.S. supported foreign and domestic investment in Africa.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Africa.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support and encouragement of economic aid provided through multi-lateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) and of aid provided from former European colonial powers.
- Moderate increase in U.S. supported programs for African infrastructure development.
- Moderate increase in U.S. supported foreign and domestic investment in Africa.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Africa.

- Moderate decrease in U.S. support and encouragement of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) and of aid provided from former European colonial powers.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. supported programs for African infrastructure development.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. supported foreign and domestic investment in Africa, etc.

5. Strongly decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Africa.
- Major decrease in U.S. support and encouragement of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) and of aid provided from former European colonial powers.
- Major decrease in U.S. supported programs for African infrastructure development.
- Major decrease in U.S. supported foreign and domestic investment in Africa.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. economic assistance programs (e.g., grants and loans) in sub-Saharan Africa.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. development projects in sub-Saharan Africa.
3. U.S. economic credits to sub-Saharan Africa.
4. U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to sub-Saharan Africa.
5. U.S. encouragement of European countries (former colonial power) to assist Africa in developing.
6. U.S. sponsored programs to offset African economic instability (e.g., inflation, unemployment).
7. U.S. support of African regional economic organizations.

9.3 Goal: Increase/Promote U.S. Economic Relations with African Countries.

Outcome. Has the United States economic presence in Africa been significantly affected? Has the United States continued to promote its economic interests in Africa?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, U.S. economic relations with African countries have:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. trade and investment in Africa.
- Major increase in U.S. access to African resources and markets.
- Major increase in cooperative economic projects between the U.S. and African states.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. trade and investment in Africa.
- Moderate increase in U.S. access to African resources and markets.
- Moderate increase in cooperative economic projects between the U.S. and African states.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. trade and investment in Africa.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. access to African resources and markets.
- Moderate decrease in cooperative economic projects between the U.S. and African states.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. trade and investment in Africa.

- Major decrease in U.S. access to African resources and markets.
- Major decrease in cooperative economic projects between the U.S. and African states.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. trade to Africa.
2. African trade with U.S./total African trade.
3. Size of U.S. foreign investment in Africa.
4. Ability of U.S. to conduct business in Africa on at least a most favored nation basis.
5. Number of violent acts against U.S. commercial interests and property in Africa.
6. U.S. access to African raw materials.
7. Agreements between Africa and U.S. companies.
8. U.S. economic aid (e.g., loans and grants) to Africa.

9.4 Goal: Promote Democratic Institutions in Africa

Outcome. Was there any significant change in the status of African democratic institutions? Did any democratic regimes replace any authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in Africa?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, democratic institutions and free enterprise in sub-Saharan Africa have:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in the number and stability of democratic institutions and regimes in Africa.
- Major increase in the adherence to human rights by African regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest imprisonment; right to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Major increase in African economic development in the capitalist mode.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in the number and stability of democratic institutions and regimes in Africa.
- Moderate increase in the adherence to human rights by African regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech and the press).
- Major increase in African economic development in the capitalist mode.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in the number and stability of democratic institution and regimes in Africa.

- Moderate decrease in the adherence to (or moderate increases in the violations of) human rights by African regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Moderate decrease in African economic development in the capitalist mode.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in the number and stability of democratic institutions and regimes in Africa.
- Major decrease in the adherence to (or major increase in the violations of) human rights by African regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Major decrease in African economic development in the capitalist mode.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of democratic regimes in Africa and number of minority-ruled regimes.
2. Status of human rights in Africa (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment).
3. Status of civil and political liberties in Africa (e.g., freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
4. Adherence to constitutional principles by African regimes.
5. Number of military coups in Africa.
6. Development and treatment of opposition parties in Africa.
7. Percent of African eligible voters who vote.

9.5 Goal: Promote/Support Non-Communist Political Stability in African Countries

Outcome. Has the ability of friendly African regimes to maintain political stability been significantly affected? Have any friendly African regimes been wholly or partly overrun by forces hostile to the United States or have any African regime established closer ties with countries hostile to the United States?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the political stability of non-Communist African countries has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major increase in the capabilities of African non-Communist regimes to maintain domestic order.
- Major decrease in (or elimination of) the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against African non-Communist regimes.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) formal or informal acts (e.g., bases, advisers, equipment/facilities, etc.) establishing closer military relations between Africa and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries.
- Major decrease in (or elimination of) super-power conflict, border disputes, civil wars, and/or irredentism in or between African countries.
- Major increase in movements towards national unification in the African countries.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate increase in the capabilities of African non-Communist regimes to maintain domestic order.
- Moderate decrease in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against African non-Communist regimes.

- Moderate decrease in formal or informal acts (e.g., bases, advisers, equipment/facilities, etc.) establishing closer military relations between Africa and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries.
 - Moderate decrease in superpower conflict, border disputes, civil wars, and/or irredentism in or between African countries.
 - Moderate increase in the movement towards national unification in the African countries, etc.
3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately disrupted/threatened.
- Moderate decrease in the capabilities of African non-Communist regimes to maintain domestic order.
 - Moderate increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against African non-Communist regimes.
 - Moderate increase in formal or informal acts (e.g., bases, advisers, equipment/facilities, etc.) establishing closer military relations between Africa and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries.
 - Moderate increase/escalation in superpower conflict, border disputes, civil wars, and/or irredentism in or between African countries.
 - Moderate decrease in the movement towards national unification in the African countries.
5. Greatly disrupted/threatened:
- Major decrease in the capabilities of African non-Communist regimes to maintain domestic order.
 - Major increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgent to carry out acts of aggression against African non-Communist regimes.
 - Major increase in formal or informal acts (e.g., bases, advisers, equipment/facilities, etc.) establishing closer military relations between Africa and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries.

- Major increase/escalation in superpower conflict, border disputes, civil wars, and/or irredentism in or between African countries.
- Major decrease in the movement towards national unification in the African countries, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of friendly African regimes in power.
2. Degree of threats/aggression by hostile insurgents against friendly African regimes.
3. Capabilities of internal security forces of friendly African regimes.
4. Capacity of insurgents to overthrow friendly African regimes as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity and quality of arms.
5. Overall domestic political stability in Africa (e.g., tribal disputes, governments' average length of time in office, number of coups, peaceful succession of governments, etc.).
6. Popular support for friendly African regimes.
7. African border disputes.
8. Quantity and quality of formal or informal acts (e.g., bases, advisers, equipment/facilities, etc.) establishing closer relations between African countries and countries hostile to the United States.

9.6 Goal: Promote Security of Cape Route and Other Major Sea Lanes of Communications Around Africa

Outcome. Has the security of the Cape Route been significantly affected in any way? Has there been any hostile interdiction of African sea lanes of communication?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the security of the Cape Route and other major sea lanes of communication around Africa has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major increase in U.S. naval presence in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
- Major increase in U.K. and French military presence in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) Soviet naval and land facilities/bases in Africa.
- Major increase in the possibility of peaceful (gradual) transition to majority rule and stability in South Africa.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate increase in U.S. naval presence in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
- Moderate increase in U.K. and French military presence in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.
- Moderate decrease in Soviet naval and land facilities/bases in Africa and/or interdiction in lines of communication.
- Moderate increase in the possibility and realization of peaceful (gradual) transition to majority rule and stability in South Africa.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. naval presence in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

- Moderate decrease in U.K. and French military presence in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.
- Moderate increase in Soviet naval and land facilities/bases in Africa and/or interdiction in lines of communication.
- Moderate decrease in the possibility and realization of peaceful (gradual) transition to majority rule and stability in South Africa.

5. Strongly threatened/disrupted:

- Major decrease in U.S. naval presence in South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
- Major decrease in U.K. and French military presence in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.
- Major increase in Soviet naval and land facilities/bases in Africa and/or interdiction in lines of communication.
- Major decrease in possibility and realization of peaceful (gradual) transition to majority rule and stability in South Africa.

Measures. Relative change in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. naval presence in South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
2. Quantity and quality of British and French military presence in South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
3. U.S. facilities/military access in sub-Saharan Africa.
4. Quantity and quality of Soviet naval presence in South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
5. Quantity of Soviet military bases in Africa and quality of Soviet basing rights.
6. Political stability in Southern Africa.

9.7 Goal: Promote Better Diplomatic Relations with Black African Countries

Outcome. Has the United States improved its relations with Black African countries? Have the United States' policies toward Africa been viewed positively by Black African regimes?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, U.S. promotion of better diplomatic relations with Black Africa has been:

1. Greatly fulfilled/increased:

- Major increase in U.S. support for the liberalization of racial laws in South Africa.
- Major increase in U.S. support for a more rapid resolution of African disputes with Southern African white regimes.
- Major increase in U.S. pressure on Rhodesia/South Africa for change in political and racial policies.
- Major increase in U.S. support for moderate African socialist countries.

2. Moderately fulfilled/increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. support for the liberalization of racial laws in South Africa.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support for a more rapid resolution of African disputes with Southern African white regimes.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support for moderate African socialist countries.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset/decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. support for the liberalization of racial laws in South Africa.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support for a more rapid resolution of African disputes with Southern African white regimes.

- Moderate decrease in U.S. pressure on Rhodesia/ South Africa for change in political and racial policies.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support for moderate African socialist countries.

5. Greatly offset/decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. support for the liberalization of racial laws in South Africa.
- Major decrease in U.S. support for a more rapid resolution of African disputes with Southern African white regimes.
- Major decrease in U.S. pressure on Rhodesia/ South Africa for change in political and racial policies.
- Major decrease in U.S. support for moderate African socialist countries.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Cooperation between the United States and Black African countries as measured by events data sources -- WEIS.
2. Black African perception of U.S. policies in Southern Africa.
3. U.S. policies towards Rhodesia and Republic of South Africa.
4. Status of diplomatic channels between the U.S. and Black Africa (size of missions).
5. OAU resolutions concerning the United States (positive or negative).
6. U.S. relations with "front line" states in Southern Africa.

Notes. This goal is primarily relevant for the Ford and Carter administrations.

APPENDIX B. SOVIET CRISIS GOALS

CRISIS DESCRIPTION

This part of the coding form is provided for writing a general narrative description of the crisis. All relevant information, notes, and reminders that the coder gathers for the crisis can be written in this space. In addition, there are a number of standard questions listed in the corresponding subsection of the U.S. crisis goals appendix that are provided in order to focus the data collection phase of the research on the most relevant information.

GENERAL OUTCOME MEASURES

There are five general outcome measures that are coded for all crises. To the extent possible these measures were selected in such a way as to minimize the need for extensive coder judgments.

- Trade: Value of foreign trade of the Soviet Union with the relevant countries as a percent of their total trade (IMF data, and so forth).
- Economic assistance: Value of Soviet economic aid to the relevant countries.
- Military transfers: Value of Soviet military sales and aid to the relevant countries (SIPRI, ACDA publications, and so forth).
- World perceptions of Soviet Union's standing: Percent of public (for countries that have public opinion polling) in Europe and Japan and, less commonly, the Third World with favorable attitudes toward the Soviet Union/percent of public with favorable attitude toward the United States (ICA polls; large amounts of missing data likely).
- Communist party members: Number of CP members in the relevant countries (excludes Maoist parties and other

CP's not recognized by the Soviet Union) (Hoover Institution publications, and so forth).

"Relevant" countries are those that are the primary targets of threats (in Soviet eyes) from the United States and other capitalist countries in a given crisis.

TECHNICAL NOTES

Wherever possible the currency units should be converted to U.S. dollars at current exchange rates and then converted to constant prices.

GOAL RELEVANCE

The relevance of a goal to a crisis is coded whenever a primary or secondary Soviet goal is threatened by an adversary.

Primary goals are those that are most directly related to the crisis involvement of the Soviet Union or are most directly threatened by its adversaries.

Secondary goals are those that by themselves are unlikely to lead to Soviet involvement or are indirectly threatened by the crisis.

Relevance is defined fairly narrowly to avoid over-coding. Primary goals are the first priority in coding.

THREAT TO GOALS

The level of threat to each primary and secondary goal in the more selective sets of nation-specific goals are coded separately. The level of threat for each relevant goal is judged separately and by its own standards. There is no common standard such as monetary costs or psychological value by which all goals are to be judged comparatively.

Level of Threat to Soviet Goals During the Crisis Period¹

1. EL Goal/value is in no significant danger.
2. VL Goal/value is in minor danger and requires very modest efforts to save it.
3. L Goal/value is in moderate danger requiring small sacrifices to save it.
4. M Goal/value is in moderate danger requiring moderate sacrifice to save it.
5. H Goal/value is in high danger requiring costly but limited sacrifice to save it.
6. VH Goal/value is in very high danger requiring massive and unlimited sacrifice to save it.
7. EH Goal/value is in danger of extinction, not even massive Soviet effort may save it.

RELIABILITY

Reliability of information used to code relevance, outcomes, and causal linkages are coded by a 7-point scale.

Reliability of Codes

1. EL Missing Data.
2. VL Codes are based on coder judgment and highly unreliable information, for example precedent Soviet actions, objectives.
3. L Codes are based on limited information and informed coder judgments.
4. M Codes are based on reliable information with a few major inconsistencies.
5. H Codes are based on reliable information with minor inconsistencies.

¹ As is the case with other scales, these values will be collapsed, if the results of reliability tests indicate the desirability of such an action.

6. VH Codes are based on highly reliable and consistent data.

7. EH No significant doubt about reliability of codes.

TYPE OF DATA SOURCE

The type of data that are primary sources of coding are indicated by seven codes.

Primary Source of Data

1. Soviet sources in Russian or Western translations.
2. Soviet sources in English (Soviet translations only).
3. Journalistic Western sources.
- 4. Scholarly Western sources.
5. Anti-Soviet literature (code in preference to 3 or 4).
6. Coder inference from a mix of sources.
7. Other.

OUTCOMES

The outcome of each crisis is described by either a state or change variable. For the state variables outcomes are coded four times:

1. Before crisis,
2. During crisis,
3. 1-year after crisis,
4. 5-year after crisis.

For the change (that is, change in a state) variables only the last two data points are coded.

IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON THE OUTCOME

The impact of the crisis on the outcome variable is a measure of the degree to which the crisis could have led to (or caused) an outcome.

1. EL Insignificant or nonexistent causal linkage.
2. VL Minor but likely causal linkage.
3. L Weak causal linkage with many exogenous factors equally likely.
4. M Moderate causal link with many possible alternative causal factors.
5. H Strong causal link with several moderately exogenous factors.
6. VH Very strong causal link with a few weak exogenous factors.
7. EH Complete and powerful causal linkage.

CRISIS-SPECIFIC GOALS

Crisis-specific goals are detailed for the following general categories of Soviet interest:

- Soviet ideological goals,
- Soviet interparty goals,
- Soviet stability goals,
- Soviet military goals,
- Soviet economic goals,
- Soviet goals toward capitalist countries,
- Soviet goals toward Europe,
- Soviet goals toward the Third World,

- Soviet goals toward Asia,
- Soviet goals toward the Middle East and South Asia,
- Soviet goals toward Africa, and
- Soviet goals toward Latin America.

1. Soviet Ideological Goals

1.1 Goal: Support Marxist-Leninist Ideology

Outcome. To what degree did the Soviet Union give support to legitimate² Marxist-Leninist groups under threat in the countries in the crisis?

Measures.

1. Soviet military support.
2. Soviet financial support.
3. Soviet logistical support of another Communist army going to assistance of the CP.
4. Soviet diplomatic support (e.g., at the U.N.).
5. Soviet verbal/moral support.
6. Soviet limited covert operation support.
7. Soviet naval demonstrations.
8. Soviet advisory support.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union often does not publicize its aid to CP's, particularly when they are in a country where such aid would prove embarrassing if publicized.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support for Marxist-Leninist Groups:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Limited diplomatic support with full moral support.
3. L Moderate to low financial support with full diplomatic support.
4. M Large financial support with minor military assistance.
5. H Limited Soviet naval deployment.
6. VH Limited Soviet ground/air forces deployment.

² A "legitimate" Marxist-Leninist group is one which is not Maoist or openly anti-Soviet and is recognized by the Soviet Union as a fraternal party or movement. Groups declaring themselves Marxist-Leninist but not yet recognized by the Soviet Union as legitimate are excluded from consideration in coding.

7. EH Complete military support for the groups
(unlimited support).

Notes. The escalatory nature of support is not a neatly continuous or cumulative set of actions. Therefore, the coder should exercise a good deal of judgment before assigning a code to the level of Soviet support for Marxist-Leninist groups in a crisis. Nevertheless, there is evidence supporting the proposition that at least some varieties of Soviet aid form at least a rough cumulative scale (Squires, 1976).

1.2 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Ideological Unity of the Fraternal Communist Parties

Outcome. Did the unity of fraternal Communist parties remain high or decline?

Measures.

1. Did the level of criticism of policies of CPSU increase?
2. Did any member of Warsaw Pact attack common policies?
3. Did any of the CP's advocate regionalism?
4. Did any CP publicly attack CPSU's foreign policy?
5. Did the unity of CP's over approach to world revolution decline?
6. How many CP's broke away from the "pro-Soviet" line to join Maoists, Trotskyites, or any other renegade groups?
7. Did any CP's take adventurist roads against the advice of CPSU and other pragmatic CP's?

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union sees narrow nationalism, regionalism, adventurism, dogmatism, revisionism, and reformism as major dangers to the unity of the fraternal parties.

Definition: In the Soviet Union's view, fraternal CP's exclude all Maoist parties. Yugoslavia rejoined the list of fraternal parties after the 20th CPSU Congress.

From Soviet viewpoint unity requires some degree of discipline and is not compatible with a situation in which CP's frequently criticize each other publicly.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Unity of Fraternal Parties:

1. EL Complete disunity with no identifiable groupings.
2. VL Large scale disunity with more than two major groups.
3. L Large scale disunity with two major groups.
4. M Moderate disunity with one major and one minor group.

5. H Frequent criticisms of common policies but no break on major issues.
6. VH Complete unity except for occasional public criticisms.
7. EH Complete unity with no significant public criticism of common policies.

Notes. Since the Sino-Soviet dispute took an ideological flavor the level of unity of CP's has ranged from moderate to low. Under Stalin, unity was high to very high and perhaps even extremely high.

1.3 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Ideological Leadership of CPSU

Outcome. Did the prestige and historical leadership role of CPSU in the ideological field remain high? Did the leadership of CPSU receive any major new challenge from another CP?

Measures.

1. Did any CP's attack the CPSU as hegemonic?
2. Did any CP's assert that the CPSU has inappropriate historical experience for their countries' path toward socialism?
3. Did any CP's join China against Soviet Union?
4. Did any European CP's advocate regionalism (i.e., Euro-Communism)?
5. Did the ideological prestige of CPSU suffer from any of its actions?
6. Did the CPSU leadership experience any disunity or succession crisis that gave away some of their initiative in ideological matters concerning world Communism?

Technical Notes. Since Soviet leaders always deny any desire for the tangible rewards of a leadership role among world CP's, the coder will have to make inferences from their speeches and actions, plus the behaviors of other CP's. The Italian CP's reactions are often key signals.

"Ideological leadership" is defined as a role in which a CP maintains initiative in interpreting Marxist-Leninist doctrines in a manner consistent with its own preferences and persuades other CP's to adopt a similar interpretation. The instruments of persuasion need not be coercive. There could be logical reasoning or the historical prestige of the persuader.

Outcome Assessment Question. Ideological Leadership of CPSU Among CP's:

1. EL No significant CP accepts the leadership of CPSU.
2. VL Only a small group of major CP's accepts leadership of CPSU.
3. L Many CP's challenge CPSU for the leadership role.
4. M Most CP's accept CPSU leadership but with frequent criticism.

5. H Only a few significant CP's do not accept CPSU leadership.
6. VH Only a few insignificant CP's do not accept CPSU leadership.
7. EH Absolute leadership; no significant challenge.

Notes. During the period of Sino-Soviet conflict ideological leadership of CPSU has been at least moderate and generally high to very high. Under Stalin the post-World War II CPSU leadership was very high to extremely high.

1.4 Goal: Support Progressive Ideologies (Other Than Marxism-Leninism)

Outcome. To what extent did the Soviet Union give support to progressive movements? To what degree did the Soviet Union come to the aid of progressive groups under threat from reactionary forces?

Measures.

1. Soviet military support.
2. Soviet financial support.
3. Soviet logistical support of another Communist army going to the assistance of a progressive group.
4. Soviet diplomatic support.
5. Soviet verbal/moral support.
6. Soviet limited covert operation support.
7. Soviet naval demonstration.
8. Soviet advisory support.

Technical Notes. Covert operations of the Soviet Union are generally not covered in open sources.

The Soviet Union traditionally has symbolically supported most progressive movements but has given material assistance in relatively few cases.

A progressive movement is defined as any group struggling for popular causes such as national liberation, economic independence, racial equality, and political equality. Groups that challenge the Soviet Union's own record in these areas or support the anti-Soviet policies of China are excluded.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support for Progressive Groups:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Limited diplomatic support with full moral support.
3. L Large financial support with full diplomatic support.
4. M Limited Soviet naval demonstration.
5. H Soviet military assistance (mainly materiel).

6. VH Limited Soviet ground/air forces deployment.
7. EH Complete military support for the groups
(unlimited support).

Notes. The escalatory nature of support is not a neatly continuous or cumulative set of actions. Therefore, the coder should exercise a good deal of judgment before assigning a code to the level of Soviet support for progressive groups in a crisis.

2. Soviet Interparty Goals

2.1 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Leadership of CPSU in International Policymaking of CP's

Outcome. Did CP's support of CPSU foreign policy decline/increase? Did any CP's seriously challenge the de facto leadership of the CPSU in international policy-making for the world Communist movement?

Measures.

1. Did any CP publicly attack CPSU's foreign policy?
2. Did any CP join China/Albania CP's in criticizing CPSU's foreign policy program?
3. Did any CP's challenge the CPSU for the leadership of CP's foreign policy?
4. Did any CP's claim the right to publicly deviate from the CPSU and other CP's on foreign policy issues?
5. Did any CP's support foreign policy positions of reactionary and capitalist groups?
6. Did any CP's advocate formation of CP's foreign policy according to regional groups that exclude CPSU? (e.g., European or Asian groups that exclude the Soviet Union.)

Technical Notes. Some degree of overlap with ideological variables should be expected since interparty and ideological goals are not mutually exclusive.

Much of the effort of the Soviet Union in pursuit of the above goal is directed toward keeping the foreign policies of CP's along the mainstream of Marxism-Leninism as defined by the USSR. This generally involves taking conservative positions and discouraging extremism and adventurism while preventing the right and left extremes from forming splinter groups.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support by World CP's for the CPSU's Foreign Policy Leadership:

1. EL No significant support by any major CP's.
2. VL Support by only a small group of small CP's.
3. L Support by only a group of CP's (including some major CP's).
4. M Support by most CP's except a small group of CP's (including a few large CP's).

5. H Support by most CP's except a small group of CP's.
6. VH Support by all CP's except occasional criticism by a few small parties.
7. EH Complete support by all CP's.

Notes. Support for the CPSU's foreign policy leadership has always been moderate or higher. Since the Sino-Soviet dispute support has ranged from moderate to high. Under Stalin, support was high to extremely high.

2.2 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Unity of CP's in Foreign Affairs

Outcome. Did the unity of CP's in the foreign policy field increase/decrease? Did the number of CP's supporting the common internationalist policies of CP's decline? Did any CP's support China's foreign policy?

Measures.

1. Did any CP's publicly criticize the common policies of CP's?
2. Did any CP's withdraw their support from common policies?
3. Did any CP's join China on foreign policy issues?
4. Did any CP's form a splinter group on foreign policy issues?
5. Did any CP's support reactionary foreign policies?
6. Did any CP's give aid to anti-Soviet groups in other countries?

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union's attempt to maintain the foreign policy unity of CP's is closely related to its efforts to maintain a leadership role in the foreign policy formulation of the world Communist movement. Therefore, the measures for the outcomes of both goals are nearly identical. However, the coder should try to distinguish between attempts at leadership and efforts to maintain unity (the previous goal) wherever feasible.

Outcome Assessment Question. Unity of CP's in Foreign Policy Field:

1. EL Complete disunity, many changing factions.
2. VL High disunity with several major hostile groupings.
3. L Disunity with two major hostile groupings.
4. M Unity is broken by a small group of CP's (including a major CP).
5. H Unity is broken by a small grouping of CP's.
6. VH Unity is broken only occasionally by a few small CP's.
7. EH Complete unity; no significant dissent by any CP's.

Notes. The foreign policy unity of CP's has generally been no lower than moderate. Under Stalin, unity was high to extremely high. Since the initiation of the Sino-Soviet dispute it has ranged from moderate to high.

2.3 Goal: Give Support to CP's in Developed Capitalist Countries

Outcome. Did the Soviet Union give support to CP's in capitalist countries?

Measures.

1. Financial support.
2. Political support.
3. Diplomatic support.
4. Military support.
5. Moral/verbal support.
6. Covert operation support.

Technical Notes. The nature or amount of Soviet aid to other CP's is seldom known publicly; some European sources provide speculation, as does the U.S. independent left press.

It is assumed that anti-Soviet CP's are not eligible for Soviet aid and should not be coded.

It is assumed that for this goal the important variables are Soviet acts in support of CP's rather than what happened to the CP's themselves. In otherwords, a favorable image of Soviet actions in assisting fraternal parties is the major Soviet goal.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Support to CP's in Developed Capitalist Countries:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral/verbal support.
3. L Diplomatic support.
4. M Small financial aid only.
5. H Moderate financial aid only.
6. VH Large financial aid with small covert operations.
7. EH Large financial aid with covert military aid.

Notes. Soviet support to CP's in the developed capitalist countries has apparently fluctuated greatly but it has generally been moderate or less.

2.3 Goal: Give Support to CP's in Developed Capitalist Countries

Outcome. Did the Soviet Union give support to CP's in capitalist countries?

Measures.

1. Financial support.
2. Political support.
3. Diplomatic support.
4. Military support.
5. Moral/verbal support.
6. Covert operation support.

Technical Notes. The nature or amount of Soviet aid to other CP's is seldom known publicly; some European sources provide speculation, as does the U.S. independent left press.

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It is assumed that for this goal the important variables are Soviet acts in support of CP's rather than what happened to the CP's themselves. In otherwords, a favorable image of Soviet actions in assisting fraternal parties is the major Soviet goal.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Support to CP's in Developed Capitalist Countries:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral/verbal support.
3. L Diplomatic support.
4. M Small financial aid only.
5. H Moderate financial aid only.
6. VH Large financial aid with small covert operations.
7. EH Large financial aid with covert military aid.

Notes. Soviet support to CP's in the developed capitalist countries has apparently fluctuated greatly but it has generally been moderate or less.

Soviet support for CP's in developing countries has generally been low to extremely low. However, as Soviet overseas military presence increases, Soviet support for CP's in developing countries may begin to increase.

3. Soviet Stability Goals

3.1 Goal: Maintain/Restore Domestic Stability

Outcome. Did any part of the Soviet Union experience political instability, turmoil, unruly demonstrations, riots, or terrorism?

Measures.

1. Riots.
2. Revolts.
3. Demonstrations (unauthorized or unruly ones only).
4. Assassinations.
5. Acts of terrorism.
6. Hijackings.
7. Mutinies.
8. Strikes.

Technical Notes. Only events linked to international crises are relevant, for example, unruly demonstration by Chinese students in Moscow in the 1960's.

Ignore all orderly demonstrations that have apparent backing of the Soviet Government.

Include events that are related to the nationalities problem. Even though this may lead to some degree of double coding, it is justified because of its implications for domestic stability in addition to its more direct relevance for the issue of the "nationalities problem."

Coverage of this factor in open source materials is poor; some data is available in Soviet dissidents' writings.

Outcome Assessment Question. Domestic Stability:

1. EL Widespread major instabilities of all types.
2. VL Frequent, escalating major incidents.
3. L Frequent, related major incidents.
4. M Isolated, frequent major incidents.
5. H Isolated, infrequent major incidents.

6. VH Isolated, infrequent minor incidents.

7. EH No significant incidents.

Notes. During the post-World War II period, Soviet domestic stability has been generally high to very high.

3.2 Goal: Prevent External Interference in Soviet Domestic Affairs

Outcome. Did the level of external interference in Soviet domestic affairs (e.g., domestic politics, human rights of Soviet citizens, operations of Soviet economy, and so on) increase? (Did the Soviet perception of such interference change?)

Measures.

1. Interferences in Soviet political processes.
2. Interferences in the operations of the Soviet economy.
3. Interferences in the development/operations of the Soviet armed forces.
4. Interferences in the Soviet legal system.
5. Interferences in the affairs of the Soviet nationalities.
6. Interferences in the civil and political rights of Soviet citizens.
7. Sending hostile propaganda into the Soviet Union from outside.
8. Sending material assistance to Soviet dissidents, terrorists, or political deviants from outside.
9. Harboring Soviet refugees hostile to the Soviet Union.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union may sometimes blame outsiders for disturbances that are unrelated to outside interferences. On the other hand, it may deemphasize external interferences in order not to appear weak against external threats.

Outcome Assessment Question. Absence of External Interference:

1. EL Widespread, systematic infiltration and subversion attempts from outside.
2. VL Infrequent infiltration of men and material.
3. L Hostile propaganda encouraging instability, but no infiltration of men and material.
4. M Critical propaganda but not excessively hostile.
5. H Infrequent but strongly critical propaganda.

6. VH Infrequent and mild critical comments aimed at Soviet population.
7. EH No significant incidence or accusation of interference.

Notes. For calibration purposes the following may be useful: during the worst period of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War (e.g., the 1950's), the Soviet Union experienced very low "absence of external interference" while its experience since 1972 has been in the moderate to very high range.

"Absence of external interference" is coded because the Soviet goal is to maximize this variable. Alternatively, the goal can be stated in terms of minimizing external interference.

3.3 Goal: Maintain/Restore Stability of Non-Russian Nationalities in the Soviet Union

Outcome. Did any of the Soviet national states experience significant national agitations, disturbances, riots, or rebellions?

Measures.

1. Nationalist public criticisms of Soviet system of government.
2. Demonstration/protests demanding nationalist autonomy.
3. Demand by states for using national languages.
4. Accusations of discrimination from nationalists against Soviet Government.
5. Nationalist riots and/or unruly protests/demonstrations.
6. Nationalist acts of terror, hijacking, or assassination.
7. Nationalist rebellions or mutinies.
8. High receptivity by national groups of anti-Soviet and anti-Russian propaganda.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Government generally is reluctant to publicize nationalistic agitations and often tries to attribute such events to other causes such as social hooliganism, nonpolitical criminals, and interference from the outside. Dissident publications sometimes contain reports.

Outcome Assessment Question. Stability of Nationalities:

1. EL Widespread rebellion by nationalities in two or more states.
2. VL Widespread rebellion by one national group.
3. L Isolated but frequent major events by groups.
4. M Isolated by frequent minor agitations by groups.
5. H Isolated and infrequent minor agitations by groups.
6. VH Isolated and infrequent agitation events by individuals.
7. EH No significant incident of nationalist agitation.

Notes. For calibration purposes the following examples may be useful: (1) the Soviet Union experienced very low to extremely low levels of stability among national groups during the 1919-1922 period; (2) since 1960 the experience of stability has been moderate to very high.

The agitations by Jewish groups are hard to classify because large numbers of Jews identify themselves as Russians (rather than a non-Russian nationality) and they are not concentrated in one region. At the same time, internal passport regulations help to foster a sense of ethnic identity. Therefore, it is often difficult to relate agitations by individuals and small groups to the dispersed Jewish population at large.

4. Soviet Military Goals

4.1 Goal: Defend the First Socialist State (Soviet Union) Against External Threats

Outcome. Did the Soviet Union remain safe from conquest, threats of aggressive neighbors, and military blackmail by capitalist countries? Did the security of the Soviet Union increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Did the Soviet Union remain militarily secure (unconquered)?
2. Did any part of the Soviet Union (population, economy, etc.) receive damage from hostile military forces?
3. Did any part of the Soviet borders get crossed by hostile military forces?
4. Did the Soviet Union successfully repulse intruders?
5. Did the credibility of the Soviet Union to defend herself remain high?
- 6. Did Soviet armed forces receive any setbacks in border skirmishes or overseas military actions?
7. Was Soviet airspace violated by hostile aircraft with no effective countermeasures?
8. Did any hostile neighbor act aggressively against the Soviet Union and mobilize for war with no apparent concern about Soviet responses?
9. Did any neighboring country stockpile strategic nuclear arms aimed at Soviet population centers?

Technical Notes. This outcome should be coded with regard to Soviet security in specific relevant areas closest to the zone of crisis. For example, a Far East crisis may threaten the security of Soviet Far Eastern regions.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Soviet Union's Security:

1. EL Large scale conquest or nuclear devastation of Soviet Union.
2. VL Partial conquest of Soviet Union.
3. L High likelihood of conquest.

4. M Potential threat from an adversary that is weaker than the Soviet Union but strong enough to be able to damage the Soviet Union and reckless enough to try.
5. H Potential threat from an adversary capable of partially conquering the Soviet Union but unlikely to do so.
6. VH Potential but unlikely threat of military attack from a powerful adversary (e.g., NATO in the 1970's).
7. EH No serious threat from any hostile forces.

Notes. The coder should approach the problem of assessing Soviet security problems from a Soviet perspective.

For calibration purposes use the following examples:

- Soviet security on the Iranian border during the 1960's was extremely high.
- Security against the NATO threat during the 1970's was very high.
- Security against NATO during the 1960's was high.
- Security against China in the late 1960's was moderate.
- Security against China in the 1990's is likely to be low.
- Security against NATO countries during 1947-1949 was very low.
- Security against external enemies during 1919-1922 was extremely low.

In general an extremely high level of security would be one in which military forces of potential adversaries are relatively weak and/or are not deployed in any aggressive/offensive posture against the Soviet Union.

An extremely low security situation would be one in which the Soviet Union sustains large scale nuclear devastation or destructive conquest or can sustain such destruction with no significant retaliatory potential.

4.1.1 Goal: Avoid Worldwide Nuclear War

Outcome. The most relevant outcome is: Did the Soviet Union avoid nuclear war? However, a more useful outcome measure is did the Soviet Union manage to keep the likelihood of nuclear war at a low level?

Measures.

1. Likelihood of nuclear war.
2. Level of international tensions.
3. Level of U.S.-Soviet tensions (Soviet perception).
4. Level of U.S.-Soviet tensions (U.S. perception).
5. Level of U.S.-Soviet tensions (third country perceptions).
6. Avoidance of superpower military confrontation.
7. Avoidance of adventurism³ against capitalist countries.

Technical Note. Assess the period as a whole rather than its end point. For instance, if the period under evaluation involved a major crisis but the crisis was followed by a period of detente do not evaluate the likelihood of war at the end point of the period alone. Focus on the crisis itself.

Outcome Assessment Question. Likelihood of Worldwide Nuclear War:

1. EH Period of high tension, numerous crises, and tendency for brinksmanship among major powers.
2. VH Period of high tension with numerous crises but superpowers are careful not to engage in brinksmanship too often.
3. H Period of high tension and occasional major crises but superpowers trying to cooperate in reducing the risks of war.
4. M Period of moderate tension with occasional major crises but little risk of nuclear war.

³ "Adventurism" in this context refers to a situation in which a socialist country/group attempts to bring about political/military change to its advantage with inadequate means or follows policies that have a high likelihood of resulting in major setbacks for the socialist countries.

5. L Period of occasional crises but little risk of superpower conflict.
6. VL Period of occasional minor crises but no risk of escalation.
7. EL Period of no significant tension or arms races.

Notes. For calibration purposes use the following examples:

- During the Cuban crisis of 1962 the threat of worldwide nuclear war was extremely high..
- During the 1948 Berlin crisis the threat was very high.
- During the 1961 Berlin crisis the threat was moderate to high.
- During the 1973 Middle East war the threat was low to moderate.
- During the 1972 U.S.-Soviet summit the threat was extremely low.

4.2 Goal: Defend the Fraternal Socialist Countries and the Three Strategically Located Neutral Countries in Europe (Finland, Austria, and Sweden)

Outcome. Did any of the fraternal socialist countries of the three neutral European nations become wholly or partly overrun by military forces from any source hostile to Soviet interests? Did any of the countries have to submit to external threat? (e.g., blackmail by capitalist countries.)

Measures.

1. Overthrow of friendly regimes.
2. Transition to anti-Soviet foreign policy.
3. Military takeover by agents of capitalist or reactionary elements.
4. Successful aggression by anti-Soviet military blocs.
5. Successful military blackmail by anti-Soviet military blocs.
6. Military power of Soviet Union.
7. Military power of Soviet Union versus NATO countries.
8. Military power of Soviet Union versus the U.S.
9. Military power of Soviet Union versus China.
10. Military power of Soviet Union versus all major potential adversaries (U.S., China, Germany, France, U.K., Japan, Iran, Turkey).
11. Military power of Warsaw Pact countries versus NATO countries.

Technical Notes. Measures 6 through 11 are indicators of deterrent capability.

Outcome Assessment Question. Security of Socialist Countries (Plus Three Neutral European Countries):

1. EL Country is or can be overrun by a hostile and aggressive power (e.g. Laos by China in 1979).

2. VL Country is or can be partly occupied at considerable cost by a hostile and aggressive country (e.g., Vietnam in 1979).
3. L Country is vulnerable to conquest by hostile forces at great cost (e.g., East Germany in 1948).
4. M Country is vulnerable to conquest by hostile forces but invasion is unlikely.
5. H Country is vulnerable to attack but not conquest (e.g., Mongolia).
6. VH Country is vulnerable to attack only in an extreme situation (e.g., Bulgaria).
7. EH No significant military threat to any of the countries.

Notes. It is important to take Soviet military deterrent forces into consideration when coding the security of socialist states and the three neutral European countries.

Other factors remaining the same, the countries closest to the Soviet Union would be the safest. For instance, Bulgaria is more secure than Cuba.

Similarly, the closer a country is to a potential adversary the more it is insecure. For instance, Laos is more insecure (by being close to China) than Cambodia.

4.3 Goal: Support Progressive and Democratic Forces Abroad

Outcome. Did the Soviet Union establish/maintain/improve relations with progressive/democratic forces through material assistance to progressive/democratic regimes and movements abroad? (Did the Soviet Union successfully deter imperialist threats of aggression against such regimes and movements?)

Measures.

1. Material assistance (aid).
2. Logistical support.
3. Military advisory support.
4. Soviet naval demonstration.
5. Limited land/air forces deployment.
6. Unlimited military support.
7. Use of military threats (verbal).

Technical Notes. Ideally this goal outcome should be assessed in terms of security needs (or level of threat) rather than by an absolute standard. However, for this study, the coder should concentrate on the level of Soviet military support and disregard its relation to need (or threat levels).

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Soviet Military Support to Progressive/Democratic Forces Abroad:

1. EL Moral support only/no material assistance.
2. VL Low level material aid.
3. L Moderate scale material aid.
4. M Small scale logistical support and advisory role and/or large scale material aid.
5. H Large scale logistical support and advisory role.
6. VH Limited troop deployment on a small scale.
7. EH Large scale unlimited troop deployment.

Notes. For calibration purposes use the following examples:

- Soviet support for the Western allies during the 1944 Ardennes German counteroffensive was extremely high.
- Soviet support for Egypt in 1970 was very high.
- Soviet support for China in 1951-1952 was moderate to high.
- Soviet support for North Yemen in 1968 was low to moderate.
- Soviet support for Nigeria in 1968-1969 was low.
- Soviet support for Chile in 1973 was extremely low.

Note that none of the codes in the above examples take the level of threat into consideration (see Technical Note).

4.4 Goal: Increase the Prestige of the Soviet Armed Forces

Outcome. Did the Soviet armed forces increase their prestige and deterrent capability through their actions during the crisis?

Measures.

1. Receptivity to Soviet military aid.
2. Receptivity to Soviet military presence in the region.
3. Perception of increased credibility of Soviet deterrent ability among other countries.
4. Successful conduct of military operations (including exercises and demonstration of forces).
5. Results of actual "use" of deterrence capability.
6. Actual Soviet-U.S. military balance.

Technical Notes. In cases where the result of actions are highly ambiguous the coder should use the Soviet-U.S. and Soviet-China military balances to assess Soviet military prestige.

This could be considered an "instrumental" goal used to achieve other aims/outcomes that is also valued and pursued in its own right. However, Soviet military writers often treat it as an end in itself.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Soviet Military Prestige:

1. EL Unsuccessful deterrence of minor adversaries and/or successive major military failures.
2. VL Unsuccessful deterrence of middle level powers and/or several military setbacks in strategically important regions.
3. L Unsuccessful deterrence of a major power and/or minor military setbacks against other countries.
4. M Ambiguous outcomes of deterrence actions; high Soviet military capability but uncertainty about its utility; stalemate situation against all military adversaries.
5. H Successful deterrence of minor powers' aggression with no major military setbacks in other areas.

6. VH Successful deterrence of middle level powers' aggression (e.g., Japan or Germany) with no significant military setbacks in other cases.
7. EH Successful deterrence of a major aggressor (e.g., China or U.S.) and/or perception of very high Soviet capability among other countries with no military setbacks.

Notes. Soviet military prestige reached its zenith during 1944 when the Soviet Army was rolling back the German army in East Europe seemingly at will. However, the U.S. acquisition of the atomic bomb and the swift advance of the U.S. Army in West Europe during 1945 reduced the relative prestige of the Soviet military forces. The postwar Stalin and Krushchev purges of the Soviet armed forces did not help their prestige. Since the early 1960's, the Soviet military prestige has been gradually increasing from very low to moderate levels to moderate to very high levels.

5. Soviet Economic Goals

5.1 Goal: Increase the Economic Capacity of the Soviet Union at a Rapid Rate

Outcome. Did the Soviet economy grow at a historically rapid rate? If not, did the rate appear rapid for recent years? If not, did the rate slow because of exogenous natural and internal causes?

Measures.

1. Output/world GNP.
2. Output/GNP of U.S.
3. Output/GNP of industrialized countries.
4. Output/GNP of OECD countries.
5. Output/GNP of socialist countries.
6. Output compared to Soviet economic growth since 1920.
7. Output compared to Soviet economic growth since 1946.
8. Output compared to Soviet economic growth since 1960.
9. Output compared to Soviet economic growth since 1970.

Technical Notes. The Soviet economic growth rate has declined greatly from the spectacular rates of the post-World War II reconstruction period. Most observers expect the growth rate to remain well below 6 percent per annum because of the maturity of the economy, slow birth rate of the population, and gradual shift in investment patterns to more emphasis on consumer goods. Some experts also believe that the high defense burden may slow economic growth rates.

Outcome Assessment Question. Growth Rate of Soviet Economy (Percent Average Annual):

1. EL Soviet GNP growth \leq 0.25 x OECD growth.
2. VL Soviet GNP growth \approx 0.33 x OECD growth.
3. L Soviet GNP growth \approx 0.5 x OECD growth.
4. M Soviet GNP growth \approx 1 x OECD growth.
5. H Soviet GNP growth \approx 2 x OECD growth.
6. VH Soviet GNP growth \approx 3 x OECD growth.
7. EH Soviet GNP growth \geq 4 x OECD growth.

Notes. In cases where the growth rates do not fit any of the above codes they should be rounded.

5.2 Goal: Increase Economic Cooperation With Fraternal Socialist Countries

Outcome. Did the level of economic cooperation with fraternal socialist countries increase? Did the socialist economies become more specialized and integrated? Did their economic plans become more coordinated?

Measures.

1. Trade with socialist countries/total trade.
2. Trade with socialist countries/GNP of socialist countries.
3. Trade with socialist countries/GNP of USSR and GNP of socialist countries.
4. Trade agreements with socialist countries.
5. Trade with socialist countries/previous levels of trade.
6. Degree of cooperation in development of regional resources.
- 7. Degree of coordination of economic plans.
8. Degree of cooperation in specialization of industry.
9. Degree of cooperation and investment in developing regional transportation.
10. Degree of economic assistance to the weaker members of the socialist community.

Technical Notes. Soviet trade shares with socialist countries should be a function of transportation cost (distance) and the types of export commodities available in the socialist countries.

Outcome Assessment Question. Trade of Fraternal Socialist Countries With the Soviet Union:

1. EL Two percent or less of fraternal socialist countries trade is with the Soviet Union.
2. VL Five percent of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.
3. L Ten percent of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.

4. M Twenty percent of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.
5. H Thirty percent of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.
6. VH Forty percent of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.
7. EH Fifty percent or more fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.

Notes. In cases where the trade data are not available the coder should estimate its size from other variables.

5.3 Goal: Expand Mutually Beneficial Commercial Relations With Nonsocialist Countries

Outcome. Did mutually beneficial economic relation with nonsocialist countries in the area affected by the crisis increase?

Measures.

A. Trade Relations

1. Trade with the Soviet Union/total trade of area.
2. Trade with the Soviet Union/GNP of the area.
3. Trade with the Soviet Union/previous levels of trade with USSR.
4. Trade with Soviet Union/world trade.
5. Long-term trade/development agreements.
6. Short-term trade/credit agreements.

B. Other Economic Relations

1. Transfer of technology agreements.
2. Agreements for solving regional economic problems.
3. Agreements for development of border resources (e.g., rivers).
4. Agreements for cooperation in technology development (e.g., energy, space, etc.)

Technical Notes. In the long run the most important constraints to expansion of Soviet trade with nonsocialist countries have been shortage of hard currencies and the limited overseas market for Soviet consumer and industrial goods.

Outcome Assessment Question. Economic Relations With the Nonsocialist Countries:

1. EL Insignificant economic relations with nonsocialist countries.
2. VL Minor economic relations with selected capitalist countries.

3. L Low trade with nonsocialist countries but with a few exceptional cases that have high trade with the Soviet Union.
4. M Moderate to high trade ties with many capitalist countries.
5. H Widespread economic ties with many capitalist countries.
6. VH Widespread economic ties with most capitalist countries.
7. EH Widespread economic cooperation in all fields, no external restrictions on Soviet trade.

Notes. Soviet economic relations with nonsocialist countries have never been extremely high. Because of domestic and external restrictions the Soviet economic relations with capitalist countries have remained at moderate to high levels during the 1970's.

5.4 Goal: Assist Economic Independence of Developing Countries

Outcome. Did the developing countries in the area affected by the crisis become economically more independent from the major capitalist economies? Did they become more socialist in their economic orientation?

Measures.

A. Trade Independence

1. Trade with the Soviet Union/trade with capitalist countries.
2. Trade with socialist countries/trade with capitalist countries.
3. Trade with socialist countries/GNP of the country.
4. Trade with socialist countries/world trade.

B. Socialist Economic Orientation

1. Declaration of socialist policies.
2. Nationalization of foreign investments.
3. Nationalization of major domestic industries.
4. Nationalization of material means of production.
5. Nationalization of financial institutions.
6. Nationalization of foreign trade.
7. Nationalization of all private property.
8. Nationalization of all financial capital.
9. Redistribution of wealth.
10. Nationalization of service industries.
11. Percent of economy nationalized (% GNP).

Technical Notes. Major capitalist countries are U.S., Japan, Germany, France, U.K., Italy, Canada, and Australia. The first five are the most important.

Outcome Assessment Question. Economic Independence of Developing Countries:

1. EL Socialist program is discarded in favor of capitalism, dependence is extremely high.
2. VL Socialist program is greatly undermined by reactionary policies, dependence on capitalist countries is very high.
3. L Socialist programs is adjusted to local conditions by local reformists, economic dependence is high.
4. M Partial socialist program adopted but unlikely to be implemented, moderate to high dependence on capitalist countries.
5. H Partial socialist program adopted and is being implemented, economic dependence is moderate to high.
6. VH Complete socialist program adopted but faces instability because of dependence on capitalist countries.
7. EH Complete, firm socialist policy adopted, no significant dependence on capitalist countries.

Notes. In cases where data is available use trade with major capitalist countries/total trade to measure dependence.

6. Soviet Goals Toward Capitalist Countries

6.1 Goal: Reduce Chances of War With the United States and NATO

Outcome. Did the probability of war with the United States and NATO increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Number of major international crises.
2. International tension levels.
3. Number of major unresolved international issues.
4. Number of local wars.
5. Intensity of East-West accusations.
6. Stability of strategic and conventional arms buildup.
7. Willingness of major powers to refrain from use of armed force over international disputes.

Technical Notes. In coding this variable the coder should exercise a good-deal of judgment about contextual information and weighting of variables.

In evaluating the probability of war the coder should emphasize Soviet perceptions of what factors cause war. The Soviet writers generally blame war on capitalist/imperialist aggressors but also recognize that the likelihood of war increases by the presence of international tension spots "hotbeds of wars" and unreasonableness of international actors.

Outcome Assessment Question. Probability of Peace With the United States and NATO:

1. EL War with the U.S. or NATO has occurred or is certain to occur shortly.
2. VL Many major disputes and crises are unresolved and are likely to escalate into major wars.
3. L Some major disputes and crises are unresolved but likelihood of war is not very high.
4. M Some major disputes are unresolved and could escalate conflicts leading to international crises.
5. H Some major disputes are unresolved but not likely to lead to war.

6. VH Chances of war with the U.S./NATO are remote,
only minor disputes exist.

7. EH No chance of war.

Notes. Since 1946 the periods with highest probabilities of U.S.-Soviet war have been during the first Berlin crisis (1948), Korean war period (1950-1952), and Cuban missile crisis (1962). During these crises the probabilities of no war (or continued peace) were very low to low. Since the 1972 U.S.-Soviet strategic arms agreements the probability of no war has been generally high to very high.

The ordinal scale used above has more value for situations in which war is unlikely than cases with high likelihood of war. This is because the probability of war is generally very low.

6.2 Goal: Increase Mutually Beneficial Exchanges With Capitalist Countries

Outcome. Did the level of commercial, scientific, technological, and cultural ties with capitalist countries increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet trade with OECD countries.
2. Soviet scientific/technological exchanges with OECD.
3. Soviet financial ties with OECD.
4. Soviet cultural ties with OECD.

Technical Notes. Soviet writers often include cultural ties among the above list of desirable relationships. However, in practice they seem to show a desire for only a selected range of cultural ties. In particular they seem hesitant to expose the Soviet public to the full range of diverse publications and artistic expressions that exist in the West.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Commercial, Scientific, and Technological Ties With Capitalist Countries:

1. EL No significant ties.
2. VL Restricted ties with only a few major capitalist countries.
3. L Restricted ties to many capitalist countries.
4. M Ties with most major capitalist countries.
5. H Widespread ties but with selected major restrictions by the capitalist countries.
6. VH Widespread ties with some minor restrictions by the capitalist countries.
7. EH Widespread ties with no political restrictions/obstacles by the capitalist countries.

Notes. It is assumed that the Soviet Union will always try to maintain some restrictions on its contacts with the capitalist countries even though it desires to remove all restrictions placed by the other side.

During the Soviet Union's most isolated period, its ties with capitalist countries were very low to low. During the early 1950's its ties were low to moderate to high. It is likely that by the 1980's, Soviet ties will increase to very high and possibly to extremely high.

Deemphasize the volume of contacts between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries (OECD). Instead, emphasize the freedom of the Soviet Union to interact with OECD countries without political restrictions from the latter.

6.3 Goal. Continue the Anticapitalist Ideological Struggle

Outcome. Did the credibility of the Soviet Union's anticapitalist policy among socialist countries and progressive movements decline? Did any fraternal parties or progressive group accuse the Soviet Union of weakening its anticapitalist struggle? What is the level of the Soviet Union's anticapitalist efforts?

Measures.

1. Did any socialist countries or CP's accuse the Soviet Union of weak anticapitalist policies?
2. Did any socialist countries or CP's form a new anticapitalist grouping with more aggressive policies?
3. Did any socialist countries or CP's join China in criticizing the weakness of Soviet anticapitalist policies?
4. Did the Soviet Union's symbolic (verbal) attacks against capitalism decline in quantity or intensity?
- 5. Did the Soviet Union's efforts in the anticapitalist struggle decline in intensity (e.g., material aid to anticapitalist groups and countries.)

Technical Notes. Ideally there should be two measures for this two-dimensional concept. Its two dimensions are actual level of Soviet anticapitalist struggle and the perceptions of the Soviet efforts as perceived by socialist countries and progressive movements in other countries.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Union's Anticapitalist Efforts (Aid to Anticapitalist Countries and Groups):

1. EL No significant efforts.
2. VL Only occasional symbolic (verbal) efforts.
3. L Frequent and intense symbolic (verbal) efforts with very small financial assistance.
4. M Frequent symbolic (verbal) effort with limited military aid.
5. H Moderate military assistance with small naval or troop deployment.
6. VH Massive Soviet military aid with limited troop deployment.

7. EH Unlimited military deployment.

Notes. Only actual (rather than perceived) level of effort should be coded.

Except during the last 2 years of the Second World War, the Soviet Union has seldom used military force to support anticapitalist groups. Soviet support of anticapitalist groups in the Third World has generally been very low to moderate. In the case of Ethiopia (1977-1979) the Soviet effort was moderate to high. In the cases of Czechoslovakia (1968) and Hungary (1956) Soviet efforts were very high to extremely high.

7. Soviet Goals Toward Europe

7.1 Goal. Maintain/Increase Security of East European Buffer States

Outcome. Did the military cohesion and security of Warsaw Pact countries increase/decrease? Did the external or internal threats to Warsaw Pact members increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Balance of East-West theater forces in Europe.
2. Capacity of the Red Army to deter capitalist aggression.
3. Level of U.S. troops in Europe.
4. German militarism and military capability.
5. International recognition of European boundaries.
6. Willingness of NATO countries to negotiate the resolution of outstanding problems.
7. Mutually beneficial peaceful cooperation among East and West Europeans.
8. Disolution of aggressive military blocs (i.e., NATO).
9. Military defense capability of individual East European countries under threat.

Technical Notes. Security depends on pro-Soviet military forces, forces of opposition, and the degree of tension or ongoing disputes between the two sides. The coder should pay attention first to the degree of likely threat directed at East Europe (from the Soviet perspective) and then the balance of East-West forces in the area of conflict.

Outcome Assessment Question. Security of East European Buffer States:

1. EL No significant defense against potential aggressors for any state.
2. VL Security is very low for many states.
3. L Security is very low for a few states and cohesion of Warsaw Pact is weak.
4. M Security of a few states is low but cohesion of Warsaw Pact is strong.
5. H Security of some members is low but Soviet deterrent makes defense possible.

6. VH Security of the weakest members is low but no immediate threat as long as Soviet deterrent is maintained.

7. EH Complete security, no significant threat.

Notes. The coder should measure threat to East Europe from the Soviet perspective. In the Soviet world view, the major threats to East Europe are capitalist aggression from West Europe, NATO adventurism, West German militarism, and the reactionary elements within East Europe.

The countries perceived to have been under the most threat are East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Since the 1969 detente with West Germany, the Soviet Union has seemed far more relaxed about the security problem of East Europe. However, this may be partly a result of the strengthening of Warsaw Pact forces.

7.2 Goal. Oppose Revival of Militarism in West Germany

Outcome. Did the militaristic tendencies in West Germany increase/decrease? Did the conditions conducive to revival of militarism in West Germany increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Military spending/GNP in West Germany.
2. Number of men under arms in West Germany.
3. Military spending at constant prices in West Germany.
4. Support for nuclear armaments in West Germany.
5. Level of development of the arms industry in West Germany.
6. Soviet perceptions of German participation in overseas military adventures (e.g., Zaire).

Technical Notes. It is difficult to separate genuine Soviet concerns about German militarism from their possible propaganda statements designed to embarrass the Bonn Government and NATO countries.

The coder should use his judgment to separate genuine concerns with some allowance for the fact that the Soviet Union's view of Germany is far different from that of most Westerners, particularly Americans.

Outcome Assessment Question. German Militarism:

1. EH Germany decides to develop large numbers of strategic nuclear weapons.
2. VH Germany decides to develop tactical and small numbers of strategic nuclear weapons.
3. H Germany boosts its defense spending to 10 percent or more of its GNP or 30 percent or more of U.S. spending.
4. M Germany boosts its defense spending by 50 percent or more in a 5-year period (real).
5. L Germany maintains its 1978 defense/GNP ratio.
6. VL Germany reduces its 1978 defense/GNP ratio.
7. EL Germany greatly reduces its defense spending (real).

Notes. The above codes emphasize actual militarism rather than conditions conducive to militarism.

Soviet fear of German militarism was most acute during the late 1940's and early 1950's. During these years it probably ranged from moderate to high. Since 1969, Soviet fear appears to have declined to low to moderate levels.

7.3 Goal. Promote Unity of Fraternal Socialist Parties of Europe

Outcome. Did the unity of fraternal socialist parties increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Did advocates of Euro-Communism gain in strength?
2. Did any Warsaw Pact member attack the common defense policies?
3. Did advocates of revisionism (e.g., Yugoslavs) gain strength?
4. Did discord among European COMECON increase?
5. Did leaders of West European CP's attack CPSU policies?
6. Did advocates of economic reformism gain strength in East Europe?
7. Did advocates of dogmatism and adventurism (e.g., Albania) gain strength among European CP's?

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union sees narrow nationalism, regionalism, adventurism, dogmatism, revisionism, and reformism as major dangers to the unity of the fraternal socialist parties.

In the Soviet view, fraternal socialist parties exclude all Maoist and all other anti-Soviet parties. For instance, the Albanian Party of Labor is excluded.

From the Soviet viewpoint unity requires some degree of discipline and is not compatible with a situation in which socialist parties frequently criticize each other publicly.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Unity of Fraternal Parties in Europe:

1. EL Complete disunity with no identifiable groups.
2. VL Large scale disunity with more than two major groups.
3. L Large scale disunity with two major groupings.
4. M Moderate disunity with one major and one minor group.
5. H Frequent criticisms of common policies but no break on major issues by any significant party.

6. VH Complete unity except for occasional public criticisms.
7. EH Complete unity with no public criticism of common policies.

Notes. Since the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute was partly resolved just prior to the Twentieth CPSU Congress, European parties' unity has ranged from moderate to very high.

7.4 Goal: Oppose European (NATO) Aid to China

Outcome. Did the level of Sino-West European cooperation aimed against the Soviet Union increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. West European commercial credits to China.
2. West European military assistance to China.
3. West European industrial assistance to China.
4. West European trade with China.

Technical Notes. The coder should emphasize relations as viewed from Moscow rather than Washington. However, normal international relations should not be interpreted as anti-Soviet merely because some Soviet writers so claim.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of West European-China Cooperation:

1. EH Fully coordinated major anti-Soviet measures and cooperation between West Europe and China.
2. VH Large scale credits and arms sales to China.
3. H Major West European assistance to some of China's military industries.
4. M Limited West European assistance to China's military industries.
5. L West European assistance to China's strategic industries.
6. VL West European grants of "easy" credits to China for trade.
7. EL No significant anti-Soviet cooperation between West Europe and China.

Notes. Ordinary trade and diplomatic relations should not be interpreted as anti-Soviet cooperation.

Since the 1960's, most West European countries have been careful not to give an anti-Soviet cast to their relations with China. However, some have been giving assistance to China's strategic civilian industries,

such as steel, and a few have begun to discuss limited assistance for China's military industries. In general, anti-Soviet/West European cooperation with China has ranged from very low to moderate and has not yet reached the high range of the scale.

7.5 Goal: Promote Peaceful, Mutually Beneficial Cooperation With Nonsocialist European Countries

Outcome. Did the level of Soviet commercial, scientific, technological, and cultural exchanges with nonsocialist European countries increase?

Measures.

1. Soviet trade with West Europe.
2. Soviet scientific/technological ties with West Europe.
3. Soviet financial ties with West Europe.
4. Soviet cultural ties with West Europe.

Technical Notes. Soviet writers often include cultural ties among the above list of desirable relationships. However, in practice they seem to show a desire for only a selected range of cultural ties. In particular they seem hesitant to expose the Soviet public to the full range of diverse publications and artistic expressions that exist in the West.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Ties with Nonsocialist European Countries:

1. EL No significant ties.
2. VL Restricted ties with only a few major capitalist European countries.
3. L Restricted ties with many capitalist European countries.
4. M Restricted ties with most major capitalist countries.
5. H Widespread ties but with selected major restrictions by some capitalist countries.
6. VH Widespread ties with some minor restrictions by the capitalist countries.
7. EH Widespread ties with no political restrictions/obstacles by the capitalist countries.

Notes. It is assumed that the Soviet Union will always try to maintain some restrictions on its contacts with the capitalist European countries even though it desires to remove all restrictions placed by the other side.

Soviet contacts with European countries increased steadily during the 1950's and 1960's from a range of low to moderate to a range of high to very high. During the 1970's Soviet ties have been very high to extremely high.

Deemphasize the volume of contacts between the Soviet Union and European capitalist countries. Instead, emphasize the freedom of the Soviet Union to interact with European capitalist countries without political restrictions from the latter.

8. Soviet Goals Toward the Third World

8.1 Goal: Defend Fraternal Socialist Countries in the Third World

Outcome. Did any fraternal socialist country requiring assistance receive adequate assistance in time? Did any fraternal country have to submit to military threat because of Soviet instability to assist?

Measures.

1. Did any socialist LDC come under military threat?
2. Did any socialist LDC accuse the Soviet Union of inadequate military assistance?
3. Did any socialist LDC accuse the Soviet Union of military collusion with capitalist countries?
4. Did any socialist country accuse the Soviet Union of being weak in the face of capitalist or Chinese threats to socialist LDC's?
5. Did any fraternal socialist party in a developing country lose control because of a military coup, invasion, or counter-revolutionary rebellion?
6. Did any fraternal socialist country suffer economic hardship because of economic blockades or boycotts by capitalist/imperialist powers?

Technical Notes. Since the Sino-Soviet dispute took a turn for the worse in the mid-1960's, China has been excluded from the list of fraternal socialist countries.

Outcome Assessment Question. Security of Fraternal Socialist Countries (LDC's):

1. EL All socialist countries are threatened and likely to fall to antisocialist elements.
2. VL Most socialist countries are threatened and some are likely to fall to antisocialist elements.
3. L Most socialist countries are threatened and many can survive only through major Soviet assistance.
4. M Most socialist countries are threatened and some require Soviet assistance to survive.
5. H Some socialist countries face internal/external threats, a few require Soviet assistance to feel more secure.

6. VH Some socialist countries are insecure but need no external assistance to survive.

7. EH All socialist countries are completely secure.

Notes. Since the World War II, except for the Korean War period, the security of most developing socialist countries has been moderate to extremely high.

During the early 1950's the security of developing fraternal countries was low to moderate.

8.2 Goal: Defend Progressive Regimes and Movements and Socialist-Oriented Countries

Outcome. Did progressive regimes and movements and socialist-oriented countries that were under threat survive?

Measures.

1. Number of stable socialist-oriented countries in the region.
2. Number of progressive regimes in the region.
3. Number of liberation movements destroyed during the period under consideration.
4. Strength of surviving liberation movements.
5. Number of reactionary governments (e.g., anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, or fascist governments).

Technical Notes. Socialist-oriented countries differ from socialist or fraternal socialist developing countries. The latter refer only to what the Western sources call Communist or Marxist-Leninist countries (excluding Albania and China since the Sino-Soviet dispute became vicious, and sometimes excluding Yugoslavia). Socialist-oriented countries include many developing countries with "progressive" policies such as state control of most major industries and financial enterprises. Fraternal socialist developing countries in early 1979 included: Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, and Cambodia. Socialist-oriented countries included a much larger list of Arab, African, and Asian countries.

Outcome Assessment Question. Security of Progressive Regimes/Movements and Socialist-Oriented Countries:

1. EL Many major threats requiring massive Soviet military intervention without high chances of success.
2. VL Major threats requiring Soviet troop deployment in the regions.
3. L Major threats requiring Soviet aid and military logistical support.
4. M Major threats in some cases requiring Soviet military and economic aid but not Soviet troops or naval support.
5. H Major threats in a few cases requiring small amounts of Soviet aid.

6. VH Minor threats requiring no Soviet assistance.
7. EH No significant threat to any movement, regime, or country.

Notes. Soviet leaders see progressive regimes/movements to be under major threat in most cases. In the past the Soviet Union has been relatively cautious in intervening on behalf of threatened regimes/movements. For calibration purposes, consider security of progressive regimes and movements in the African region as having ranged from moderate to very low, in Latin American and Southeast Asia from very low to extremely low, and in the Middle East from low to extremely low.

8.3 Goal: Assist Economic Independence of Developing Countries

Outcome. Did the developing countries in the area affected by the crisis become economically more independent from the major capitalist economies? Did they become more socialist in their economic orientation?

Measures.

A. Trade Independence

1. Trade with the Soviet Union/trade with capitalist countries.
2. Trade with socialist countries/trade with capitalist countries.
3. Trade with socialist countries/GNP of the country.
4. Trade with socialist countries/world trade.

B. Socialist Economic Orientation

1. Declaration of socialist policies.
2. Nationalization of foreign investments.
3. Nationalization of major domestic industries.
4. Nationalization of material means of production.
5. Nationalization of financial institutions.
6. Nationalization of foreign trade.
7. Nationalization of all private property.
8. Nationalization of all financial capital.
9. Redistribution of wealth.
10. Nationalization of service industries.
11. Percent of economy nationalized (% GNP).

Technical Notes. Major capitalist countries are the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, U.K., Italy, Canada, and Australia, however, the most important are the first five.

Outcome Assessment Question. Economic Independence of Developing Countries:

1. EL Socialist program is discarded in favor of capitalism, dependence is extremely high.
2. VL Socialist program is greatly undermined by reactionary policies, dependence on capitalist countries is very high.
3. L Socialist programs is adjusted to local conditions by local reformists, economic dependence is high.
4. M Partial socialist program adopted but unlikely to be implemented, moderate to high dependence on capitalist countries.
5. H Partial socialist program adopted and is being implemented, economic dependence is moderate to high.
6. VH Complete socialist program adopted but faces instability because of dependence on capitalist countries.
- 7. EH Complete, firm socialist policy adopted. No significant dependence on capitalist countries.

Notes. In cases where data is available, use trade with capitalist countries/total trade to measure dependence.

8.4 Goal: Increase the Soviet Union's International Prestige Among Developing Countries

Outcome. Did Soviet prestige among developing countries increase?

Measures.

1. Support for Soviet regional policy by the LDC's in the region.
2. Support for general Soviet foreign policy by the LDC's.
3. Receptivity of LDC's to Soviet offers of aid.
4. Attitude of LDC's toward Soviet overseas military presence.
5. Support for Soviet policies in the U.N.
6. World opinion towards the Soviet Union (European and Japanese polls).

Technical Notes. Many Western experts of Soviet affairs view the Soviet Union as having an excessive inferiority complex which she tries to overcome through public relations spectaculars (such as the space program, and the Olympic Games and military power displays).

Another common Western view of the Soviet Union is that she overemphasizes loss of face. However, it is difficult to measure this attitude and compare its level to, say, that of the United States. Moreover, the behavior associated with face-saving could very well be a display of "national determination" or inflexibility of foreign policy.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Prestige Among Developing Countries:

1. EL No LDC support in any international setting (e.g., the U.N.).
2. VL No support from any major LDC's.
3. L Opposition by most LDC's and popular fronts.
4. M Opposition by many LDC's including several major progressive LDC's and movements.
5. H Support by most/but opposition by several major progressive LDC's and movements.
6. VH Support by most significant LDC's and fronts.

7. EH Support by nearly all significant LDC's and popular fronts.

Notes. During the early 1950's, Soviet prestige among LDC's was very low to moderate. After Stalin's death, it increased to a moderate to high range.

8.4.1 Goal. Increase Soviet Prestige Among Developing Countries Through Aid, Trade, and Cultural Contacts

Outcome. Did Soviet aid, trade, and cultural contacts with developing countries in the region increase?

Measures.

1. Soviet economic aid.
2. Soviet military aid.
3. Soviet trade.
4. Soviet cultural relations.

Technical Notes. This goal focuses on a narrower range of indicators of Soviet prestige than the preceding goal.

Outcome Assessment Question. Overall Soviet Aid/Trade/Cultural Contacts With LDC's:

1. EL No contacts.
2. VL Minor, infrequent contacts.
3. L Frequent but minor contacts.
4. M Frequent contacts and small volumes of trade.
5. H Frequent contacts and moderate volumes of aid and trade.
6. VH Very high levels of aid, trade, and cultural ties.
7. EH Maximum reasonable level of contacts.

Notes. Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union have been very high to extremely high since 1970. Syria's ties to the Soviet Union have been moderate to very high over the same period. For most developing countries, however, Soviet ties are very low to moderate.

8.5 Goal: Contain Influence of China Among Developing Countries

Outcome. Did China's containment of influence in the area of crisis increase/decrease? Alternatively, it can be asked did China's influence increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. China's diplomatic standing in the region.
2. China's economic relations with the region.
3. China's trade/Soviet trade with the region.
4. China's assistance/Soviet assistance to the region.
5. Soviet military presence in the region.
6. China's military presence in the region.
7. Attitude of local CP's toward China.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union has never publicly announced a containment policy toward China, but it is assumed here that it pursues such a policy particularly among CP's and other progressive groups.

China's influence among developing countries need not be inversely related to Soviet influence. However, assuming such a relationship simplifies coding and should be practiced wherever applicable.

Outcome Assessment Question. China's Containment Among Developing Nations

1. EL Containment is complete failure, China has close relations with most nation states and most CP's and progressive movements.
2. VL China has diplomatic and economic relations with many nations and some major CP's.
3. L China is surrounded by many nations that have friendly ties with the Soviet Union but are not hostile to China.
4. M China has friendly relations with several major countries and CP's.
5. H China has friendly relations with several small countries and CP's.
6. VH China has friendly relations only with a few small countries and CP's in the region.

7. EH Complete containment, no significant, nation-state has relations with China, China is surrounded by hostile nations.

Notes. China's containment since the mid-1970's has been moderate to high in most Third World regions.

Since Mao's death, China's isolation among CP's and liberation movements increased while her isolation among non-Communist countries has declined.

China's abandonment of a people's war strategy in the early 1970's led to greater isolation in Africa but lesser isolation in East and non-Communist Southeast Asia.

9. Soviet Goals Toward Asia

9.1 Goal: Deter/Oppose China From Military Adventurism Against the Soviet Union

Outcome. Did China increase/decrease its military provocations against the Soviet Union?

Measures.

1. Chinese military acts against the Soviet Union.
2. Soviet claims of Chinese military aggression.
3. Sino-Soviet border clashes.
4. Incidents of small border incursions or overflights of Soviet border regions by Chinese military forces.
5. Chinese harassment of Soviet border posts and patrols.
6. Shooting down of Soviet planes by Chinese anti-aircraft defenses or interceptors in the border regions.
7. Buildup of offensive weaponry by the Chinese near the border with the Soviet Union or Mongolia.
8. Chinese incursions and aggressiveness against Mongolia.

Technical Notes. Data about China's military preparation and actions against the Soviet Union are extremely poor and unreliable. The open sources include mostly self-serving statements of the two sides about events which they wish to publicize, e.g., Louis (1979).

Outcome Assessment Question. China's Military Aggressiveness Against the Soviet Union:

1. EH Frequent major actions of provocation, military build-up with apparent aggressive intention against the Soviet Union.
2. VH Frequent major acts of provocation but accompanied with a moderate mobilization.
3. H Frequent major acts of provocation but not accompanied with any significant mobilization.
4. M Frequent minor acts of provocation, major capability for adventurism.
5. L Infrequent minor acts of provocation, major capability for adventurism.

6. VL Infrequent minor acts of provocation, moderate capability for adventurism.
7. EL No significant acts of provocation and low military capability for adventurism, overwhelming Soviet military superiority.

Notes. China's military aggressiveness against the Soviet Union were extremely low to very low during the 1950's, very low to low during the late 1960's, and moderate to low during the 1970's.

9.2 Goal: Deter/Oppose China From Military Adventurism Against Fraternal Socialist Countries

Outcome. Did China's military aggressiveness and provocations against Asian fraternal socialist countries increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Border clashes between China and socialist countries.
2. Border disputes between China and socialist countries.
3. Overflights of socialist countries by Chinese aircraft.
4. Naval incidents between China and socialist countries.
5. Mobilization of Chinese forces for potential aggression near borders with Asian socialist countries.
6. Chinese covert operations within socialist countries (e.g., aid to Meo tribesmen in Vietnam).
- 7. Chinese harassment of border posts and patrols of its neighboring socialist countries.

Technical Notes. China's lack of "aggressiveness" may not be mainly determined by Soviet deterrent capability. Internal problems and the policies of other major powers may be equally or more important. However, the most relevant end result is the security of Soviet socialist allies from Chinese acts of aggression.

Outcome Assessment Question. China's Military Aggressiveness Against Socialist Countries:

1. EH Frequent major acts of provocation, military build-up with aggressive intentions.
2. VH Frequent major acts of provocation accompanied with a major mobilization.
3. H Frequent major acts of provocation accompanied with significant mobilization.
4. M Frequent minor acts of provocation, major capability for adventurism.
5. L Infrequent minor acts of provocation, major capability for adventurism.

6. VL Infrequent minor acts of provocation, moderate capability for adventurism.
7. EL No significant acts of provocation and low military capability for adventurism, overwhelming Soviet military superiority.

Notes. Until the early 1970's, China's aggressiveness against Asian socialist countries was extremely low to low. During the 1970's China's aggressions increased to low to extremely high.

9.3 Goal: Support/Defend Fraternal Socialist Countries in Asia Against Other (Imperialist) Threats

Outcome. How capable are the fraternal socialist countries to defend themselves against imperialist aggressions?

Measures.

1. Capability of fraternal armies of Asian socialist countries.
2. Size of armed forces of fraternal socialist countries in Asia.
3. Soviet military capability to defend the socialist countries in Asia against a major military threat.
4. Soviet ability to give large scale military aid rapidly in an emergency situation.
5. Soviet naval presence in the region (number of vessels, type, etc.).
6. Soviet ability to intervene directly with land and air forces in support of socialist allies.
7. Soviet performance in giving aid to socialist allies in times of crisis.

Technical Notes. Although Soviet performance in support of her allies is an important element of this goal, the coder should limit evaluation to the end result: the military capability of the socialist countries to defend their security on their own.

The coder should consider security in terms of likely threats such as limited U.S. or Chinese military attacks rather than unlikely unlimited military attacks.

Outcome Assessment Question. Military Security of Fraternal Asian Socialist Countries:

1. EL Most countries are incapable of defending themselves even with massive Soviet assistance and intervention.
2. VL Most countries are capable of defending themselves with massive Soviet assistance and limited intervention.

3. L Most countries are capable of defending themselves with major Soviet assistance and small numbers of advisory personnel.
4. M Most countries are capable of defending themselves with small Soviet assistance but some will require direct logistical support.
5. H Most countries are capable of defending themselves with small Soviet assistance.
6. VH Most countries are capable of defending themselves against all likely threats without significant Soviet assistance.
7. EH All countries are capable of defending themselves against all likely threats without significant Soviet assistance.

Notes. For calibration use the following examples:

- During 1979 most fraternal Asian socialist countries (particularly Laos) were vulnerable to Chinese attack but most could defend themselves against a limited Chinese or U.S. military attack with minimal Soviet aid.
- During the 1950's most fraternal Asian socialist countries would have required at least major Soviet assistance in order to defend themselves against a limited U.S. military attack.

9.4 Goal: Develop Alternative Transport Routes to the Trans-Siberian Railway

Outcome. Did the security of East-West transportation from potential Chinese military threats increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Security of Trans-Siberian land routes.
2. Security of Trans-Siberian air routes.
3. Security of Arctic Sea route. .
4. Security of Indian/Pacific oceans route.
5. Security of indirect air routes (i.e., routes requiring overflights of third countries).

Technical Notes. In case of a Sino-Soviet war the Soviet Far Eastern territories are likely to become isolated from the rest of the Soviet Union except for long-range Soviet aviation and ocean shipping. Soviet military planners appear to have developed a capability for their Far Eastern command to sustain a medium term isolation without losing its military capability against potential Chinese attackers.

Outcome Assessment Question. Security of East-West Transportation From Chinese Threat:

1. EL Chinese threats to land, air, and sea routes are high.
2. VL Potential Chinese threat to land and air routes are high but moderate for the sea routes.
3. L Moderate threats to land and air routes and small threat to the sea routes.
4. M Small Chinese threats to land, air and sea routes.
5. H Small Chinese threats to overland and air routes but no threats to sea routes.
6. VH Potential Chinese threats to overland routes are small.
7. EH No potential Chinese threat to the major carrier routes.

Notes. During the 1960's the security of East-West transportation, particularly during the Fall to Spring periods, was very low to moderate.

With the developments of Soviet long-range transportation and naval capability the security of Soviet transportation should have increased. But the increases were somewhat offset by improvements in the Chinese military capabilities. Therefore, at best the security of the Soviet East-West transport network is moderate.

9.5 Goal: Undermine the Legitimacy of China's Territorial Claims Against Its Neighbors (Except in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao)

Outcome. Did the level of international acceptability of China's territorial claims against its neighboring countries (excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao) increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Number of countries with unresolved border disputes with China.
2. Number of countries in Asia who support Soviet policy of permanence of post-World War II borders.
3. Number of countries in Asia with diplomatic ties with China/number of countries with Soviet diplomatic ties.
4. Number of countries with territorial claims against the Soviet Union (e.g., China and Japan).
5. Number of countries with territorial claims against socialist countries in Asia.
6. International support for China/Japan territorial claims against the Soviet Union.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union's policy toward its post-World War II borders is defensive. The Soviet Union's major territorial concern has been to induce recognition of the legitimacy of its present borders among its neighboring countries.

Outcome Assessment Question. International Acceptability of China's Territorial Claims:

1. EH Most Asian countries support China's claims. Japan and China both press their demands against the USSR in a broad diplomatic front.
2. VH Most Asian countries sympathize with China's demands but only a few major countries (including Japan) give her diplomatic support.
3. H Several Asian countries (including Japan) sympathize and a few support China in her territorial demands.
4. M A few Asian countries (including Japan) support China's territorial claims.

5. L A few Asian countries (including Japan) sympathize with China's territorial claims.
6. VL A few small Asian countries sympathize with China's territorial claims.
7. EL No country shows any sympathy for China's claims.

Notes. International support for China territorial claims has generally been low to very low. However, in recent years some anti-Soviet countries seem to have begun to think of this issue as one that could be used to widen the Sino-Soviet rift. Consequently, there seems to be a slight but preceptible move by some countries to show greater sympathy towards China's territorial claims against the Soviet Union and her allies, Vietnam and Laos.

9.6 Goal: Support Progressive Governments and Countries With Socialist-Oriented Orientation (Excluding Socialist Countries Such as North Korea, Vietnam, and, Since 1975, Laos and Cambodia)

Outcome. Did Soviet moral and material support for the socialist-oriented countries and progressive governments increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet moral (verbal) and diplomatic support.
2. Soviet material (economic) assistance.
3. Soviet material (military) assistance.
4. Soviet limited naval deployment.
5. Soviet limited logistical support of local combatants.
6. Soviet limited logistical support of third country's forces (e.g., Cuban troops).
7. Soviet limited ground forces deployment.
8. Soviet military deployment on an extensive scale.
9. Soviet limited covert support.
10. Soviet use of nuclear threats (nuclear deterrence).
11. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with the United States or China in support of local allies.

Technical Notes. From the Soviet perspective, progressive governments and socialist-oriented countries in Asia have been very few: Indonesia under Sukarno, Burma, India, Cambodia under Sihanouk, and Sri Lanka.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Support for Progressive Governments and Socialist-Oriented Countries:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral (verbal) support.
3. L Diplomatic and moral (verbal) support.
4. M Limited material assistance in a selected number of cases.
5. H Unlimited material assistance in selected extreme cases and more limited material assistance in others.

6. VH Limited direct military support.

7. EH Unlimited direct military support.

Notes. In only a few Asian cases the Soviet Union has given moderate levels of support to progressive governments: Sukarno's and India's governments. In most other cases the Soviet Union has limited itself to moral and diplomatic support. The reason for this policy is that most governments in Asia have been strongly anti-Soviet.

9.7 Goal: Support Peaceful and Mutually Beneficial Relations With Asian Countries

Outcome. Did the regional acceptability of Soviet advocacy of peaceful coexistence among nonsocialist Asian countries increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet trade with Asian countries.
2. Voting record of Asian countries in the U.N.
3. Cohesion of SEATO.
4. Attitude of Asian countries toward Soviet concepts of Asian mutual security system, nuclear free zones, and peaceful coexistence.
5. Number of Asian countries with diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.
6. Hostility of nonsocialist Asian countries toward socialist countries and local CP's.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union's peace program for Asia emphasizes the elimination of anti-Soviet military blocs such as SEATO and ANZU. More recently, containment of China appears to have become the primary goal, but Soviet writers so far have not admitted the existence of such a goal.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support for Peaceful Coexistence Among Nonsocialist Asian Countries:

1. EL No significant support by any nonsocialist country.
2. VL Lukewarm diplomatic support by a few small countries and insignificant economic ties.
3. L Strong diplomatic support by a few small countries but insignificant economic ties.
4. M Strong diplomatic support by a few small and major countries and insignificant economic ties with the Soviet Union.
5. H Strong diplomatic support by most countries and moderate economic ties with the Soviet Union.

6. VH Strong diplomatic support by most countries and moderate and growing economic ties with the Soviet Union.
7. EH Very strong diplomatic support and widespread economic ties with the Soviet Union by most countries in Asia.

Notes. Support for the Soviet policy of peaceful and mutually beneficial relations in Asia has never been high among nonsocialist Asian countries. In general it has ranged from very low to low support.

10. Soviet Goals Toward the Middle East and South Asia

10.1 Goal: Reduce Potential NATO/CENTO Threats to the Soviet Union

Outcome. Did the local governments' support for NATO/CENTO in the Middle East and South Asia increase/decrease? Did the cohesion of NATO/CENTO decrease?

Measures.

1. Cohesion of CENTO.
2. Regional hostility towards NATO.
3. Military cooperation among regional members of NATO and CENTO.
4. Contribution of regional members of NATO and CENTO to the defense of U.S. and West European interests.
5. Conflicts among regional members of NATO and CENTO.
6. Soviet military aid and sales to regional members of NATO and CENTO.
7. Soviet economic ties with regional members of NATO and CENTO.

Technical Notes. Soviet policy toward the NATO/CENTO threat probably involves a two-pronged strategy of encouraging the break-up of these blocs and improving diplomatic relations with their members.

Outcome Assessment Question. NATO/CENTO Threat in Middle East/South Asia:

1. EH Regional components of NATO/CENTO are extremely strong and cohesive and are backed by major regional military presence of the nonregional (European and U.S. components, NATO/CENTO regional front could become major invasion route against the Soviet Union).
2. VH NATO/CENTO military capability is strong enough to pose a major threat to the Soviet Union's southern flank in Europe and the Middle East.
3. H NATO/CENTO military capability is strong enough to pose a moderate threat to the Soviet Union's southern flank in Europe and the Middle East.
4. M Regional components of NATO/CENTO are closely aligned and militarily supported by considerable presence of nonregional components.

5. L Regional components of NATO/CENTO are closely aligned but the regional military presence of nonregional components is weak.
6. VL Regional components of NATO/CENTO are weakly aligned and the regional military presence of nonregional components is weak.
7. EL Regional components of NATO/CENTO are in disarray and there is no significant regional military presence by the nonregional components.

Notes. The NATO/CENTO threat in the Middle East/South Asia has never been high to very high from an objective viewpoint. However, the Soviet perceptions may have been different. During the 1950's the NATO/CENTO image as perceived by the Soviet leaders may have been strong enough to lead them to conclude that Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Pakistan were major threats to the Soviet Union's multinational southern states and allied countries such as Bulgaria and Rumania. Therefore, Soviet perceptions may have led them to believe that the NATO/CENTO regional threat was high to extremely high.

Since the coder is not likely to be able to find consistent information on Soviet perceptions of this threat, actual threat should be coded here.

10.2 Goal: Support/Defend Progressive and Socialist-Oriented Governments In the Region (e.g., Socialist and Nationalist Arab Governments, India, and Sri Lanka)

Outcome. Did the Soviet moral and material support to progressive and socialist-oriented governments in the region increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet moral (verbal) and diplomatic support.
2. Soviet material (economic) assistance.
3. Soviet material (military) assistance.
4. Soviet limited naval deployment.
5. Soviet limited logistical support of local combatants.
6. Soviet limited logistical support of third countries' forces (e.g., Cuba).
7. Soviet limited ground forces deployment.
8. Soviet deployment of land forces on an extensive scale.
9. Soviet limited covert operation support.
10. Soviet use of nuclear threats (nuclear deterrence).
11. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with the United States or China in support of local allies.

Technical Notes. From a Soviet perspective, progressive and socialist-oriented governments in the region have included most Arab socialist regimes such as the FLN in Algeria, Baathists in Iraq and Syria, and Nasser's government in Egypt.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Support for Progressive and Socialist-Oriented Governments:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral (verbal) support.
3. L Diplomatic and moral (verbal) support.
4. M Limited material assistance in selected cases.
5. H Unlimited material assistance in selected extreme cases and more limited material aid in others.

6. VH Limited direct military support.

7. EH Unlimited direct military support.

Notes. Soviet support for progressive and socialist-oriented countries in Middle East/South Asia was low to extremely low until the mid-1950's. Then support began to increase and in the late 1960's and early 1970's reached moderate to very high levels.

10.3 Goal: Support/Defend Progressive and Democratic Movements in the Region (e.g., Nationalism, Communist Parties, Socialist Parties, and Liberation Groups)

Outcome. Did Soviet moral and material assistance to progressive and democratic movements in the Middle East/South Asia region increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet financial and moral support to local CP's and liberation movements.
2. Soviet material assistance.
3. Soviet diplomatic support.
4. Soviet opposition to persecution and harassment of progressive forces.
5. Soviet military intervention.
6. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with major powers in defense of local progressive forces.
7. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with local governments in defense of progressive forces.

Technical Notes. Soviet support for Middle East/S. Asian CP's has been constrained by her desire to maintain good relations with local governments which are often anti-Communist if not anti-Soviet.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Support for Progressive and Democratic Movements:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral and diplomatic support.
3. L Covert economic aid and moral support.
4. M Unlimited material assistance in a selected small number of cases.
5. H Unlimited material assistance in some cases and limited aid in other cases.
6. VH Limited direct military support.
7. EH Unlimited direct military support.

Notes. Soviet support to Middle East/South Asian progressive and democratic forces has always been low to very low.

10.4 Goal: Support Economic Independence of Countries in the Middle East/
North Africa Region

Outcome. Did the economic independence of the countries in Middle East/
South Asia from the capitalist countries increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Nationalization of foreign businesses.
2. Control of the regional oil industries by local governments.
3. Industrial development of regional economies.
4. Soviet trade with the region/total trade of the region.
5. Soviet trade with the region/trade of the region with the OECD countries.
6. Soviet economic aid/Western economic aid,
7. U.S. and West European investment/GNP of the region.
8. Number of U.S./West European citizens working in the region.
9. Number of countries claiming socialist-oriented economic policies.

Technical Notes. A major Soviet concern in the Middle East has been the foreign oil monopolies' exploitation of regional resources. All moves by local governments to increase national control over oil resources are applauded by Soviet commentators.

During the mid-1950's the Soviet Union began to improve its relations with the Middle East/South Asian countries through encouragement of mutually beneficial economic interactions. By the early 1970's, the Soviet Union had successfully completed many economic agreements with the countries in the region. Although most of these projects are of great benefit to the Soviet Union, the probable aim of many projects may have been inducing greater economic independence from the West. In most cases it is difficult to guess which motive may have been predominant.

Outcome Assessment Question. Economic Independence of Middle East/South Asia from the West:

1. EL All major countries are greatly dependent on the West.

2. VL Only a few major countries are not mainly dependent on the West.
3. L Only several major countries are not mainly dependent on the West.
4. M Many major countries are mainly dependent on the West.
5. H Several major countries are mainly dependent on the West.
6. VH A few major countries are mainly dependent on the West.
7. EH No significant country in the region is mainly dependent on the West.

Notes. The coder should take into consideration that most countries in the region have been and continue to be greatly dependent on the West for their exports and imports.

Assume that Japan is included in the Western bloc.

10.5 Goal: Secure Soviet Naval Access to the Indian Ocean

Outcome: Did the friendliness and cooperation of the countries in the region toward the Soviet Union increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Number of countries in the region with friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
2. Number of countries in the region supporting Soviet concepts of peace zones and regional security.
3. Number of countries in the region voting in favor of the Soviet Union in the United Nations General Assembly.
4. Number of countries with Soviet military advisers.
5. Number of countries with Soviet air and naval facilities.
6. Number of countries receiving Soviet military aid and sales.
7. Number of countries with socialist-oriented governments.
8. Number of countries hostile to NATO military bloc.
9. Number of countries allowing Soviet military overflights.

Technical Notes. The most relevant determinants for this goal are the friendliness of regional countries toward the Soviet Union and their cooperativeness toward Soviet regional military presence. However, the relevant final outcome is Soviet naval access to the Indian Ocean.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Naval Access to the Indian Ocean:

1. EL Many strategic countries are hostile to the Soviet Union and hinder Soviet access.
2. VL Several strategic countries are hostile to the Soviet Union but cannot greatly hinder Soviet access.
3. L Several major countries are hostile to the Soviet Union but do not hinder access.
4. M A few major countries are hostile to the Soviet Union but cannot hinder access.

5. H Several major countries in the region are friendly and facilitate access and the rest are indifferent.
6. VH Most major countries in the region are friendly and cooperate in facilitating access.
7. EH All important states in the region are friendly to the Soviet Union and cooperate in facilitating access.

Notes. Soviet naval access to the Indian Ocean since the Second World War has increased considerably from low to moderate during the first 2 decades to moderate to high during the 1970's.

Increased Soviet access has been partly due to the increased blue water capabilities of the Soviet navy and partly due to Soviet diplomatic relations with the Middle East/South Asia region. However, the coder should emphasize the latter.

This goal is obviously related to the previously cited aim of securing alternatives to the vulnerable Trans-Siberian rail links to Soviet East Asia.

11. Soviet Goals Toward Africa

11.1 Goal: Defend/Support the Security of African Countries Proclaiming the Intention of Moving Toward Building Socialism

Outcome. How capable are the socialist countries to defend themselves against likely external threats without Soviet military intervention?

Measures.

1. Military capability of the socialist-oriented countries.
2. Military cooperation with the Soviet Union.
3. Soviet economic assistance.
4. Soviet military assistance (equipment).
5. Soviet direct logistical support of local military.
6. Soviet limited military deployment (land/air forces).
7. Soviet naval demonstration.
8. Soviet diplomatic support.
9. Soviet support of a third country's military intervention (e.g., Cuba).
10. Soviet declaration of support with nuclear weapons.
11. Soviet threats of military action.
12. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with the U.S.

Technical Notes. The important variable here is the ability of socialist-oriented countries to defend themselves rather than the symbolic nature of Soviet support.

In early 1979 the African countries fitting the label of "having declared the intention of moving toward socialism" included Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and the Congo.

Outcome Assessment Question. The Security of Socialist Countries in Africa:

1. EL No capability to maintain power even with massive Soviet intervention.
2. VL Defense requires massive Soviet intervention.

3. L Defense requires moderate levels of Soviet military intervention.
4. M Defense requires moderate levels of Soviet logistical support and material assistance.
5. H Defense requires moderate amounts of Soviet material assistance.
6. VH Defense requires small amounts of Soviet material assistance.
7. EH Capability to maintain power with no Soviet assistance against any regional threat.

Notes. During the mid-1970's the security of African socialist countries was low to very high. The least secure countries in 1979 were Angola and Ethiopia.

11.2 Goal: Support Other Progressive Regimes and Movements and Socialist-Oriented Countries

Outcome. Did Soviet moral and material support for progressive regimes and movements and socialist-oriented countries increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet moral support for progressive and democratic movements.
2. Soviet material assistance for progressive and democratic movements.
3. Soviet support for socialist-oriented countries.
4. Soviet support for Marxist regimes.
5. Soviet support for local CP's.
6. Soviet support for national liberation movements.
7. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with the United States and NATO countries in support of local progressive forces.

Technical Notes. Until recently Soviet support for African progressive movements had been constrained by the very limited ability of the Soviet military to project power beyond its borders. Since the late 1960's the increased capability of the Soviet long-range military airlift and overseas naval presence have gradually increased Soviet capability to exercise military power in Africa.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support of Progressive Regimes and Socialist-Oriented Countries:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral support.
3. L Diplomatic and moral support.
4. M Limited material assistance in a selected number of cases.
5. H High levels of material assistance in selected extreme cases and more limited material assistance in others.
6. VH Limited direct military support.

7. EH Unlimited direct military support.

Notes. During the 1960's Soviet support for progressive regimes and movements and socialist-oriented countries was low to moderate. Since the early 1970's Soviet support has increased to moderate to high levels.

11.3 Goal: Support the General Independence of African Countries

Outcome. Did the independence of African countries from the capitalist countries of Europe and North America increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. U.S. trade with Africa/total trade of Africa.
2. U.S. trade with Africa/Soviet trade with Africa.
3. U.S. investment in Africa/GNP of Africa.
4. West European trade with Africa/total trade of Africa.
5. West European trade with Africa/Soviet trade with Africa.
6. West European trade with Africa/GNP of Africa.
7. Hostility of OAU toward the capitalist countries.
8. Level of Soviet ties with Africa.
9. Soviet military aid to Africa/U.S. and European military aid.
10. Soviet arms sales/total arms imports of Africa.

Technical Notes. The coder should take into account that most African countries have a tendency to maintain an above normal level of interactions with their former colonial masters. For instance, France continues to be the major trading partner of most former French colonies.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Independence of Africa From Capitalist Countries:

1. EL Capitalist countries dominate most countries' economies and have closely coordinated diplomatic/military policies with most.
2. VL Capitalist ties consist of strong economic, military, and diplomatic ties.
3. L Capitalist ties consist of normal ties and strong military cooperation with most countries.
4. M Capitalist ties consist of normal ties and military assistance and arms exports to most countries.

5. H Capitalist ties consists of normal ties and low level military ties with many countries.
6. VH Capitalist ties consist of normal commercial and diplomatic ties only.
7. EH Capitalist countries ties consist of below normal commercial and diplomatic ties.

Notes. Until the mid-1960's African countries' independence from capitalist countries were very low to extremely low. Since then their independence has increased to moderate to high.

Use GNP's of trading partners as weights to determine normal levels for their trade.

11.4 Goal: Increase Soviet Influence/Prestige Among African Countries

Outcome. Did Soviet prestige/influence in Africa increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Voting record of African countries on the issues strongly supported by the Soviet Union.
2. Volume of Soviet trade with Africa/total trade of Africa.
3. Number of countries in Africa with diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
4. Number of African officials visiting USSR.
5. Receptivity of African countries to Soviet naval presence in nearby ocean waterways.
6. Soviet military presence on African lands.
7. Soviet military assistance (volume and number of recipient countries).
8. Number of countries proclaiming socialist orientation.
9. Number of countries proclaiming Marxist orientation.

Technical Notes. The relevant variable is Soviet perception of its prestige/influence among African countries. Nevertheless, the coder should focus on evaluation of Africans' view of Soviet prestige/influence since coding perceptions of perceptions is far too complex to be reliable.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Prestige/Influence in Africa:

1. EL Soviet Union has no significant ties with any major African countries.
2. VL Soviet ties consist of mainly minor commercial ties with major African countries.
3. L Soviet ties consist of commercial and normal diplomatic ties with a few cases of Soviet economic and military assistance.
4. M Soviet ties consist of friendly but not very strong relations with many countries and very strong relations with a few.

5. H Soviet ties consist mainly of strong diplomatic and economic ties with many African countries and close military ties with several.
6. VH Soviet ties consist of strong diplomatic, military, and economic relations and high influence with many countries.
7. EH Soviet ties with African countries are strong and Soviet influence is high with most African countries.

Notes. Soviet ties with African countries increased from extremely low levels in the 1950's to low to moderate levels in the 1960's and moderate to high levels in the 1976's.

Note that for African countries the perceptions of liberation movements are sometimes more important to the Soviet Union than those of governments.

11.5 Goal: Contain Chinese Influence Among African Countries

Outcome. Did China's influence or prestige among African governments and liberation groups increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Number of African countries voting in favor of China in the United Nations.
2. Number of African countries with diplomatic relations with China.
3. Number of African countries receiving material assistance from China.
4. Number of African liberation groups recognized by OAU receiving assistance from China.
5. China's African trade/Soviet African trade.
6. China's military presence/Soviet military presence in Africa.
7. China's assistance/Soviet assistance to Africa.

Technical Notes. The coder should code this variable from Soviet perspective which gives more weight to influence among progressive and democratic groups than among reactionary and white racist groups.

Note that the preceding Soviet goal was concerned with Soviet prestige vis-a-vis the capitalist countries whereas the above goal is concerned with Soviet influence vis-a-vis China.

Outcome Assessment Question. China's Prestige and Influence in Africa:

1. EH China's influence far exceeds Soviet influence.
2. VH China's influence is equal to Soviet influence.
3. H China's influence is high among many countries and groups but is exceeded by Soviet influences.
4. M China's influence is high only among a few major countries.
5. L China's influence is high only among a few small countries.

6. VL China's influence is high only among a few small liberation groups not recognized by OAU.

7. EL China's influence is insignificant.

Notes. China's influence among African countries rose to its peak during the 1960's people's war strategy period. But even then China's influence was low to moderate. Since Mao's death, China's influence has been declining among "progressive" African groups and increasing among "reactionary" groups. From the Soviet perspective, the latter trend does not offset the former by any significant degree. Therefore, China's net influence in Africa has declined to low or very low.

12. Soviet Goals Toward Latin America

12.1 Goal: Defend/Support Cuba Against External Threats

Outcome. How capable is Cuba of defending itself against likely external threats without Soviet military intervention?

Measures.

1. Military spending/GNP of Cuba.
2. Military spending of Cuba at constant prices.
3. Size of armed forces of Cuba. .
4. Size of air forces of Cuba.
5. Cuban armed forces' capability relative to its major adversaries (excluding the United States).
6. Cuba's economic capacity for withstanding the U.S. trade boycott.
7. Cuba's ability to deal with its internal enemies and exile groups hostile to Cuba.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union's defense policy with respect to Cuba is not solely military. Soviet diplomatic policy is also involved. This seems to include a policy of encouraging diplomatic rapprochement between Cuba and all its neighbors. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union is interested in keeping Cuba isolated in order to maintain its dependence on the Soviet Union.

Outcome Assessment Question. Cuba's Military Capability:

1. EL Cuban forces are incapable of dealing with internal enemies or exile forces infiltrating Cuba.
2. VL Cuban military requires massive Soviet intervention to defend the island.
3. L Cuban military requires major Soviet intervention to defend island.
4. M Cuban military can defend island with modest Soviet intervention.
5. H Cuban military can defend island with no Soviet intervention against all threats except a major U.S. invasion.

6. VH Cuban military is capable of defending homeland and can project power overseas (Africa) with modest Soviet logistical support.
7. EH Cuban military is capable of defending homeland and can project power overseas (Africa) with no direct Soviet aid.

Notes. The defense capability of Cuba does not consist of military variables alone. However, the coder should emphasize military variables as the primary determinants.

12.2 Goal: Avoid Direct Military Confrontation With United States (and OAS) in Latin America

Outcome. Did any actions of the Soviet Union, Cuba, or local CP's provoke the United States (or OAS) into direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union or Cuba?

Measures.

1. Soviet military presence in Cuba.
2. Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean.
3. Soviet military intervention in Latin America.
4. Cuban export of revolution to other countries.
5. Cuban overt military intervention in Latin America.
6. Coup d'etat by local CP's leading to avowedly Marxist-Leninist governments in Latin America.
7. Soviet permanent deployment of nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere.

Technical Notes. The coder should evaluate the probability of Soviet confrontation with U.S./OAS by the degree of hostility existing between the two sides.

The Soviet side includes Cuba and local CP's in Latin America. The U.S./OAS side includes all members of the OAS and other anti-Soviet groups in Latin America.

The Soviet Union would never publicly admit that any confrontation with the United States and OAS could be caused by Soviet actions.

Outcome Assessment Question. Probability of U.S./OAS Confrontation With the Soviet Union and Cuba (As Indicated by the U.S./OAS Hostility Toward the Soviet Union, Local CP's, and Cuba in Latin America:

1. EH High degree of hostility and tension by all countries toward Cuba, local CP's and the Soviet Union.
2. VH High degree of hostility by all countries but mainly against Cuba and local CP's.
3. H High degree of hostility toward local CP's but not against Cuba or the Soviet Union.

4. M High degree of hostility by many countries and low hostility by the U.S. toward local CP's.
5. L Hostility by a few major Latin American countries but not the U.S. against the local CP's.
6. VL No significant hostility by any major Latin country or U.S.
7. EL No significant hostility by any country.

Notes. Probability of U.S./OAS confrontation with Soviet Union/Cuba was high to extremely high during the 1950's and 1960's. Since the late 1960's the probability of confrontation has declined to moderate to low.

12.3 Goal: Encourage the Independence of Latin American Countries From the United States

Outcome. Did the level of general independence of Latin American countries from the United States increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. U.S. trade with Latin America/total trade of Latin America.
2. U.S. trade with Latin America/Soviet trade with Latin America.
3. U.S. investment in Latin America/GNP of Latin America.
4. Hostility of Latin America toward the United States.
5. Cohesion of the Organization of the American States.
6. Level of Soviet ties with Latin America.
7. Soviet military contacts with Latin America.

Technical Notes. The coder should take into account the fact that Soviet trade suffers from a higher transport cost than U.S. trade. However, in the past, the major disadvantage of Soviet exports has been their inferior quality compared to U.S., European, and Japanese exports.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Independence of Latin American From the United States:

1. EL U.S. dominates most countries' economies and has closely coordinated diplomatic/military policies with most.
2. VL U.S. ties include strong economic, diplomatic, and military ties with most countries.
3. L U.S. ties consist of normal ties and strong military cooperation with most countries.
4. M U.S. ties consist of normal ties and military assistance ties to most countries with OAS capable of military action.
5. H U.S. ties consist of normal ties and low level military ties with OAS in disarray.

6. VH U.S. ties consist of normal commercial and diplomatic ties only.
7. EH U.S. ties consist of below normal commercial and diplomatic ties only.

Notes. During the first 2 decades after the Second World War, the level of independence of Latin American countries was moderate to extremely low. Since the late 1960's, their independence has increased to moderate to high.

Use GNP's of trading partners as weights to determine "normal" levels of their trade.

12.4 Goal: Increase Solidarity Among Progressive and Democratic Forces in Latin America

Outcome: Did Soviet support for progressive and democratic forces in the region increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet financial and moral support of local CP's.
2. Soviet material assistance to antifascist forces.
3. Soviet opposition to persecution of progressive forces.
4. Soviet diplomatic support of local CP's.
5. Soviet direct assistance to progressive regimes.
6. Soviet military support for Marxist regimes.
7. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with the United States in support of local progressive forces.

Technical Notes. Soviet support for Latin American CP's and other progressive movements has been constrained by limited Soviet ability to project its power to Latin America, which is several thousand miles away from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has been hesitant to risk provoking the United States by adopting a high profile in the region.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support of Solidarity With Progressive Forces in Latin America:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral and diplomatic support.
3. L Covert economic aid and moral support in most cases.
4. M Unlimited material assistance in a small number of cases.
5. H Unlimited material assistance in some situations and more limited aid in other cases.
6. VH Limited direct military support.
7. EH Unlimited direct military support.

Notes. Soviet support to Latin American progressive and democratic movements since 1966 has been very low to moderate. Although Soviet support for Cuba has been more or less high (that is, included unlimited material assistance), this has been an exceptional case.

12.5 Goal: Increase Soviet Prestige/Influence in Latin America

Outcome. Did Soviet prestige/influence in Latin America increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Voting record of Latin American countries on the issues strongly supported by the Soviet Union.
2. Volume of Soviet trade with Latin America/total trade of Latin America.
3. Number of countries in Latin America with diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
4. Number of Latin Americans visiting USSR.
5. Receptivity of Latin American countries to Soviet naval presence in the nearby Atlantic and Pacific waters.
6. Number of countries receiving Soviet military and economic aid.

Technical Notes. The relevant variable is Soviet perception of its prestige/influence among Latin American countries. Nevertheless, the coder should focus on evaluation of Latin Americans' view of Soviet prestige/influence since coding perceptions of perceptions is far too complex to be reliable.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Prestige/Influence in Latin America:

1. EL The Soviet Union has no significant ties with any major Latin American country.
2. VL The Soviet Union has largely minor commercial ties with major Latin American countries.
3. L The Soviet Union has close diplomatic ties with a few Latin American countries.
4. M The Soviet Union has close diplomatic and military ties with a few Latin American countries.
5. H The Soviet Union has close diplomatic ties with many Latin American countries and military ties with a few.
6. VH The Soviet Union has close diplomatic and military ties with many Latin American countries.

7. EH The Soviet Union has close, friendly ties and high influence among most Latin American countries.

Notes. Although the above codes emphasize bilateral ties instead of influence and prestige, the coder should try to infer the level of Soviet influence from such ties and any other relevant information.

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20. project, with emphasis on future analyses and the development of an Executive Aid to allow decision-makers to have ready access to the data developed in this research. Chapter 6 briefly introduces and outlines the U.S. and Soviet codebooks presented in the appendices. Appendices A and B provide a codebook for the assessment of U.S. and Soviet crisis outcomes.

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